Figure 1.--This Japanese photograph did not have any writing on the back. We believe he is a young recruit being deployed abroad. Hopefully a CIH reader will tell us what the banner said. Photographs like this was standard for the recruits being posted abroad. They would leave a hair cutting and fingernail clippings as monentos for the family. The Japanse soldier proved to be some of the most determined and steadfast of all the World War II combatants. Their commnders, however, proved to be some of the leat competent. Japanese soldiers deployed to China had a good chance of surviving. Those deployed to Southeast Asia and the Pacific experienced far greater casualty rates because of the fire power of Allied forces and often amateurish tactical doctrine like suisidal Banzai attacks.
The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) was the dominant Japanese military service. It was much larger than the Imperial Navy. The IJA through threts an assasination seized control of the Japanese Government. Many of the criticl decisions that ked to War were taken by the military, in several instances field commanders. The decesion to launch the Pacific war was taken at the highest level, but only after the IJA has seized control of the Government. The IJA established the Office of Inspectorate General of Military Training (教育総監部 Kyoiku sokanbu--OIGMA) (1898). Its mission was to provide centralized oversight for the Imperial Japanese Army training efforts. This included the Imperial Japanese Army Academy, specialized weaponry and technical training schools, and the various military preparatory schools located around the country. The Japanese produced some of the most determined and committed soldiers of the War although often poorly armed and supplied. The Japanese Army commanders, however, were some of the least competent of all the major combatants. They often resorted to incredably costly frontal Banzai attacks in which their men were mowed down. The strongest support for Pacific War came from the Imperial Army which was determined to complete its subjucation of China. It was the Army that led the militarization of Japanese society, assainating any political leader who questioned the military. It was the Kwantung Army not the Government which decided to seize Manchuria (1931). And Army commanders turned a small incident at the Marco Polo Bridge into a full scale invasion of China (1937). At the time of the Pacific War, the Imperial Army had been fighting a war in China for 4 years. Curiously this was after failing to win the War in China which was being fought at enormous cost. Not only had the Army failed to complete its victory in China, but the Army was decisevely defeated by the Red Army in a sharp engagement on the Mongolian Border (July 1939). Fighting the poorly armed Chinese was one thing. Fighting a well armed, modern army was a different matter. One might have though that after fighting the Red Army that Japanese commanders would have realized that there equipment was deficent in fighting a well-armed foe. Incredibly, the Japanese militarists decided that they could go to war with the United States and Britain. The militarists apparently concluded that the Deutsche Wehrmacht after launching Barabrossa (June 1941) would smash the Red Army and the United States would have to concentrate its efforts in Europe. They also did not believe that the Americans had the warrior spirit neede to fight a war. The Wehrmacht not only failed to destroy the Red Army, but suffered devestating losses in a Red Army Winter Counter-offensive before Moscow (December 1941). The Imperial Army achieved some stunning successes early in the War, but as American industry began to restore the military balance, weaknesses in Army tactical doctrine and weaponry led to one failure after another in the Pacific despite the fanatical commitment of the individual soldier. As the Allies began to field well-trained and -equipped forces, the Japanese string of victories ended. And after Midway and the Solomons, the Imprial Navy cold offer very limited support. They were not only inavble to provide military support, but commonly supplie were not delivered. , even with supply. Even when the Japanese had a substantial superority in forces, they filed to retake Guadalcanal, in large part because of astonishly amateurish tactics, including suisidal Banzai attacks. Army doctrine soon degenerated into how to kill as many Americans as possible in hopeless defenses of one Pacific island after another. The IJA was responsible for some of the most terrible atrocities of World War II. The Rape of Nanking was the most infamous, but most of the terrible Japanese atrocities were conducted by the IJA. The brutal treatment of Allied POWs is well known. Less well know is that the IJA dod not take Chinese prisoners, they simply murdered them, often in the most barbaric ways.
Imperial General Headquarters
In event of war, an Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) was created. During World War II it consisted of the chief and vice chief of the Army General Staff, the Minister of the Army, the chief and vice chief of the Naval General Staff, the Inspector General of Aviation, and the Inspector General of Military Training.
Few World War II soldiers fought with such spirit and devotion, despite the fact that the Japanese soldier was equipped with largely inferior weaponry and supported with inadequate logistics. Japanese military commanders believed that fighting spirit imbued in their soldiers could overcome what ever material inadequcies existed. And this was not only when they were winning, but when they were losing and certain to die. Surrounded and starving Japanese grisons throughout the Pacific, refused to surrender. Imperial Army Headquaters were fully aware that their garisons were starving. They were told to become self sufficent, essentilly to starve. The Japanese packed such large numbers of soldiers on various islands that there was no way they could grow their own food, even if they became full time farmers. Still they did not surrender. Island campaigns commonly ended with suisidal Banzai charges rather than surrender. Soldiers including the walking wounded charged into American positions. This might work in China, but not aginst the Americans armed with modern automtic weapons, tanks, and artillery. And the spirit which imbuded the Japanese soldier also was felt by many civilians which the military incouraged to also resist the advancing Allied forces and ultimately if they failed to commit suiside. This included women and children. American Marines fotst encountered this on Saiplan (June 1944). The Japanese fighting spirit was based on the Way of the Samurai an the Bushido Code. It was the spirit behind the Kamikazee in the final year of the War. Very few Japanese soldiers questioned it. There were more Japanese surrendering in the final major battle of the War (Okinawa), but still only a small fraction of the island's garrison. Japanese commanders were infused with the spirit of Bushido--"the way of warriors". It is the collective term for the many codes of honour and ideals adopted by the samurais which dominated Japanese warfare for centuries. Central to Bushido was loyalty unto death meaning no surrender even when defeat loomed.
Desision for War
It was the Kwantung Army not the Government which decided to seize Manchuria (1931). And Army commanders turned a small incident at the Marco Polo Bridge into a full scale invasion of China (1937). At the time of the Pacific War, the Imperial Army had been fighting a war in China for 4 years. Curiously this was after failing to win the War in China which was being fought at enormous cost. Not only had the Army failed to complete its victory in China, but the Army was decisevely defeated by the Red Army in a sharp engagement on the Mongolian Border (July 1939). Fighting the poorly armed Chinese was one thing. Fighting a well armed, modern army was a different matter. One might have though that after fighting the Red Army that Japanese commanders would have realized that there equipment was deficent in fighting a well-armed foe.
The Pacific War Calculations
Incredibly, the Japanese militarists decided that they could go to war with the United States and Britain. Unable to bring the war in China to a concluio, they decided that defeating America and Britin was how to finally win the war in China. It would gain them the Southern Resource Zone with the oil and other raw materials that Japan needed. This was not as crazy as it may seem as the Deutsche Wehrmacht after launching Barabrossa (June 1941) seem to be smashing the Soviet Red Army. If this had occurred the United States would have had to concentrate its efforts in Europe. The Japabese also did not believe that the Americans had the warrior spirit neede to fight a war. The Japanese militarists knew that America had aarger industrial base than Japan, although how aware they were of the disparity is not clear. Tt was widely believes, however, that it was not weaponry ht was winning the war in China, but the inte superority and fighting spiriit of the KJapanese nation. The Japanese militarists that launched the Pacific War were convinced that ytheir superior fughting spiirit could defeat America and Britain. The decesion for war was made while the Wehrmacht's Brabrossa offensive looked to be winning in the Soviet Union. The Wehrmacht, however, not only failed to destroy the Red Army, but suffered devestating losses in a Red Army Winter Counter-offensive before Moscow which was lunched at about the same time bombs fell on Pearl Harbor (December 1941). And contrary to their expectations they found that America was not only a powerful industrial nation, but its young men were as willing to fight for their country as Japanese young men.
Weaponry
The Japanese military, espoecilly the Imperial Army, fought the War with some of the worst weapons of any beligerant nation. There were some exceptions. The Japanese Navy had well enginered ships and was especially prepared for night fighgting. A major weakness was fire suppression systems. generally the Japanese placed most of their focus on attack, thus fire supression was negekected. Thee surface Navy's reatest asset was the excellent Long Lance Torpedo. The other major asset was the Mitsubishi A6M Zero, used by both the Imperail Army and Navy. It dominted the Pacific for a year (1942). It was, however, not an engineering marvel. Speed and manuervability was achieved by light weight. The Zero had virtully no defensive armor. Once advanced American aircraft with powerful, engines arrived, like the A6M Hellcat, the Zero was totaly outclassed (1943). The Japanese infantryman fought the War with many poorly designed and manufactured weapons supported by inasequate tanks and artillery. Despite the Axis Alkiance, Japan had none of the excellent German infantry weaoon technology. And even if they had, did not have yhe industrial capacity to produce heavy infantry weapons in quantity. Japanese infantry weapons were more than adequate against the poorly armed Chinese forces, but totally inadequate against a modern fighting foirce. The principal infantry weapon was the Type 99 rifle. This was an adequate weapon, but all too often Japanese commanders used it bayonet assualts againsrt dug-in Allied positions with dusaterius results. The Japanese had no assault (sub-machine) guns. One of their better weaapons was the the Nambu Tyoe 99 Light machine Gun, based on the British Bren Gun. The Japnese even fitted it with a bayonet.
Of no actual military value, Japanese officers carried swords. They were revered by the Army and would commonly actually be used as an infantry weapon. They were also known to use them to behead captives. The Type 92 batallion gun was light making it mobile, but also limited its impact. The 70 mm Model 92 Infantry Howitzer could not penetrate SAmerican armor. It could be dismantled which was important. The largely unmotorized Japanese infantry cold thus carrt it, alothoiugh with considerable difficulty ober any distance. The lightly armored Type Chi Ha Type 97 Medium Tank had only a 47 mm gun and was among the poorest tanks of the War. It saw extensice service bin Chian, but could easily be taken out by American bazookan and were obliterated by American tanks in the few armored battles of the War.
And as the war began to go against Japan, the raw materials reaching the Home Island declined and the quality of manufcturing only declined. The quality of Japanese weaponry was not a makor problem when Japan faced the poorly armed and trained Chiinese armies. It did prove important when the Japanese army took on the modern industrial nations, the Soviet Red Army (1939) and the United States (1941).
Military Competence
No country instilled such fierce fighting spirit in their fighting men, but there was an extrodinary level of incompetence among Japannese officers who prepared to make frontal caarges against entrnched forces backed by artillery and machine guns. These tactics worked in China against poorly armed and trained troops. And they worked in the opening months of the OPacific War when the Japnaese faced poorly trained coklonial police forces and the cut off American forces in the PEbphilippines. This changed dramatiucally when they encountered wekll arnmed and trained Allkied combat firces. After the first 6 months of the War, the IJN did not win a single battle with the Americans, even in the rare occassions that they had superior forces such as Guadalcanal. Col Ichiki who ordered his men into a frontal assault againstr entrenched Marines at Aligator Creek on Guadalcanal is the best example of this (August 1942).
Failure
The Imperial Army achieved some stunning successes early in the War, against poorly trained and equipped forces. But as American industry began to restore the military balance, weaknesses in Army tactical doctrine and weaponry led to one failure after another in the Pacific despite the fanatical commitment of the individual soldier. As the Allies began to field well-trained and -equipped forces, the Japanese string of victories ended. And after Midway and the Solomons, the Imprial Navy cold offer very limited support. They were not only inavble to provide military support, but commonly supplie were not delivered. , even with supply. Even when the Japanese had a substantial superority in forces, they filed to retake Guadalcanal, in large part because of astonishly amateurish tactics, including suisidal Banzai attacks. Army doctrine soon degenerated into how to kill as many Americans as possible in hopeless defenses of one Pacific island after another.
The IJA was responsible for some of the most terrible atrocities of World War II. The Rape of Nanking was the most infamous, but most of the terrible Japanese attrocities were conducted by the IJA. The brutal treatment of Allied POWs is well known. Less well know is that the IJA dod not take Chinese prisoners, they simply murdered them, often in the most barbaric ways.
apan did not and does not today admit the full extent of its responsibility for launching World War II. Many Japanese attempt to hide the extent of their country's war crimes and prefer to view their country as a victim of the War. The list of Japanese atrocities and war is very long, involving the deaths of millions, mostly innocent civilians. The list in its entirity is too long to list here, but we need to mention some of the most grevious atrocities committed by the Imperial armed forces. The primary war crime is the launching of aggerssive war first against China (1937) and then the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands (1941). Specific examples include the terror bombing of undefended Chinese cities (Shanghai); mascres of Chinese civilians (the Rape of Nanking), use of biologcal and chemical weapons, mistreatment and massacres of Allied POWs (the Batan Death March), abuse of civilain internees, use of slave labor, conscription of civilian women for prostitution (Korean comfort women).
Sources
Fujiwara Akira. "The role of the Japanese Army," in Dorothy Borg and ShumpeiOkamoto, eds. Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973).
Storry. Richard. The Double Patriots: A Study of Japanese Patriotism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957).
