* World War I -- America enters the war Wilson's decession








America Enters the War: Wilson's Decession


Figure 1.--

After German U-boats sank five American merchant vessels, President Wilson asked Congress to Declare War on Germany (April 2). The traditional explanation was that the combination of Germany resuming undeclared submarine warfare and the Zimmerman telegram changed Wilson's mind. [Keegan, pp. 351-52.] Perhaps this assessment is correct. These actions do seem to have changed the minds of large numbers of Americans. There is no way of knowing precisely what was going through Wilson's mind. I do not know that Wilson ever explained precisely why he decided on War. Publically the German resumption of unrestricted submarime warfare was the major reason. Most historians believe that more was involved. It seems strange that Wilson rejected war in 1915, but decided on war in 1917. Quite a bit had changed in those 2 years. After the Russian Revolution (February 1917), the Allied situation had weakened. This must have affected Wilson's thinking. Certainly a German victory would have significantly affected the strategic balance of power. A victorious Germany with a powerful High Seas fleet would had exposed America as never before. Since Trafalgur America had developed behind a shield created by the Atlantic Ocean and Royal Navy. To what extent such real politik influenced Wilson I am not sure. War loans made to the Allies may also have been a factor. One historian argues that idealistic moral diplomacy was Wilson's prime motivation. [Powell] We know that Wilson did have such idealistic attitudes. His acttions in the Caribbean and Mexico show a mixture of idealism and racism. Certainly his pronouncements such as a war "to make the world safe for democracy" show the imprint of his idealism. Statements made after the declaration of war can not be taken as a definitove statement of why Wilson decided on war. One historian believes that the key deciding factor was Wilson's desire to be a part of the post-War peace settlment. He realized that unless he was a part of the victorious Allied coalition that he and America would have no say in the peace. [Strachan] Clearly a wide range of issues may have affected Wilson and historians have discussed these issues. What we have not noted is persuasive evidence of what finally persuaded Wilson.

Declaration of War (April 1917)

After German U-boats sank five American merchant vessels, President Wilson asked Congress to Declare War on Germany (April 2). The traditional explanation was that the combination of Germany resuming undeclared submarine warfare and the Zimmerman telegram changed Wilson's mind. [Keegan, pp. 351-52.] Perhaps this assessment is correct. These actions do seem to have changed the minds of large numbers of Americans. There is no way of knowing precisely what was going through Wilson's mind. I do not know that Wilson ever explained precisely why he decided on War.

Unrestricted Submarine Warfare

Publically the German resumption of unrestricted submarime warfare was the major reason. Most historians believe that more was involved. One historian argues that this was not a cogent reason for War and that Americans traveling in a war zone and sending their goods to beligerants should not have expected the American Government to go to war to ensure their saftey. [Powell] This is not an irational view. It does, however, avoid the more important point that most Americans thought sunmarine warfare was barbaric . And many but a smaller number of Americans did want their Government to tale action. These were not opinions created by Wilson, although they seemed to have been shared by him.

Public Opinion

It is unclear to us at this this time as to what extent Wilson was following or leading public opinion when he decided on war. This is a topic we need to address.

Russia

It seems strange that Wilson rejected war in 1915, but decided on war in 1917. Quite a bit had changed in those 2 years. After the Russian Revolution (February 1917), the Allied situation had weakened. The Russian Army had been devestated by the Germans. The Germans had seized Poland and much of the Baltics and were moving into Russia proper. Wityh the abdigation of the Tsar, it was not clear if the Provissional Government would or could continue the War. If Russia signed a separate peace, the Allied situation on the Western Front would be seriously threatened. This must have affected Wilson's thinking.

Potential German Victory

Certainly a German victory would have significantly affected the strategic balance of power. A victorious Germany with a powerful High Seas fleet would had exposed America as never before. Since Trafalgur America had developed behind a shield created by the Atlantic Ocean and Royal Navy. To what extent such real politik influenced Wilson I am not sure. Here a historian argues that a German victory was not likely as they were so exhausted that even with Russia out of the War they could not have defeated the British and French. And even if they did that they wouls been bogged down in costly passification opertaions in Russia and the Balkans. [Powell] Here we are not at all convinced. The AEF did play an important role in blunting the final German offensive. We also believe that a Europe dominated by Germany and with a weakened Britain and France would not be an outcome in the best interest of the United States.

Economic Assessment

War economics is a poorly explored topic. This is unfortunate as war economics and finance is a very important aspect of war, especially protracted wars that became wars of attrition. We note a range of claims about both financing and corporate involvement. Often these are ideoligally based charges and poorly documented if documented at all. After the War in the 1920s and 30s, many authors persued an economic explanation of Americ's entry in the War. Authors described the desire of American arms manufactuers and financiers to pesue their interests and investmdnts in the Allied side. This became a widely accepted view. Authors making this charge make statements like, "At least 21,000 new millionaires and billionaires were made in the United States during the World War.� This is presented as evidence that industrialists led America into the war. There is no doubt that many Americans benefited from the War, not only industrialists, but workers and farmers. This does not mean that these invididuals instigated the War or even American involvement, Congress launched an invesigation of arms merchants, but failed to find any clear-cut evidence that their influence had brought about American involvement or the war itself. American banks made very substantial War loans made to the Allies. These loans would be virtually impossible to collect if the Allies lost the War. (In fact they proved difficult to collect eventhough the Allies won the Wr.) We have seen claims that the Allies' debts prevented the United States from remaiing neutral. Many World War I histories do not address the issue. The claims that we have seen offer little substantiation beyond the level of the loans involved. We are not prepard to say that the loans were not important. We have yet to see any solid evidence substantiating the charges tht the loans were a major factor in President Wilson's decesion. Here an important factor to consider is the fact that one advantage that Britain had in its wars was a superior financial system. This in large measure explains the British Victory over France in the Seven Years War. The superior financial system of the allies was a factor in winning the War, but does not mean that it was a cause of the War or a major factor in American involvement. Marxist theory is not proof of the charges made. And we have yet to see solid evidence to the contrary. We would be interested in insights on this that readrs may be able to offer.

National Interest

Gradually historians have adopted a less economic-based assessment. Many have adopted a real-politik assessment. They describe a growing concern among President Wilson and American elites about a Europe dominated by Wilhemite Germany, an authoritarian and aggresively militaristic state. The emerge of revolutary Bolshevism in Russia was another challenge. Rather Wilson saw it as in American interest to act to ensure the preservation of liberal democracy and an open capitalist world economy. [Williams/Levin] The emphasis here is on the imperatives of national interests. Here economics is certainly a factor, but only one factor in a wider spectrum of interests.

Wilson's Decesion Making

Other historiand give great importance to President Wilson's decision making. This view is not unrelated to the imperitives of national interest, but focuses on the President's deesion making. President Wilson led leading neutral power whose economic and financial power could powerfully influence the outcome of the War. Historians believe that the German resumption of submarine warfare did in fact have a decisive impact on Wilson's thinking. Here the predominantly pro-British attitude among American elites was an important factor. As was the President's fervent belief in a liberal future for Europe and the goal of a lasting peace based upon a league of nations. Here Wilson's morality has been ignored or depreciated by real-politik historians, but it was a strong factor in his decision making. Historianns differ on the specific of the President;s decision making, but severl important historians agree that it was a major factor in America's entry in the War [Ferrell, Knock, Link, and May] The problem for historians is that Wilson has not left us any detailed description explaining his decesion to go to war.

Liberal Idealism

One historian argues that idealistic moral diplomacy was Wilson's prime motivation. [Powell] We know that Wilson did have such idealistic atytitudes. His acttions in the Caribbean and Mexico show a mixture of idealism and racism. Wilson was a racist who set back civil rights many years. He segregated the Federal Government when he assumed office. These racist attitudes were a factor in his Latin American policies. He publically stated that he was going to teach Mexican to choose better leaders. Certainly his pronouncements such as a war "to make the world safe for democracy" show the imprint of his idealism. Statements made after the declaration of war can not be taken as a definitove statement of why Wilson decided on war. One historian believes that the key deciding factor was Wilson's desire to be a part of the post-War peace settlment. He realized that unless he was a part of the victorious Allied coalition that he and America would have no say in the peace. [Strachan] One critic of President Wilson argues that the world "fought to make the world safe for democracy" resulted in making in safe for dictators. [Powell] There is some truth to this argument, although part of this was due to the harsh peace the British and French insisted on and not to Wilson's liberal idealism.

Evidence of What Persuaded Wilson

Clearly a wide range of issues may have affected Wilson and historians have discussed these issues. What we have not noted is persuasive evidence of what finally persuaded Wilson. Historians can site Wilson's earlirr foreign policy in the Caribbean or public statements after entering the War. But this does not mean that these are the factors that convinced Wilson. We have only seen scholorly speculation on his subject, not definitive evidence as to what convinced Wilson to enter the War.

Sources

Ferrell, Robert H. Woodrow Wilson and World War I, 1917�1921 (1985).

Gregory, Ross. The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (1971).

Keegan, John. The First World War (Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 1999), 475p.

Knock, Thomas J. To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (1992).

Levin, N. Gordon, Jr. Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (1968).

Link, Arthur S. Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916�1917 (1965).

May, Ernest R. The World War and American Isolation, 1914�1917 (1959).

Powell, Jim. Wilson's War.

Tuchman, Barbara. The Zimmermann Telegram.

Wells, H.G. The Outline of History: The Whole Story of Man (Doubleday & Co.: New York, 1971), 1103p.

Williams, William Appleman. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1959).






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Created: 4:55 AM 7/24/2005
Last updated: 2:35 AM 11/5/2007