*** World War II Allied strategic bombing campaign -- Allied air superiority








World War II: European Allied Strategic Bombing Campaign--Allied Air Superiority

Allied air suprriority
Figure 1.--Here the young German soldiers in a troop convoy are seeking cover in the midst of an Allied air strike. This photograph was taken May 24, 1944 only days before D-Day. German units trying to mive forward during the day were devestated by Allied air power. German soldiers found themselves fighting with virtually no air cover and support. We are not sure where this photograph was taken. Click on the image for Wehrmact identification information.

"Within the next six months, you have got to get a fighter to priotect our bombers. Whether you use an existing type or have to start from scratch is your problem. Get to work on this right away, because by January '44, I want fighter escort for all of our bombers from the UK into Germany."

-- USAF Gen, 'Hap' Arnold (July 1943) orders to his deputy, Gen Barney Giles.

The Luftwaffe dominated the skies over Europe during the early years of the War. The superority of German planes and the Luftwaffe's tactical doctrine was a key factor in the stunning German victories, especially the defeat of France (1940). This changed in 1943 and by 1944 German civilians as well as the Wehrmacht were paying a terrible price. Superficial assessments of the Allied strategic bombing campaigns often point to the fact that German production of armaments increased in 1943 and in many areas even in 1944. Of course this is not a valid assessment as the historian has to assess what the Germans could have produced without the bombing. Contrary to popular opinion, the German war economy was not efficently run in the early years of the War and Speer in fact achieved substantial results when he was put in charge of war production. Another critical impact of the strategic bombing campaign was the impact on the Luftwaffe. Although the Allies paid a heavy loss in air crews, large numbers of Luftwaffe planes and the irreplaceable pilots were destroyed in the skies over Germany. In addition the Luftwaffe had to pull back to defend German cities. The arrival of high performance Allied fighters in large numbers was one factor in achieving air superority over the battlefields, but another key factor was that the Luftwaffe had to be withdrawn back to Germany. This meant that much of the German air strength was not available to support the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front. It also meant that the Allied air forces had a free hand to attack Hitler's vaunted Atlantic Wall. When the invasion finally came, the Luftwaffe could offer only token resistance. The Allies achieved the air superiority in 1944 that the Luftwaffe attempted to achieve and failed over Britain in 1940. And it was this air superority that made the D-Day Normandy landings possible.

Luftwaffe's Importance

Hitler used his new Luftwaffe to cow the British and French at Munich and force the Czechs to comply. The Luftwaffe dominated the skies over Europe during the early years of the War. The superority of German planes and the Luftwaffe's tactical doctrine was a key factor in the stunning German victories, especially the defeat of France (1940). The Luftwaffe served as highly mobile artillery as was a key factor in the success of the Wehrmacht's Blitzkrieg doctine. The Germans also used their aerial domance to bomb whole cities. This first occurred in Poland at the beginning of the War. The German aerial dominance was such that the Hitlerand the NAZIs assumed that only countries that resisted them would have their cities bombed. G�ring assured Hitler and the German people that their cities would never be bombed.

Weaknesses

Although it was not clear a the beginning of the War, there were weaknesss in the German air strategy. The Germans hd a powerful airforce because they launched a massive rearmament program that the British and French did not match quickly enough. Even by the time of the Battle of Britain, the British were already building more planes than the Germans. Even more ominously for the Germans was that President Roosevelt even before the War began had laid the foundation or a 50,000 plane American air force. These were numbers the Germans could not begin to match. And they do not even include Soviet aircraft production. In addition, because of the limited industrial capacity, Germany only built a tactical airforce. The Allies, both the British and Americans, began building a long-range strategic bomber force. As Air Marshal Harris explained, The Germans began the war with the naive assumtion that they would bomb other countries, but their cities would not be bombed. "They have sown the wind, and so they shall reap the whirlwind." Not only did the Germans have a more limited industrial capacity, but Luftwaffe planners did not efficently use the capacity they had. As a result, although there were plans to build innovative new fighters, the Germans were still using the ME-109 that they began with, at the end of the War. They added the FW-109, but the innovative jets were never available in the numbers needed. There were also serious weaknesses in the Luftwaffe's pilot training program.

Shift in Air Ballance

The Luftwaffe failed in the Battle of Britain (1940), but was still dominant on the continent as it demonstrated in Balkans campaign against the British (April 1941). The turning point for the Luftwaffe was Hitler's decession to invade the Soviet Union. The Luftwaffe after conducting punishing raids on Britain in early 194q1 graduyally began shiting its forces east. The Luftwaffe virtually destroyed the Red Air Force on the first few days after Hitler launched Barbarossa (June 22, 1941). The Soviets were caught on the ground in many instances. Stalin had ordered the Red Air Force not to oppose Luftwaffe reconisance flights so as to ensure Hitler would have no ecuses for an attack. The Soviets also had many obsolete models that could not compete with the modern Luftwaffe aircraft. The Luftwaffe played an important role in the early German successes in Barbarossa. Barbarossa, however was fought over a huge ara, a much wider battlefield than the battles in the West. Thus the Luftwaffe could not dominate the battles as it had done in the West. Even more significantlyy, the Soviet Union did not collapse after a short few weeks campaign. The result was that the Luftwaffe was put under great strain. And without strastegic bombers, the Luftwaffe could not attack the Soviet air craft factories moved east of the Urals. Luftwaffe pilots racked impressive tallies of Soviet aircraft shot down, but the Luftwaffe pilot training perogram could not keep up with the steady attrition. And Luftwaffe aces were not brought home to train new pilots, rather they countinued flying missions until thy were shot down, losing their considerable expertise. As the Luftwaffe was gradually being worn down in the East, Americand Britain were deploying both tactical and strategic air forces with high quality planes in much larger numbers than the Germans could match.

Allied Strategic Bombing Campaign

Arguably the most contoversial aspect of World War II was the Allied strategic bombing campaign. There are two elements of the campaign that remain controversial. First is the effectiveness of the campaign. Second is the morality of the campaign. With the NAZIs in command of the Continent, the only way that Britain could stike at Germany was by air. Germam air defenses meant that the RAF could only bomb at night and restricted British strategy to areavbombing. This significantly inhibited the effectiveness of British operations. The entry of America into the War meant that the air offensive could be significantly expanded. Both Curchill and Roosevely were committed to strategic bombing. The hope was that strategic bombing would force the NAIs to capitulate. The Allies at Casablanca demanded unconditional suurendetr (January 1943). The American buildup of air forces in Bitain continued throughout 1942 and by the beginning og 1943the 8th Air firce was ready to join the British in an around the clock bombing campaign against Germany. American and British planners agreed on four priority targets: 1) U-boat building facilities, 2) aircraft production plants, 3) ballbearing plants, and 4) oil refineries. Although not at the time, the Allied strategic boming campaign has become the most controversial aspect of World War II. German civilians as well as the Wehrmacht were paying a terrible price. Superficial assessments of the Allied strategic bombing campaigns often point to the fact that German production of armaments increased in 1943 and in many areas even in 1944. Of course this is not a valid assessment as the historian has to assess what the Germans could have produced without the bombing. Contrary to popular opinion, the German war economy was not efficently run in the early years of the War and Speer in fact achieved substantial results when he was put in charge of war production. Another critical impact of the strategic bombing campaign was the impact on the Luftwaffe. Although the Allies paid a heavy loss in air crews, large numbers of Luftwaffe planes and the irreplaceable pilots were destroyed in the skies over Germany. In addition the Luftwaffe had to pull back to defend German cities. The arrival of high performance Allied fighters in large numbers was one factor in achieving air superority over the battlefields, but another key factor was that the Luftwaffe had to be withdrawn back to Germany. This meant that much of the German air strength was not available to support the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.

North Africa and Italy

The Luftwaffe was a factor in North Africa, but the Luftwaffe could not match the forces deployed by the British and the situalion was worsened when the Americans and British invaded North frica (November 1942). The Luftwaffe was used to rush German units to Tunisia, but could not adewqutely supply them once they had been inserted. The Luftwaffe's problem in North Africa was mot just numbers, but difficulties supplying the squadronds that were deployed. With the invasion of Sicily (July 1943) and Italy (September 1943), the Luftwaffe did not have the strength to contest Allied air power.

Allied Air Camopaign (1942)

Once America joined the War in December 1941, a massive bombing campaign against Germany from England became feasible. America's indistrial potential gave the Allies to mount a strategic bombing campaign orders of magnitude above the Luftwaffe's capability. The air campaign became a major aspect of Allied strategy. While American began building in facilities in 1942, the British debated how to begin the strategic bombing campaign in 1942. Some wanted to target key German industrial sites, especially German synthetic fuel plants. Had they done so at this time might have changed the course of the War. Hiting precission targets, however, over heavily defended, often cloud-covered German cities was no easy matter with 1942 bombing technology. [Speer, p. 287.] In addition the British had been bloodied by the Blitz and the much easier to execute strategy of area bombing was appealing. The strategy of area or terror bombing of civilians won out. RAF planner Charles Portal was the leading abvocate of area bombing. Air Marshall Arthur "Bomber" Harris, the head of RAF Bomber Command, introduced area bombing as the RAF's principal strategy in the bombing campaign. Harris phrased it susinctly, "The Germans sewed the wind, now they will reap the whirllwind." The RAF began its area bombing strategy on March 28, 1942 with a massive night time raid on L�beck, virtually destroying the historic city. Hitler transferred two bomber groups of about 100 planes each from Sicly which conducted Baedaker targeting historic treasures of British cities. The ballance of forces, however, had turned decidedly against the Germans. The RAF responded on May 30 with its first 1,000 bomber raid on Cologne. The results were devestating.

France (1942-44)

The Luftwaffe still dominated the skies over France in 1942 as it demonstrated at Dieppe (April 1942). Hitler's declaration of war on America (December 1941) resulted in a buildup of the 8th Air Force in Britain. The first confrontation with the Luftwaffe was ovr France. From the beginning of the War, American military planners saw the invasion of France and the drive into Germany as the central campaign of the War. The British had begun raids on France and they were joned by the 8th Air Force (1943). The Luftwaffe depleted from the Eastern Front found itself unable to protect French sites. They exacted terrible losses on raids into the Reich, but Bfitish and American raids on German targets in France were increasingly effective as Allied air forces steadily grew and usually with light loses. The deployment of P-51 Mustangs (December 1943) changed the ballance in the air war over Germany. Not only were targets being hit deep in Germany, but increasing numbers of Luftwaffe pilots were being shot down.

Bombing the Reich (1943)

The combined Allied air assault on Germany was planned and coordinated by Air Marshall Harris and the American commanders General Hap Arnold and Ira Eaker. The British would continue to bomb at night and the Americans would begin daylight raids. This would put aditional stress on the Germans defenses, forcing them to defend 24 hours a day. The fires from the American bombs could be used as navigational guides by thge British at night. The American 8th Air Force began initial opearions against the Germans in 1943. The Americans opened their full-scale daylight bombing campaign on January 27, 1943 with an attack on Wilhelmshaven. Througout 1943, German cities were exposed to "round the clock bombing" inflict serious civilian casulties. The Americans bombing by day, attempting to hit specific targets using their Nordon bomb sites. The British bombed by night and at best could hit specific cities. There was agreement on the major targets: 1) the Ruhr in western Germany, 2) major cities in the interior of Germany, and finally 3) Berlin. Actual results in terms of impairing German war production was limited. The Ruhr was heavily hit, but producton increased. Allied bombers attempting deepenetration raids were savaged. Althoughcloser targets like Hamburg were devestated. Attacks on Berlin were largely unsuccessful and cstyly. Large numbers of German civilians were killed, injured, or rendered homeless. While the main objectives of the campaign were not being achieved. The Luftwaffe was being driven out f its forward bases along the Channel and back to Germant. In addition, it was being strenched to an extent that it could not provided needed support to the Wehrmacht on the titantic battles on the Eastern Front. The American and British air crews suffered very heavy casulties against German fighters and increasingly effective anti -aircraft guns. At times it was unclear if the bombing campaign could be sustained. Long range fighters were not available in 1942-43 to escort the bombers to their targets in Germany, but the United States by the end of the year had begun to introduce the long-range P-51 Mustang which had the capability to accompany the bombers all the way, even on deep-penetration raids. Göring had assured the Führer that this was not possible.

Fighter Escorts

President Roosevelt appointed Hap Arnold, who was tauhghtto fly by the Wright brithers, to command the Army Air Corps (1938). This would become the U.S. Air Forces (USAF). Early on Arnold becme one of the Bomber boys that dominated the USAF. He encouraged development of the B-17 Flying Fortress and later the B-24 Liberator -- bioth heavy four-engine bombers and the precision training of the crewms. After the B-17 Project received the endorsement of Isolationist star Charles Lindbergh, it soon went from a basically experimental aircraft to the major American air program. Arnold sold it as coastal patrol and protection plane. Arnold and the American Bomber boys like British Bomber Command were convinced that strategic bombing would win the War. The British were disabused of this illusion early in the War when they found that their bombers were lacking and the German air defenses, especially the fighters, were fearsome. They still thought that strategic bombing was a war-winning strategy once they has more capable air craft. Even so, when the Avro Lancaster arrived they continued bombing at night which reduced the effectiveness of the bombers. Arnold dis missed the British experience and thought that the American B-17 Flying Fortress with its awesome armament could fight its way through to th Reich and back. American airmen were trained exclusively for daylight operations. Not only that, but Arnold while prepared for a combined campaign was not interested in joint operations with the British which inevitably would have meant sharing resources. As a result, as in Britain the USAF have relatively little attention to fighters. Officers like Claire Chennault who advocated for fighters saw their careers stunted. And as a result, the United States entered World War II without a long range fighter capable of escort duties. Eight Air Force raids on lightly defended French targets did not expose the B-17 vulnerabilities. The B-17 was built for daylight precision bombing. The first flight (1935) occurred at a time that it could beat off existing targets. Even when introduced (1938), it could beat off existing American fighters. Daylight raids into the Reich (1938) were a very different matter (1943). Arnold was quickly disabused of his illusions about the B-17. Arnold was not about to give up on his commitment to strategic bombing. He did suddenly realize the need for long range escorts. While fighters were low priority there were several fighter projects. Barney Giles was appointed lieutenant general (May 1943) and in July was named deputy USAF commander. It is at this time that Arnold gave Gikles the task of finding a long range escort fir the B-17. He had several aircraftvto chose from. The P-38 Lighting did mot have the firepower needed. The p-39 Aircobra did not have the altitude capability needed. The primary fighter early in the war was the P-40 War Hawk, but it was not up to European interceptor standards. The P-47 was used as an escort, but did not have the range into the Reich abd was exopensive to prioduce. This problem was solved by drop tanks, but it would be the P-51 Mustang that Giles would give he nid to be the primary Anerican escort.

D-Day Air Campaign (March-June 1944)

The success of the Allied stratehic bombing campaign meant that the Luftwaffe had to concentrate ints dwindling resources on protecting German cities, especially industrial citied manufactuaring armd and the synthetic petroleum plants. also meant that the Allied air forces had a free hand to attack Hitler's vaunted Atlantic Wall. As a result by early 1944, the Allies controlled the skies over France, a necessary prerequisite for an invasion. General Eisenhower took over operational control of Allied air firces (March 1944). The strategic bombing campaign was temporarily suspended and raids focused on beavh defenses and the transportation system. The goal was to weaken the Atlantic Wall and to ensure that the Germans could not rapidly rush mobile formations forwad to prevent the Allies from establishing their beachead. This was critical. The Germans had substanytial firces in France, including pwerful Panzer Divisions that the Allied soldiers could not match until they had their armor and artillery ashore in force. When the invasion finally came, the Luftwaffe could offer only token resistance. The Allies achieved the air superiority in 1944 that the Luftwaffe attempted to achieve and failed over Britain in 1940. And it was this air superority that made the D-Day Normandy landings possible. The German Panzerdivisions were effective inly if they were mobile and the Allied air superority essentially imbolizied these powerful units. These Allies were also aided by their disinformation campaign that kept German Panzers in the Pas de Calais whwre even after D-Day the Germans expected another invasion.

Liberation of France (August 1944)

Eisenhower kept operational control of Allied air forces during the fidhting in France. Allied air power prevented the Panzers Divisions from attacking the Allied beachhead in France. German tanls were much more powerful than the American Sherman, but Allied air power precentging the Panzers from attacking in strength. American air strikes opened the German lines that allowed the break out from the Normandy beachhead. Massive carpet bombing raids tore a whole in the German lines near St. Lo through which Patton's Third Army poured in tanks and men (July 1944). Much of the German 7th Army was captured or destroyed. From that point on the Wehrmacht was in full retreat back to the Reich. Paris was liberated (August 1944) and the Allies reached Belgium (September 1944).

Renewed Bombing Campaign: Germany (September 1944-April 1945)

Eisenhower released the Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force (September 1944). Although the failure of Market Garden (October 1944) abnd supply problems stalled the Allied ground offensive, the Allied strategic bombing campaign intensified. What followed was one of the greatest orgies of destruction in the history of warfare. Great damage had been done to German industry and cities before D-Day. What followed was much worse. The bombers were able to strike anywher in the Reich with only light opposition. Ever major German city was hit, in most cases repeteadly. Berlin became a major target as did the synthetic petroleum factories. German cities were turned into piles of rubble. The transportation network was also targetted so that ir became to move not only troops but arms and raw materials. The factories that were not destroyed ran out of raw materials. Now war production did plumit. And it was not only the bombers involved. The fighters that esorted the bom,bers were released for low level arttacks, often striking Luftwaffe air fields as well as railroads and barges. By the time the Allies crossed the Rhine, Germany ceased to esist as an industrial nation and the Luftwaffe did not exist as a an effictive fighting force.






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Created: 6:11 AM 9/15/2004
Last updated: 8:40 PM 2/4/2024