Second Sino-Japanese War: Ground Campaigns (1940-44)
Figure 1.--Here Japanese soldiers guard Chinese Natiionalist POWs. The Japanese smashed Nationlist siuvisions and tool large nymbers of prisiners in their Ivho-Gi offensive. An internet source suggested this photograph was taken durung the Japanese Ichi-go offensive, but we can not confirm that. The normal Japanese practive was to murder Chinese POWs in many brutal wats such as bayonet practice, life burials, beheadings, drowning, and other heinous ways At the end of the War, the Japanese had no Chinese POWs to turn over to the Chinese.
Fighting continued in China after Pearl Harbor, but at a relatively low level. The Nationalist Kuomintang Army and the Communist Chinese Army both resisted the Japanese, to a point. Chiang and Mao agreed to a truce, but never really united to fight the Japanese or coordinte operations. Armed encounters between the Nationalists and Communists in fact continued throughout the War. The last major offensive against the Japanese was launched by the Comminists in 1940, the Hundred Regiments Campaign (Summer-Fall 1940). They suffered heavy losses. The New Fourth Army Incident
ended any possibility of real cooperation between the Nationalists and Communists (January 1941). The Nationalists did not launch any major offensives. The Japanese were basically restrained by the requirement of garisoning conquered territory and the logistics of moving deeper into the interior. Perodic Rice Offensives were launched. The Japanese attempted to use their air force to bomb the Nationalists into submission. Here they could strike deep into the interior. This was complicated, however, by the American Flying Tigers and later the regular Ameican Army Air Force. Even after the Japanese cloesed the Burma Road, the Allies flew supplies in over The Hump. Most of these supplies went to the air effort. The United States assigned General "Vinegar" Joe Stwillwell to advise Chang. The two clashed, but Stillwell's replacement did little better. Basically a major reform of the Nationalist military was needed. Chang refused to commit his forces to battle or reform them. President Roosevelt and the China Lobby in America had hoped that Chiang's huge army would play an important role in the War. It did not. It simply did not engage the Japanese Army. China's vastness, however, proved a huge commitmet for the Japanese. Once at war with America, which was suposed to make victory in China possible, Japan could no longer commit additional forces and resources to China. The Japanese did mange one final offensive in China--Ichi-Go. It was a massive offensive. The objectives included destroying the American aur bases that were being prepared to bomb the Japanese Home Islands. They also wanted to establish land routes to Southeast Asia so that the vital resources there could be transported overland to the Home Islamds. As the Pacific War went increasingly against Japan, they had to draw down forces. But given the nature of the Pacific battlefield and the constraints of the Japanese logistical capability, shifting massive forces was difficuilt. The Japanese did what they could as the final battle for the Home Islands began shaping up. This enabled the Nationalist Army to begin the liberation of their country.
The Hundred Regiments Campaign (Summer-Fall 1940)
The last major offensive against the Japanese was launched by the Comminists in 1940, the Hundred Regiments Campaign (Summer-Fall 1940). This was largest and longest Communist offensive during the ebtire Sino-Japanese War. The Communist commander was Peng Te-huai / Peng Dehuai . The Communisrs committed 104 regiments, the bulk of their military force. They attacked transportation networks and Japanese positions throughout northern China, They wanted obtain control of vast rural food producing areas from the Japanese. There were some initial success. The Japanese sypported by Chunese colabotationist forces regroupped and struck back with a brutal, systematic counter-offensive. The Japanese approch was their infamous "kill all, burn all, loot all" tactic. The root out the Communist and smashed their best milirary units. The Communist losses were massive. [Dreyer, pp. 252-54.]
The New Fourth Army Incudent (January 1941)
The New Fourth Army Incident ended any possibility of real cooperation between the Nationalists and Communists (January 1941). The Second KMT-CCP United Front was srill in effect. The Communists and the Kuomintang were, however, still struggling for territorial advantages in what was left of 'Free China', meaning the sybstantial area still not occupied by the Japanese or cintrooled by the Wang Jingwei puppet government. Major clashes occured between the Red Army and KMT units (late 1940 - early 1941). Chiang demanded that the CCP New Fourth Army evacuate Anhwei/Anhui and Kiangsu/Jiangsu Provinces (December 1940). The New Fourth Army commanders heavily pressired by the KMT forces, they begin to comply. Despite this the KMT forces ambushed and seriously defeated then (January 1941). The incudebt gad two cinsequences. First, it seiously weakened the CCP position throughout cebtral Chuna. Second, it ended any possibility id substantial KMT-CCP cooperation even againstvthe Japanese.
Pearl Harbor (December 1941)
Fighting continued in China after Pearl Harbor, but at a relatively low level. The Nationalist Kuomintang Army and the Communist Chinese Army both resisted the Japanese, to a point. Chiang and Mao agreed to a truce, but never really united to fight the Japanese or coordinte operations. Armed encounters between the Nationalists and Communists in fact continued throughout the War.
Burma (1942)
Stalemate
The Nationalists did not launch any major offensives. The Japanese were basically restrained by the requirement of garisoning conquered territory and the logistics of moving deeper into the interior. Much has veen weurren about loigistucs on the Eastern Front war between the NAZIs abd Soviets. Russian dirt roads were, however, like autobhans compared to what the Japanese faced in central China. Logistics were more of an obstacle to furher advanves than the KMT Nationalist Arny. Not only was logistics an issue, but once territiry was seized, it had to be garisoned, further reducing the Japanese Army's offensuve combatstrength. Perodic Rice Offensives were launched. The Japanese attempted to use their air force to bomb the Nationalists into submission. Here they could strike deep into the interior. This was complicated, however, by the American Flying Tigers and later the regular Ameican Army Air Force. Even after the Japanese cloesed the Burma Road, the Allies flew supplies in over The Hump. Most of these supplies went to the air effort.
American Reassessment
The United States assigned General "Vinegar" Joe Stwillwell to advise Chang. The two clashed, but Stillwell's replacement did little better. Basically a major reform of the Nationalist military was needed. Chang refused to commit his forces to battle or reform them. President Roosevelt and the China Lobby in America had hoped that Chiang's huge army would play an important role in the War. It did not. It simply did not engage the Japanese Army. China's vastness, however, proved a huge commitmet for the Japanese. Once at war with America, which was suposed to make victory in China possible, Japan could no commit addition forces and resources to China.
Once at war with America, which was suposed to make victory in China possible, Japan could no longer expand operations in China. The Japanese did manage one final offensive in China--Ichi-Go (April 1944). The Japanese had two major concerns. First, the Americans were cpreoaring bomb Japan from Chinese airfields. Second, as the Pavific War developed, the Japanese were being cut off from the resources of the Southern Resource Zone they had gone to war to secure. Thus the Japanese were inhtenht on creating ba land route from Southeast Asia to Shanagahi were the resoirces could be shipped to the factories on the Home Islands. It was the largest Japanese military operation of the War. They smnashed major Natioanlist units. The nationalsist sustained huged casualties and lost large areas of territory--sunstnatial areas of central China. The Nationalists regime nearly collapsed. The Japanese mobilized virtually every soldier they could find in China which meant large number of men were withdrean from occupation duty in the north. This cleared the way for the Commuinists to move into areas that Japanese occupation units had secured. Ichi-go has no impact on the American Pacific drive toward the Home Islands. It would be a major factor in the Communist victory after the War.
Final Battles
As the Pacific War went against Japan, Ichi-go, they had to draw down forces. But given the nature of the Pacific battlefield and the constraints of the Japanese logistical capability, shifting massive forces was difficuilt, but begam as the final battle for the Home Islnds began shaping up. This enabled the Nationalist Army to begin the liberation of their country.
