* Imperial Japanese Army








Imperial Japanese Army (1868-1945)


Figure 1.--This stereo view card shows Imperial Japanese Army soldiers parading we believe somewhere in Japan because of the cheering crowds. It is not dated, but we believe it was part of a troop movement during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). Japan defeated the Russians, but primarily because Russian was a primarily European power which was unable to project power into the Pacific.

The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA--大日本帝國陸軍) was the ground-based armed force of the Empire of Japan (1868 - 1945). The IJN was founded with the Meiji Resti\oration and the defeat of the Shogunate. As such it was the dominant militart force in Japam as th Imperial Navy was much smaller. The Imperial Japanese Army General Staff Office and the Ministry of the Army oversaw the IJA. Both were subordinate to the Emperor as supreme commander. This was the case with the Emperor Meiji. But given the rise of militarism after World War I, it was not the case of Emperor Hirohito. Given the tendency of elements within the IJA to assainate political figures which opposed them, it is unclear to what extent Hirohito had even nominal control over his military. Even after the two atomic bombs were dropped on the Japan, IJN units attempted a coup when the Emperor announced his surrender decision. During World War II a third service was organized, overseen by the Inspectorate General of Aviation. In event of war, an Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) was created. During World War II it consisted of the chief and vice chief of the Army General Staff, the Minister of the Army, the chief and vice chief of the Naval General Staff, the Inspector General of Aviation, and the Inspector General of Military Training. Japanese commanders were infused with the spirit of Bushido--"the way of warriors". It is the collective term for the many codes of honour and ideals adopted by the samurais which dominated Japanese warfare for centuries. Central to Bushido was loyalty unto death meaning no surrender even when defeat loomed. Japan was the only industrialized country in Asia, which meant it could defeat China a much larger country, the First Sino -Japamese War (1894-95). And they defeated Tsarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). And Japanese victories in World War I gave IJN commanders confidence that they had the capability to defeat major military powers. While its victories were largely based on its industrial development, IJN commanders convinced thensleves that it was the Bushido spirit that could gain victories against even the world's major industrial powers. The Soviet Red Army victory in Manchuria (July 1939), just before World War I should have convinced them that this was not the case, but it did not. The Japanese military decided that the way to end the war they failed to win in China was to enter World War II, attacking America and Britain. The result was the disasterous Pacific War. No country instilled such fierce fighting spirit in their fighting men, but there was an extrodinary level of incompetence among Japannese officers who were prepared to make frontal cahrges against entrnched forces backed by artillery and machine guns. After the first 6 months of the War, the IJN did not win a single battle with the Americans, even in the rare occassions that they had superior forces such as Guadalcanal.

Foundatioin

The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA--大日本帝國陸軍) was the ground-based armed force of the Empire of Japan (1868 - 1945). The IJN was founded with the Meiji Resti\oration and the defeat of the Shogunate.

Senior Service

The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) was the dominant Japanese military service. It was much larger than the Imperial Navy and thus more inflential. The steady expansion of the military's poliitical role was largely pursued nby the Army, not exclusivlry, but largely. And with the seizure of Manchuria (1931) and even more so the invasion of China (1937) the IJA was significantly expanded. As a result few of the benefits of seizing Manchuria and large areas of China actually benefitted the Japanese people. The food supplies gained went mostly to feed the men deployed to China. This was a drag on the economy as enlarging the military mean that large numbers of men were not involved in productice activities (agriculture, industry, mining, etc.). Supporting these men and equipping them had to be paid by the men and women actually working. And most of this flowed to the Army. The invasion of China, primarily conducted by the Army, greatly expanded the resources devoted to the Army. There was an intense rivalry between the two services accentuated by the need to obtain the resources to prepare for war. This by itself is not unusual. There are service rivalries in most countries. In Japan the rivalries weee especially opronounced and had a major impact on the coinduct of the War. The Imperial Navy, for example, keopt the Midway disaster a secret, not only from the Japanese public, but from he army as well. This affected Army olanning at a critical point of the War. Army commanders had no idea how fundamentally the ballance of power had shifted in the Pacific.

Social Class

Social class and educational backgrounds were poweful fornmative factors in shaping the Japanese officers the Americans would meet in the Pacific War. Historians reoort that something like a third of the officer corps in the inter-War era has lower-middle-class backgrounds. [Storry, p.43.] This was not the case in the 19th and early-20th century. Until after World War I the officer corps was dominasted, almost the exclusive preserve of the Choshu and the Satsuma clans. After World War I we see large numbers of young men with backgrounds like small landowning and shopkeeping families. Thgese young men did not have family traditions of military service. They did not stand in the social hierarchy like the aristocrtic that had been so dominant. They were thus suspectable to radical political ideas promoting xhenephobic, nationalist ideas to create a new order and assuring them that they had anique role to bring this about. Notably it was the same social groups in Germany that were striong supporters of the NAZI Party. Until the advent iod the NAZis and Japanese militarists, this stata of society had limited prospects for sdvancements. Large numbers of these young men (perhaps 30 percent) did not attend regular schools, but rather military preparatory schools (rikugun yonen gakko). This meant boys from about 12 years of age were immersed in a rarified military mileau isolated from civilian life. [Fujiwara, p. 92.] These schools stressed above all the special duty of army officers, basically a mission and their unique place in society.

Organization

The Imperial Japanese Army General Staff Office and the Ministry of the Army oversaw the IJA. Both were subordinate to the Emperor as supreme commander.

Turning Point: Nationalist Outrage

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902) was a departure for both Britain and Japan. British policy in the late-19th century at the time was 'Splendiud Isolation' that had dominated British diplomacy after the Naspoleonic Wars, but is especially associated with the late-19th century, despite the growing German challenge. The primary purpose was the mutual concern toward the Russians. The Alliance beefitted both countries. The British relationship was a fctor in the subsequent Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). And the Japanese supported the Brutish in World War I (1914-18). There were discenters, both within and outside the Empire. Australians and others were not all that happy with the arrangements. Neither were the Americans. And concerns were growing in Japan, not so much with the British, but toward the Americans, but many Japanese did not destinguish between America and Britain which had the same language and looked alike. Problems began with the American immigration policy and than President Roosevelt's who mediated an end to the Russian War. Many Japanese nationalists believed that Roosevelt prevented them from obtaining the spoils they believed that they deserved. Than America and Britsin forced them to backdown from the Twenty-One Demands they desired to impose on China. The Japanese were offended by their treatment at the Versailles Peace Conferencer (1919). In particular they expected support from the British. The Americans further incened the Japanese by demanding they withdraw from Siberia after World War I (1922). Perhaps the greatest greviance of all, espcilly for nasval officers, was that that Japanese did not receive parity with the American and British fleets. Many officers considered the Treaties a humiliating insult to their national honor. Many natioinalists advocated an aggressive preparation for war, although this was their mindset even before the Washington Treaties. Others such as Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto insisted that war with America and Britian would be suicidal. Because of America's superior industrial and technical capability, Yamamoto argued that Japan could never win a naval arm's race. The Washington Trasty thus was advantageous to the Japanese. Yamamoto was for a time targeted for assasination. He was, however, appointed commander of the Imperial Navy. He was an inovative strategist and in particular prompted the naval air wing. After the Washington Treaty, Britain how to make a decision. They could continue their relationship with Japan or develop a new relationship with America that had begun when America entered World War I on the Allied side (1917). Britain's policy since Trafalgar was to maintain a naval force ar least equal to the two other largest navies. The cost of World War I and the rise of the United States meant that this was no longer possible. And the British estblishmenbt wuth some unease decided to accept the rise of American naval power. The Treaty was terminated by the British (1921-23). The Japanese were offened, another factor in the series of grevianses felt by the Japanese.

Junior Officers


Loyal Insubordination


Political Role

Civilian control was the case with the Emperor Meiji. But given the rise of militarism after World War I, it was not the case of Emperor Hirohito. Given the tendency of elements within the IJA to assainate political figures which opposed them, it is unclear to what extent Hirohito had even nominal control over his military. Even after the two atomic bombs were dropped on the Japan, IJN units attempted a coup when the Emperor announced his surrender decision.
The IJA through threts an assasination seized control of the Japanese Government. Many of the critical decisions that led to War were taken by the military, in several instances field units. The junior officers in many cases played major roles, either directly ir influencing senior officers. Here the Kwantung Army was especially important. The decesion to launch the Pacific War was a major exceotion, it was taken at the highest level, but only after the IJA has seized control of the Government.

Professionalism and Training

The IJA established the Office of Inspectorate General of Military Training (教育総監部 Kyoiku sokanbu--OIGMA) (1898). Its mission was to provide centralized oversight for the Imperial Japanese Army training efforts. This included the Imperial Japanese Army Academy, specialized weaponry and technical training schools, and the various military preparatory schools located around the country. The Japanese produced some of the most determined and committed soldiers of the War although often poorly armed and supplied. The Japanese Army commanders, however, were some of the least competent of all the major combatants. They often resorted to incredably costly frontal Banzai attacks in which their men were mowed down.

Militarization of Japanese Society

The strongest support for Pacific War came from the Imperial Army which was determined to complete its subjucation of China. It was the Army that led the militarization of Japanese society, assainating any political leader who questioned the military.

Air Service

During World War II a third service was organized, overseen by the Inspectorate General of Aviation.

Industrialization

Japan was the only industrialized country in Asia, which meant it could defeat China a much larger country, the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95). And they defeated Tsarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05).

Over Confidence

And Japanese victories in World War I gave IJN commanders confidence that they had the military capability to defeat major powers. While its victories were largely based on its industrial development, IJN commanders convinced thensleves that it was the Bushido spirit that could gain victories against even the world's major industrail powers. The Soviet Red Army victory in Manchuria (July 1939), just before World War I should have convinced them that this was not the case, but it did not.

Control of the Government

The Government under the Emperor Neiji (1867-1012) firmly controlled the military. This began to change undr the Emperor Taishō (1912-26) and more significantly under the young Emperor Shōwa/Hirihito (1926-89). Mostly Army officers became convinced that the civilian government was not standing up nfor the interests of the country and were incompetent if not corrupt. And they were the true, pure embodiment of the national spirit. The issue was often military budgets. At first, military offuicers began assainating civilian poloiticans qyestioining their budgets, Eventually the oprimeminister was assasiunated. Than the miklitary began acting on its own, such as the seizure of Manchuria (1931) and than the invasion of China proper (1937). Civilian politicians did not dare attempt to reign in the military. Eventually the military seized cintrol of the Government. War Minister Tojo became prime minister (1941), months later Jaoan launched the Pacific War.

War in China (1937-45)


The Pacific War (1941-45)

The IJA through threts an assasination seized control of the Japanese Government. Many of the criticl decisions that ked to War were taken by the military, in several instances field commanders. The decesion to launch the Pacific war was taken at the highest level, but only after the IJA has seized control of the Government. The IJA established the Office of Inspectorate General of Military Training (教育総監部 Kyoiku sokanbu--OIGMA) (1898). Its mission was to provide centralized oversight for the Imperial Japanese Army training efforts. This included the Imperial Japanese Army Academy, specialized weaponry and technical training schools, and the various military preparatory schools located around the country. The Japanese produced some of the most determined and committed soldiers of the War although often poorly armed and supplied. The Japanese Army commanders, however, were some of the least competent of all the major combatants. They often resorted to incredably costly frontal Banzai attacks in which their men were mowed down. The strongest support for Pacific War came from the Imperial Army which was determined to complete its subjucation of China. It was the Army that led the militarization of Japanese society, assainating any political leader who questioned the military. It was the Kwantung Army not the Government which decided to seize Manchuria (1931). And Army commanders turned a small incident at the Marco Polo Bridge into a full scale invasion of China (1937). At the time of the Pacific War, the Imperial Army had been fighting a war in China for 4 years. Curiously this was after failing to win the War in China which was being fought at enormous cost. Not only had the Army failed to complete its victory in China, but the Army was decisevely defeated by the Red Army in a sharp engagement on the Mongolian Border (July 1939). Fighting the poorly armed Chinese was one thing. Fighting a well armed, modern army was a different matter. One might have though that after fighting the Red Army that Japanese commanders would have realized that there equipment was deficent in fighting a well-armed foe. Incredibly, the Japanese militarists decided that they could go to war with the United States and Britain. The militarists apparently concluded that the Deutsche Wehrmacht after launching Barabrossa (June 1941) would smash the Red Army and the United States would have to concentrate its efforts in Europe. They also did not believe that the Americans had the warrior spirit neede to fight a war. The Wehrmacht not only failed to destroy the Red Army, but suffered devestating losses in a Red Army Winter Counter-offensive before Moscow (December 1941). The Imperial Army achieved some stunning successes early in the War, but as American industry began to restore the military balance, weaknesses in Army tactical doctrine and weaponry led to one failure after another in the Pacific despite the fanatical commitment of the individual soldier. As the Allies began to field well-trained and -equipped forces, the Japanese string of victories ended. And after Midway and the Solomons, the Imprial Navy cold offer very limited support. They were not only inavble to provide military support, but commonly supplie were not delivered. , even with supply. Even when the Japanese had a substantial superority in forces, they filed to retake Guadalcanal, in large part because of astonishly amateurish tactics, including suisidal Banzai attacks. Army doctrine soon degenerated into how to kill as many Americans as possible in hopeless defenses of one Pacific island after another. The IJA was responsible for some of the most terrible atrocities of World War II. The Rape of Nanking was the most infamous, but most of the terrible Japanese atrocities were conducted by the IJA. The brutal treatment of Allied POWs is well known. Less well know is that the IJA dod not take Chinese prisoners, they simply murdered them, often in the most barbaric ways.







CIH--WW II







Navigate the CIH World War II Section:
[Return to Main military force page]
[Return to Main military style page]
[About Us]
[Biographies][Campaigns][Children][Countries][Deciding factors][Diplomacy][Geo-political crisis][Economics][Home front][Intelligence]
[Resistance][Race][Refugees][Technology]
[Bibliographies][Contributions][FAQs][Images][Links][Registration][Tools]
[Return to the Main World War II page]



Created: 6:22 AM 6/13/2019
Last updated: 6:22 AM 6/13/2019