Figure 1.--British boys had shrapel and bits of pieces of German aircraft to play with during the War. French boys after the D-Day invasion had whole tanks to play with, both American and German. This boy apparently had an American M4 Sherman (the lower front of the hull is a sure clue) in his front yard if not livingroon. The Americans threw thousands of Shermans into the fight for France. Hundreds were destroyed by the Germans because of reatively thin armour and an under-powered main armament. The Sherman was comparable to the German Mark III when introducd in North Africa (1942). The German tanks confronted in 1944 after D-Day, however, were vastly improved types and the Shermans which were basically the same were outclassed. The M4 Sherman was a medium tank and the main American battle tank (1942-45). It proved to be reliable and mobile, but badly outclassed by German medium and heavy tanks. Still it helped liberate France, although at a considerable cost. The German tanks by this phase of the War were being used essentually as mobile pill boxes. Once the Americans broke out from Normandy at St Lo (July 25-31), the American armored divisions with their fast, mobile Shermans fanned out behind German lines in great numbers. The Germans with small numbers of slower tanks and without air cover, had no way of stopping them. Even Hitler had to order a full retreat from France. American factories easily replaced the Shermans destroyed by the Germans. Less easily replaced were the 5-man crews which paid a heavy price for America's refusal to adequately fund its Army and weapons reaserach during the inter-War era.

The Americans were far behind the Germans and other Europeans in tank technology. The United States had, however, the industrial capacity to mass produce tanks in huge quantities, not only for its army, but for allies as well. This far exceeded the capacity of the Germans. Developing effective tanks was a different matter. The M-3 Grant was rushed into production before the United States had mastered turrant technology. Even so it helped the British at a crucial point in the Western Desert. The Germans had far better tanks, but the Afrika Korps was a low priority and was on the end of a very long and vulnerable supply line. The war was being settled on the Eastern Front which had the priority in allocation of resources. And the British were able to inderdict substantial part of what was sent to the Afrika Koros. The backbone of American armored forces during the War was the M-4 Sherman. It is unclear to what extent American tank designers managed or even tried to get Soviet or German technology. Even French technology available before 1940 would have been helpful. And of course the British were building tanks with modern features. Even a photograph of Soviet or German tanks should have given American tank designers clues. The high profile of the Sherman was one of its worst features. Designers were also working on the larger and heavier M-26 Pershing. Appararently the simplicity of the M-4 and the ability to begin production sooner won out. The Americans had high hopes for the M-4 Sherman, but it proved to be very vulnerable because of relatively thin armor and had an underpowered 75/76-mm gun with which to hit back. It is unclear why the United States did not build a more effective tank and was so slow to introduce an improved version. The Sherman had its assessts. It was highly mobile and fast. And it was was produced in great quantity. The Americans had to develop armored tactics to play upon the Sherman's string points. The U.S. Army at the start of the War planned to use the tank as infantry support and not for pitched armored battles with German tankers. American tankers proved to be quick learners, although many lost their lives in the process. The learning curve in the field, especially after Kaserine, was steep. The Americans were able to develop tactics to deal with the superior German tanks, primarily based on mobility and numbers. the Shermans also had the advantage of closed air support and excellent artillery support. Only after realizing that it would take three or four Shermans destroyed to get one Panther did the United States rush development of the M-26 Pershing with a high-velocity 90-mm gun, but they did not arrive until after the Bulge. It was thus not until the final months of the War that American tankers had a tank that could slug it out with the German Panthers.

World War I

America at the time of World War I was the largest industrial power in the world. Thus America would determine the outcome of the War. Germany was the largest industrial power in Europe, but Britain and France conbined had a larger industrial base and access to the raw materials needed bcause of the Royal Navy's control of the sea. Even so, the Kaiser and the German General Staff calculated that because of their powerful army that they could win the War before the Allies' superior economic power began to turn the tide (1914). They almost did, but were stopped by he French Army on the Marne. The conflict tuned into a war of attrition that Germany was not likely to win. Again the Kaiser and General Staff made the incredably serious miscalculatiom of bring America into the War by resuming unrestricted submarine warfare. The Germans were having trouble dealing with the superior British and French industrial output. With America in the War, the Germans would have been saped by Americam industrial output of weaponry. The German calculztion was that the U-boats would prevent America from transporting men and arms to France. And they clculted with Russia faltering, they could redepply in mass to the Western Front and crack the Western Front wide open. It all proved a huge mistake. The U-boats did not sink a single American troop ship brining men to France. It would the American infantry, however, that would turn the tide on the Western Front. America not only did not have a substantial Army when it entered the War, it did not have aignificant arms industry. And it would take longer to gear up industry than to train the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) than to convert industry for war production. The only major industrial American contribution to the war was trucks. This was because the trucks were a civilian product already in production. Gearing up for the mass productiom of military weaponry was a different matter. As a result, he AEF fought the war mostly with British and French weapons. This included infantry weapons, aircraft, and tanks. American built weapons, however, did not reach the AEF in quantity before the Allies cracked the western Front open and the Germans asked for an armistice (November 1918). This was not what the Allies anticipated. America, Britain and France were gearing up for a 1919 campaign and American industrial might would become a factor. And one of the items coming out of Ameican factories was tanks, a weapon fvor which the Germans had no answer. The AEF was using a small number of French Renault FT tanks. Major Geothge Patton was put in charge of the tank unit. The United States began to build a virtual replica of the Renault FT. It was designated the M1917 and would be America's first mass-produced tank. It had 0.25" - 0.6" armor. The main armament was a 37mm M1916 gun or Marlin M1917 machine gun, the latter was replaced by the M1919 Browning machine gun. The M1917 went into mass production in America should before the Germans asked for an armistice. [Zaloga, p. 2.] It was a license-built virtual copy of the FT. It was to provide a massive tank force for the AEF. The U.S. Arny ordered 4,440. This one order exceeded the number of tanks wither the British or French built. And if the War continued would have been the first of multiple orders. In contrast, Germany did not have the indistrial capacity to build more than a handgul of tanks. As the Germans decided to end the War, ge United States only actually built 950 tanks before the order was cancelled. None were shipped to France.

Inter-War Era (1919-39)

The United States entered World War I without a sizeable army or a substantial weapns development program. The Europppeans during the late-19th abd early-20th century were involved in a massive and very expensive armsrace. The United States did not participat in this arms race. There was some naval spending, but expenditures on the Army were very limited. Thus the U.S. Army did not have modernweaponry or for that matter any weaponry in quantity. Nor did the United States despite being the world's leading industrial nation, have a substatial arms industry on the European level. As a result of the War, major advances were made in eaponry, including the tank and aircraft. The United States made no effort to expand the Army or modernize eaponry so whn i entered the War (April 197), it neither had a large standing army or the weapons which with to equip it. American Doughboys would have to fight the War with British and French weapons. The United States was no more prepared to demobilize than it had been to mobilize and enter the War. One might have thought that having to fight a war with foreign weapons might have impacted national defense thinking. It did not. Congress cut military spending to the bone, espcially Army apropriations. And this included weapons development. As a result tank development languished. There were individuals especilly interested in tank devlopment (including Eisenhwer, Patton, and MacArthur), but the general consensus was that the tank should be an infantry support weapon. This flawed concept and severe budget restrictions meant that when war broke out in Europe (1939), the U.S. Army did not have a modern tank.

War in Europe (1939-41)

The Americans were far behind the Germans and other Europeans in both tank technology and tactical doctrine. The main gun of the M-3 Grant was not even placed in a turrat. And tank tactics were not well thought out. The U.S. Army had a doctrine of mobility, but very little chance to wirk out tactics before it was propelled into the War. The U.S. Army was very small until President Roosevelt convinced Congress to pass a peace time draft. The German Army had been staging war cames for years. American commanders had only one opporttunity to maneuver with large numbers of men--the northern Louisiaa maneuvers (August-September 1941), 3 months later, America was at war.

Industrial Capacity

The United States had, however, the industrial capacity to mass produce tanks in huge quantities, not only for its army, but for allies as well. This far exceeded the capacity of the Germans. The actual production numbers are stunning. Hitler has some idea of America's industrial might but like the Japanese militarists did not begin to fully appreciate the masive potential of American industry or the ability of that industry to rapidly retool for war. Here it was America's automobile industry and the steel industry that it helped to expand were the primary industry segments involved. The United States was the only country in which ordinary people could aford cars. This is why the American automobile industry grew out of ll proprtion to European autombile industries, including the Germans. In fact at the time of the war, American utmobilecompanies wre a major part of the Europen autmobile industry. As aresult the Germans launched Barbarossa without a fully mechnized force. And only 3,600 tanks nearly suceeded in destroying the Red Army. The United States alone during World War II produced an astonishing 88,000 tanks and that does not include British and Soviet production. It was a level of production that German indistry could not begin to match. In addition, the United States produced nearly 19,000 other tracked vehicles. including armored engineering vehicles, self-propelled artillery, armored recovery vehicles, and tank destroyers. And this does not include wheeled armored cars, armored half-tracks, and amphibian tractors. [Green] American industry not only stunned the Axis, but American and Allied military commanders as well. The americans in World Wwar I made little commitment to the Allied victory in terms of arms production--exceot trucks. In World war II. the United States was making an important contribution even befor it entered the War.

Tank Types

Developing effective tanks even with America's industrial capacity prioved to be a challenge, primarily because so little work was done before the War. The U.S. fought most of the War with two tank types (the M-3 Grant and the M-4 Sherman) inferior to the German tanks they faced except in North Africa (1941-42). Only in the final months of the War did the M-26 Pershing appear, a tank that could slug it out with the German Mark-V Panther. The M-2 Stuart was relegated to training purposes by the time America entered the War, although some 50 were used on Guadalcanal. The M-3 Grant was rushed into production before the United States had mastered turrant technology. Even so it helped the British at a crucial point in the Western Desert. The Germans had far better tanks, but the Afrika Korps was a low priority and was on the end of a very long and vuklnerable supply line. The war was being settled on the Eastern Front which had the priority in allocation of resources. And the British were able to inderdict substantial part of what was sent to thecAfrika Koros. The backbone of American armored forces during the War was the M-4 Sherman. It is unclear to what extent American tank designers managed or even tried to get Soviet or German technology. Even French technology available before 1940 would have been helpful. And of course the British were building tanks with modern features. Even a photograph of Soviet or German tanks should have given American tank designers clues. The high profile of the Sherman was one of its worst features. Designers were also working on the larger and heavier M-26 Pershing. Appararently the simplicity of the M-4 and the ability to begin production sooner won out. The Americans had high hopes for the M-4 Sherman, but it proved to be very vulnerable because of relatively thin armor and had an underpowered 75/76-mm gun with which to hit back. It is unclear why the United States did not build a more effective tank and was so slow to introduce an improved version. The Sherman had its assessts. It was highly mobile and fast. And it was was produced in great quantity. Pitted against the formidable German armor, the Americans had to develop armored tactics to play upon the Sherman's strong points. The U.S. Army at the start of the War planned to use the tank as infantry support and not for pitched armored battles with German tankers. Americans tankers proved to be quick learners, although many lost their lives in the process. The learning curve in the field, especially after Kaserine, was steep. And one great advantage the Americans had was the increasing Allied superority in the air. The Americans were able to develop tactics to deal with the superior German tanks, primarily based on mobility and numbers. the Shermans also had the advantage of closed air support and excellent artillery support. Only after realizing that it would take three or four Shermans destroyed to get one Panther did the United States rush development of the M-26 Pershing with a high-velocity 90-mm gun, but they did not arrive until after the Bulge. It was thus not until the final months of the War that American tankers had a tank that could slug it out with the German Panthers.

Other Armor

Hellcat tank destroyers and a wide range of other armored vehicles played important roles in the American rmored offensive in Europe. Important components were the M2 halftrack car and tge M36 90mm motor gun. There were many adaptations and variants.

Sources

Green, Michael. American Tanks and AFV of World War II (2014), 384p.

Hoffman, George F. "The Demise of the U.S. Tank Corps and Medium Tank Development Program," Military Affairs (February 1973), Vol. 37, No. 1., Feb., 1973, pp. 20-25.

Steadman, Kenneth A. "The Evolution of the Tank in the U.S. Army, (Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College: April 21, 1982).

Zaloga, S.J. US Marine Corps Tanks of World War II (New Vanguard, 2012).

Created: 6:16 AM 2/5/2011
Last updated: 4:46 AM 6/2/2015