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World War I armies had a half century to adjust to the telegram. The wireless was a different bmatter. It had enormous military potential far beyound the telegtam. But it was very new and still being developed. It was also very indecure. World War I armies and navies operated largely independently in World War I. This is one reason that navies formed infantry forces (marines). The codes used by combatant armies and navies were different. And there was a need to develop new codes with the deployment of the new wireless. Telegraph codes were relarively secure. Wireless communications were insecure because they could be easily picked up by the enemy. It took some time for the military forces to adjust to this new reality. Codes and encription became necessary for critical messages. The navies were quicker to adjust than the armies. The navies had an easier task in this regard than the armies. Each country varied in how they adjusted to the new realities and the codes which they developed. Developing the codes, however, was only part of the problem. Ger the soldiers to use them proved to be a daunting challenge. Major military campaigns were affected by the interception of signals. One incident in favt help being America into the war. The interception of secure information in World war I was no much the result of code breaking as the failire of signals discipline.
World War I armies and navies operated largely independently in World War I. This is one reason that navies formed infantry forces (marines). The codes used by combatant armies and navies were different. And there was a need to develop new codes with the deployment of the new wireless. Telegraph codes were relatively secure. Wireless communications were insecure because they could be easily picked up by the enemy. It took some time for the military forces to adjust to this new reality. Codes and encription became necessary for critical messages. The navies were quicker to adjust than the armies. Navies could use the new radio (wireless) technology, although the range of radio was still limited. Here the Royal Navy had an advantage because of their many colonnial possessiuins where land stAtions could be built and could relay naval messages. The navies had an easier task in this regard than the armies which relied heavily on telegrams and phones using land lines. Each country varied in how they adjusted to the new realities and the codes which they developed. Developing the codes, however, was only part of the problem. Getting the soldiers to use them proved to be a difficult undertaking.
World War I began with huge failure of signals decipline on the Eastern Front. The Russian defeat at Tannenberg was in part because of commabders ignoring regulations and transmitting many messages describing troop movements and strategic/tactical measures plain text. The Germans had committed the bulk of their army to the Western offensive and as a result a much smaller force was available to oppose the Russian offensive in the East. But the Russians essentially told the Germans the details of their offensive in East Prussia where Germany bordered on Russia. The result was the hugec German victiory at Tannenberg. The Germans also learned a great deal about Russian secure communicationss. While it was the Germans who took advantage of the security lapses, at this early stage of the War, the Germans wwere also not careful about their transmissions. The Russians did obtain a major intelligence prize. The found a code book on the the German cruiser Magdeburg and turned it over to the British. This gave the British insights into German secure communications for most of the War. Naval intelligence during the War, however, was primarily assessing the direction and volume of transmissions. One of the most important examples of code breaking was the British decryption of the Zimmerman Telegran, a factor in bringing America into the War. The Germans upgraded their code system just before launching their hoped for war-winning offensive (Spring 1918). Allied crypto analysts were, as aresult, in the dark as the front-line troops braced for the German offensive. The Allies had, however, other sources of information. Aerial reconisance provided information on rear area movement which detected buildups. Wireless traffic annalisis was also useful. The French thus concluded that the final German blow would come between Compiegne and Montdidier, tow towns about 50 miles north of Paris. The Kaiserschlacht came at that exact location (June 9, 1918). The British and French with newly deployed American infantry managed to stop the final German thrust.
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