Figure 1.-- |
|
World War I began with huge failure of signals decipline on the Eastern Front. The Russian defeat at Tannenberg was in part because of commanders ignoring regulations and transmitting many messages describing troop movements and strategic/tactical measures plain text. The Germans had committed the bulk of their army to the Western offensive and as a result a much smaller force was available to oppose the Russian offensive in the East. But the Russians essentially told the Germans the details of their offensive in East Prussia where Germany bordered on Russia. The result was the hugec German victiory at Tannenberg. The Germans also learned a great deal about Russian secure communicationss. While it was the Germans who took advantage of the security lapses, at this early stage of the War, the Germans wwere also not careful about their transmissions. The Russians did obtain a major intelligence prize. The found a code book on the the German cruiser Magdeburg and turned it over to the British. This gave the British insights into German secure communications for most of the War. Naval intelligence during the War, however, was primarily assessing the direction and volume of transmissions. One of the most important examples of code breaking was the British decryption of the Zimmerman Telegran, a factor in bringing America into the War. The Germans upgraded their code system just before launching their hoped for war-winning offensive (Spring 1918). Allied crypto analysts were, as aresult, in the dark as the front-line troops braced for the German offensive. The Allies had, however, other sources of information. Aerial reconisance provided information on rear area movement which detected buildups. Wireless traffic annalisis was also useful. The French thus concluded that the final German blow would come between Compiegne and Montdidier, tow towns about 50 miles north of Paris. The Kaiserschlacht came at that exact location (June 9, 1918). The British and French with newly deployed American infantry managed to stop the final German thrust.
The War Department at the time America entered the War did not have a cryptographic unit. about the Navy Department. The AEF in France seems to have dealt with code making ion its own. Back in Washington, the War Deoartment created MI-8, a cryptological unit tasked with deciphering enemy messages. MI-8 was run by Herbert O. Yardley, the first important Anerican cryptologist. After the War, the new Republican Secretary of State Henry Stimpson disbanded MI-8, leaving an embittered Yardley unemployed. Stimpson was fameously quited as saying, "Gentlemen shouldn't read each other's mail," Stimson was Secretary of War at the time of Pearl Harbor was less bothered by his former moral scruples. Yardley later wrote a widely read book which provides a great deal of information on World war I cryptology. [Yardley] The book included the sensational relevation that MI-8 had cracked the Japanese codes and used them during the Washinton Naval Talks. The shicked Japanese moved to upgrade their codes.
The Russians obtained a major intelligence prize early in the War. They found a code book on the the German cruiser Magdeburg which had run aground in the Baltic. They turned it over to the British. This gave the British insights into German secure communications for most of the War. Naval intelligence during the War, however, was primarily assessing the direction and volume of transmissions. One of the most important examples of code breaking was the British decryption of the Zimmermann Telegran, a factor in bringing America into the War. The American public was outraged. When Germany resumed unrestricted submarime warfare, there was little opposition to entering the War despite the strong pacifist sentiment and large German minority.
The French codebreakers became extremely effective at cracking ciphers. One observer writes that the French were, "somewhat inexperienced at cracking codes, which require a slightly different mindset. It took them time to get to the point where they were able to crack the German codes in a timely fashion." The Germans upgraded their code system just before launching their hoped for war-winning offensive (Spring 1918). The ADFGX system proved very difficult to crack.
Allied crypto analysts were, as a result, in the dark as the front-line troops braced for the German offensive. The Allies had, however, other sources of information. Aerial reconisance provided information on rear area movement which detected buildups. Wireless traffic annlisis was also useful. The French thus concluded that the final German blow would come between Compiegne and Montdidier, tow towns about 50 miles north of Paris. The Kaiserschlacht came at that exact location (June 9, 1918). The British and French with newly deployed American infantry managed to stop the final German thrust.
World War I began with huge failure of signals decipline on the Eastern Front. The Russian defeat at Tannenberg was in part because commanders ignored regulations and transmitting many messages describing troop movements and strategic/tactical measures in plain text. The Germans had committed the bulk of their army to the Western offensive and as a result a much smaller force was available to oppose the Russian offensive in the East. But the Russians essentially told the Germans the details of their offensive in East Prussia where Germany bordered on Russia. This enabled the Germans to effectively manuever their smaller force. The result was the huge German victiory at Tannenberg (1914). The Germans also learned a great deal about Russian secure communications. While it was the Germans who took advantage of the security lapses, at this early stage of the War, the Germans were also not careful about their transmissions. The Germans seemed to have had huge confidence in the security of their codes. They even sent coded diplomatic messages over British-controlled cables. The result was the sensational Zimmermann Telegram (January 1917).
The British found German code books with Ottoman units. They were presumabvly for the German military advisers, but we have few details at this time.
Yardley, Herbert O. The American Black Chamber (1931).
Navigate the Boys' Historical Clothing Web Site:
[Return to Main World War I intelligence communications page]
[Return to Main World War I intelligence page]
[Return to Main World War I page]
[Introduction]
[Activities]
[Biographies]
[Chronology]
[Clothing styles]
[Countries]
[Bibliographies]
[Contributions]
[Essays]
[FAQs]
[Glossaries]
[Images]
[Links]
[Registration]
[Tools]
[Boys' Clothing Home]