Figure 1.-- These World War I heavy tanks are being tested at Fort Meade during 1922. By this time Patton had lost had left the unit in dispair and Eisenhower was about to leave. The Army decided that the best use of tanks was to support the infantry. The Germans were to reach the opposite approach and formulated massed armored spearheads aspart of Blitzkrieg. Limited funding and internal rivalries between the Infantry and Cavalry mant that when Hitler and Stalin launched World War II (1939), the U.S. Army did not yet have a main battle tank.

The United States entered World War I without a sizeable army or a substantial weapns development program. The Europppeans during the late-19th abd early-20th century were involved in a massive and very expensive armsrace. The United States did not participat in this arms race. There was some naval spending, but expenditures on the Army were very limited. Thus the U.S. Army did not have modernweaponry or for that matter any weaponry in quantity. Nor did the United States despite being the world's leading industrial nation, have a substatial arms industry on the European level. As a result of the War, major advances were made in eaponry, including the tank and aircraft. The United States made no effort to expand the Army or modernize eaponry so whn i entered the War (April 197), it neither had a large standing army or the weapons which with to equip it. American Doughboys would have to fight the War with British and French weapons. The United States was no more prepared to demobilize than it had been to mobilize and enter the War. One might have thought that having to fight a war with foreign weapons might have impacted national defense thinking. It did not. Congress cut military spending to the bone, espcially Army apropriations. And this included weapons development. As a result tank development languished. There were individuals especilly interested in tank devlopment (including Eisenhwer, Patton, and MacArthur), but the general consensus was that the tank should be an infantry support weapon. This flawed concept and severe budget restrictions meant that when war broke out in Europe (1939), the U.S. Army did not have a modern tank.

World War II Armisice

When the Germans asked for an Armistice (November 1918), the War ended before the Allies could launch a massive invasion of Germany that was being planned. Huge quantities of weapons and equipment were being amassed, including large numbers of tanks. An American tank corps commanded by Patton would have played an imprtant role. Some were being built in America based upon British and French designs. When the War ended the tanks in Europe were split between the Allies. This all meant that the United States had a tank force of foreign designed tanks.

National Defense Act (1920)

After returning to America, Gen. Pershing recommended to a joint session of the Senate and House Committee on Military Affairs that the tank be subordinated to the infantry. [Hoffman]. Pershing had immense prestige at the time having led the AEF to victory in France and and Congress accpted his recommendations. This included his recommendations about tanks. The result was the National Defense Act of 1920.

Demobilization

With the end of World War Im the priority was brining the boys home. This began even before the Germans signed the peace treaty (July 1919). The AEF that fought World War I in France was composed of the amall Regular Army, National Guard Previously called militia), and units formed with volunteers and conscripts. What few Europeans understood when the United States declared war (April 1917), the United States did not have a substantial standing army to send to France. By far the largest number of men were conscripts wth no military training. (Many European soldiers were men who had basic military training and were part of a ready reserve when called up.) World War I was the first war that America from the beginning fought with trascripts after the Selective Service Act was passed (May 1917). Unlike previous wars whem men served during a set time when they enlisted (or in the case of the Civil Warwere also drafted), Wotrld War I Doughboys served for the furation which was expected to be several years. When the Germans asked for an Armistice (November 1918). The United States was no more prepared to demobilize than it had been to mobilize and enter the War. The Army General Staff was fixiated on invading Germany. Demobilization was the furthest thing from their thoughts. When the United States declared war, the American armed forces numbered less than 300,000 men. Only 19 months later, over 2 million men were serving in France and more were training in america awaiting overseas deployment. The success of the Hunfdred Days Campign caused some thought to be given to demobilization, but very little was actually done. It was the Army that had the greatest problem because it was he largest branch and composed mostly of draftees. `Demobilization of course involved more than brining the boys home. World War I was a total war with beligerant mobilizing their economies for war. American bgan to do this but did no do so nearly to the extent of the Allies and Cbtral Powers which had been fighting the War since 1914. Because of the time it takes to design and retool industry for weapons, the AEF had to fight the War with Brutush and French weapons. This included small arms (except rifles and pistols), artillery, tanks, and planes. The primary American industrial contribution to the war effort were trucks and the Liberty engine, both of which and civilian uses. This meant that demobilization has less an inpact on indusrey as was the case in Europe. The sector most adversly affcted as Agriculture. Amerivan farmers encouraged by the Government significantly expanded production to support Allies and to feed starving countries beginning with Belgium. America essentially saved Europe from starving, including its former enemies. As Europe began to reciver in the eaely-1920s, thee was no longer a market for all the food America was producing and America's rural population entered a depression nearly a decade before the rest of the country.

Normalcy

President Harding talked about a return to normalcy. Paer of normalcy was a return to a situation in which America had a miniscule Army and no conscription. Conscription in Europe was something that had driven mny mles immigrants to America in th late-19th an erly-20th century. Military budgets wer cut to the bobe, especially the army budget. This had been the sutuation since the Civil War, but even earlier military budgets were vet limited. Appropriations for the Navy were slightly larger because the Atlantic Ocean was seen as America's primary defense. America was by far the richest country on earth, yet appropriations for the Army were on the scale of a small European country. This meant that not only the authorized strenth of the army was limited, but only minor sums were uthorized for weapons developmnt. And this was the case even hough when the AEF in World Wr I had to use Allied weapons. America made virtully no effort to pre[are for another War. Rather the dominany attirude was to stat out of any future war. To\rtotsky once said, "You may not like war, but war will ind you." This is not how many americans thought. Few Americans believed tgat the defeat of Germany in World War had improved American security. And most Americans even as aggressor natiins (Germany and the Soviet Union) launched Wkrld War II (September 1939),that America couls simply ignore the War and aggression. President Roosevelt would have to fight a life and death struggle with the Isolationists.

The Infantry and Tactics (early-1920s)

The 1920 National Defense Act disbanded the American World War I tank corps that had fought in France. It also explicity reassigned its tanks to the infantry branch. Only two heavy and four light battalions escaped post-SWar demobilization. [Steadman] The M1917 tanks were developed too late to see World War I combat. After the War, five werec deployed with the U.S. Marine Expeditionary Force commanded by Gen. Smedley Butler to Tientsin, China (April 1927). They returned to the United States (late-1928). [Zaloga, p. 5.] After the Tank Corps was abolished as a separate branch, control of tanks was turned over to the infntry. The number of tank units was progressively reduced, and the vehicles mothballed or scrapped as thy began to wear out and needed spare parts. Mo effort was made to devlop improved models. The World War I heavy tank was the Tank Mark VIII (Liberty). Liberty referred to the American built ngine. It was an Anglo-American tank, basically designd by the British, but using the American Liberty engine. The Allies were still testing the Mark VIII when the War ended. There were 100 in the United States (1919-20). They were assigned to a single unit: the 67th Infantry (Tank) Regiment, based in Aberdeen, Maryland. Some Liberty tanks were assigned to the 301st Tank Battalion (Heavy), later redesignated the 17th Tank Battalion (Heavy). Major Dwight D. Eisenhower commanded this unit (1921-22). The two key individuals involved with tanks were Patton and Eisenhower, futhure Woeld War II legends. Patton had been assined by Pershingvto work with the AEF tanks in France. World War I tanks were slow, clunky, and as well as being mechanically unreliable. Despite all of the problems, the tank had proven its value in combat. The light, medium, and heavy categories were based on weight which changed ovr time. They were stationed at Camp Meade under Brig. Samuel D. Rockenbach, former Chief of the Tank Corps and Commandant of the Tank School. Patton and Eisenhower became close friends staying up late discussung theory and doctrine for the use of tanks in mass formations to achieve breakthroughs and carry out exploitation. The dominant tactical vission in the Army supported by Pershing was to use armor in support of infantry and not as a separate arm conducting independent operations. The number of tanks availble by itself ties the tank to the infantry. And Congress showed little interest in appropriating needed funds for a major development effort. Patton, concluded that there was no future with tanks and transferred to the calvalry (September 1920). Eisenhower stuck it out longer, but was assigned to the staff of an infantry brigade in Panama (Januaary 1922).

Devlopment Programs (1920s)

The Army finally began developing albeit the budget limitations. The first all Anerican tank developed was the M1924. As it approached the mock-up phase, however, it was cancelled unable to meet the War Department's specifications which were unrealistic for a light tank. The General Staff finally conceed that a medium tank would be needed, but did not give up on a light tank (1926). This fixation on light tanks ensured that the United States would not have a medium tank when World War II broke out in Europe. Confressional appropriations were very limited, wasting resources on light tanks meant that little was going to achieved on either project.

Davis Era ( -1930)

The U.S. Army finally began to take the development of an armored serious (1928). Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis observed the British Experimental Armored Force maneuvers in Bitain. He was so impressed that he ordered a tank force be developed. It would tke 12 years before it would be officially authorized. As a beginning step, Secretary Davis' and encampment and maneuvers of an experimental mechanized force was held at Camp Meade, Maryland (July-September 1928). The mnuvers included combined arms team consisted of elements furnished by Infantry (including tanks), Cavalry, Field Artillery, the Air Corps, Engineer Corps, Ordnance Department, Chemical Warfare Service, and Medical Corps. Davis hoped to repeat the effort in 1929, but budget limitatuins did not permit it. Obsolete equipment was another problem. Even so, it had an impact. The War Department Mechanization Board which had been appointed to study results of the 1928 experiment, concluded that a permanent mechanized force be established. Although plagued with inadequate funding, the U.S. Army Ordnance Department develop several experimental light and medium tanks prototypes.

J. Walter Christie

The U.S. Army began working with J. Walter Christie, a talented innovative designer of tanks, engines and propulsion systems, They tested a Christie design model (1929). The Christie were not accpted. They exceeded specifications in everal instances significantly, but the costs were beyond that bedgets permitted Patton who never lost his fascination with tanks would worked with Christie to improve the silhouette, suspension, power, and weapons of tanks. While not accpted by the War Department, Christie's techologies were uncorporated into the tanks being developd in Germany. The Unitd States would also evetually use Christie technology.

Mac Arthur Era (1930-35

A third World War II legend would get involved with tank development. Gen. Douglas MacArthur was appointed Army Chief of Staff (1930). MacArthur srved for 5 years and saw the need mechanize the Army. He directed all arms and services adopt mechanization and motorization (1931). The different units were allowed to conduct research and to experiment as necessary. The Cavalry was ordered to develop combat vehicles that would improve its role of reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, flank action, pursuit. Thanks in part to McArthur's work, the United States along with Britain were the only two coutries to enter World War II with a fully mechanized army. Disgracefully, MacArthur actually used tamks against the Bonus Marchers. The tank by Congressional action was a weapn assigned to the infantry. MacArthur more forcefully moved toward mechanization (1933). He sonded the death knell of the cavalry, something that had been obvious since World War I, although the horse was still being used as draft aminals in major country militaries (Japan, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union). MacArthur declared, "The horse has no higher degree of mobility today than he had a thousand years ago. The time has therefore arrived when the Cavalry arm must either replace or assist the horse as a means of transportation, or else pass into the limbo of discarded military formations." The U.S. Army's cavalry branch made the the vitl decided to modernize. They needed the a fully armored vehicle, capable of keeping up with the cavalry and of fulfilling regular combat duties. To get round the prohibitions of the National Defense Act of 1920, the cavalry developed a number of what they called 'combat cars', basically lighty armored and armed tanks, but that was not very different than the tanks of the era, includung the tanks the U.S. Army infantry was using.

Combat Cars

The Calvaley began experimentung with wht they called 'combat cars (November 1936). In fact they were not too different from the tanks that the infantry was developing. This jeant a great deal of wasted effort for an Army that had severe budget limitations. This was all brought about because the National Defense Act of 1920 specifically assigned tank devloment to the Infantry. The tank was to be an infantry support wepon, nit a separate corps. It could have lead to a military disaster if the United States had gone to war with Germny with that flawed tactical doctrine. The Calvary came up with the T7 Combat Car. It was designed and built at the Rock Island Arsenal between (1937-38). It was based on the M1 Combat Car but with an extended chassis and a convertible suspension, maning it could run on both wheels or tracks. The only prototype T7 Combat Car (No. W40223) was shipped to th Aberdeen Proving Grounds to be tested (August 1938). While it tested reasonably (speed and performance), but Cavalry evaluters were not impressed. Formal tests were delayed, but were fairly successful (1939). Th T7 was used in the First Army maneuvers at Plattsburg, New York (1939). The cavalrymen reported favorably on it. The Calvalry staff, however, formulated new requirements for their combat vehicles. They committed fully to tracked vehicles. Until this time, tracked vehichles did not have he same maueverability as wheeled vehicles, but by 1939 the technology had been worked out sufficentky to go to sreaight tracked vehicles which vaoild allthe complications involved with dual systens abd convertability. The Calvaleyalso decided that a heavy machine gun was insufficient for combat requirements. The German invasion of Poland and the role of the Panzers put an end to any debate on this issue. Tanks without cannons still existed, but they were titaly ineffective i orld ar II combat. The Mechanized Cavalry Board recommended further development and test of the T7 Combat Car program as well as all other such convertible vehicles be canceled. This ended the U.S. Army development of wheel-tracked combat vehicles.

Created: 3:35 AM 6/18/2013
Last updated: 2:20 PM 7/20/2017