Fighting continued in China after Pearl Harbor, but at a relatively low level. The Nationalist Kuomintang Army and the Communist Chinese Army both resisted the Japanese, to a point. Chiang and Mao agreed to a truce, but never really united to fight the Japanese or coordinte operations. Armed encounters between the Nationalists and Communists in fact continued throughout the War. The last major offensive against the Japanese was launched by the Comminists in 1940, the Hundred Regiments Campaign (Summer-Fall 1940). They suffered heavy losses. The New Fourth Army Incident ended any possibility of real cooperation between the Nationalists and Communists (January 1941). The Nationalists did not launch any major offensives. The Japanese were basically restrained by the requirement of garisoning conquered territory and the logistics of moving deeper into the interior. Perodic Rice Offensives were launched. The Japanese attempted to use their air force to bomb the Nationalists into submission. Here they could strike deep into the interior. This was complicated, however, by the American Flying Tigers and later the regular Ameican Army Air Force. Even after the Japanese cloesed the Burma Road, the Allies flew supplies in over The Hump. Most of these supplies went to the air effort. The United States assigned General "Vinegar" Joe Stwillwell to advise Chang. The two clashed, but Stillwell's replacement did little better. Basically a major reform of the Nationalist military was needed. Chang refused to commit his forces to battle or reform them. President Roosevelt and the China Lobby in America had hoped that Chiang's huge army would play an important role in the War. It did not. It simply did not engage the Japanese Army. China's vastness, however, proved a huge commitmet for the Japanese. Once at war with America, which was suposed to make victory in China possible, Japan could no longer expand operations in China The Japanese did mange one finl offensive in China--Ichi-Go. Anbd this only bcause the Amerixasere going to bomb Japan from Chinese airfields. As the Pacific War went against Japan, they had to draw down forces. But given the nature of the Pacific battlefield and the constraints of the Japanese logistical capability, shifting massive forces was impossible until the final battle for the Home Islnds began shaping up.

Ground War

Fighting continued in China after Pearl Harbor, but at a relatively low level. The Nationalist Kuomintang Army and the Communist Chinese Army both resisted the Japanese, to a point. Chiang and Mao agreed to a truce, but never really united to fight the Japanese or coordinte operations. Armed encounters between the Nationalists and Communists in fact continued throughout the War. The last major offensive against the Japanese was launched by the Comminists in 1940, the Hundred Regiments Campaign (Summer-Fll 1940). They suffered heavy losses. The New Fourth Army Incident ended any possibility of real cooperation between the Nationalists and Communists (January 1941). The Nationalists did not launch any major offensives. The Japanese were basically restrained by the requirement of garisoning conquered territory and the logistics of moving deeper into the interior. Perodic Rice Offensives were launched. The United States assigned General "Vinegar" Joe Stwillwell to advise Chang. The two clashed, but Stillwell's replacement did little better. Basically a major reform of the Nationalist military was needed. Chang refused to commit his forces to battle or reform them. President Roosevelt and the China Lobby in America had hoped that Chiang's huge army would play an important role in the War. It did not. It simply did not engage the Japanese Army. China's vastness, however, proved a huge commitmet for the Japanese. Once at war with America, which was suposed to make victory in China possible, Japan could no longer expand operations in China The Japanese did manage one final offensive in China--Ichi-Go (April 1944). The Japanese had two major concerns. First, the Americans were cpreoaring bomb Japan from Chinese airfields. Second, as the Pavific War developed, the Japanese were being cut off from the resources of the Southern Resource Zone they had gone to war to secure. Thus the Japanese were inhtenht on creating ba land route from Southeast Asia to Shanagahi were the resoirces could be shipped to the factories on the Home Islands. It was the largest Japanese military operation of the War. They smnashecmajir Natioanlist units. They took over large areas of central China. The Nationalists regime nearly collapsed. The Japanese mobilized virtually every soldier they could find in China which meant large number of men on occupation duty. This cleared the way for the Commuinists to move into areas that Japanese occupation units had secured. It would be a major factor in the Comminist victory after the War. As the Pacific War went against Japan, they had to draw down forces. But given the nature of the Pacific battlefield and the constraints of the Japanese logistical capability, shifting massive forces was impossible until the final battle for the Home Islands began shaping up.

Figure 1.--This September 1941 press photograph accomanied a newspaper article about the war in China and the Japanese bombing of Chunking. The smiling boys were described as refugees in Chunking, the Nationlist capital. We suspect it was more of a staged photograph. The situation for refugees was becoming increasingly bad and would become worse. The KMT was finding it increasingly difficult to feed the population of the cities it still controlled, let alone the refugees. At the time the Japanese were bombing Chunking which had no air defenses. President Roosevelt had, however, ordered the creation pf the AVG (Flying Tigers) which was just arriving at the time of Pearl Harbor a few months later. The AVG would proive air defenses for Chunking.

Air War

The Pacific War was fought on the largest battlefield in history. This would make the range of aircraft to be an imprtant factor. The air war in the Pacific began as in the European theater with mastery of the skies by the Japanese. The Chinese air force was vitually non-existant. The Japanese conducted terror bombing raid, first on Shanghai and then on other Chinese cities. Japanese aircraft, especially the Mitusubishi A6M Zero, were so effective that they were able to achieve air superority during land and sea battles against Britain and the United States beginning with the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Zero was fast and maneuverable and had an impressive range. This continued throughout much of 1942 and only with the arrival of new American 56L Hellcat in large numbers did the Allies begin to gain the upperhand in the sky. The gradual attrition of skilled Japanese pilots was another factor. New American aircraft brgan reaching the fleet (January 1943). The Gruman 56L Hellcat would be the mainstay of the U.S Navy during the Pacific War. Gradually American flyers had planes with capababilities well beyond those of the Zero. The seizure of the Marianas and the deployment of of the new long range B-29 bombers brought the Japanese homeland within range of strategic bombardment. The initial raids were inclonclusive. General Curtis LeMay devised a strategy of fire bombing which caused massive destruction in Japanese citis crammed with highly flameable wooden structures. When Japan refused to surender after the Yalta Conference, President Truman ordered the use of tha Atomic Bomb in August 1945. The Japanese surendered in September.

Naval War

There was a complete mismatch btween China and Japan in naval terms. China had no navy of any imporance. There thus were no naval battles, but this does not mean that that ther was no naval component of the War. China did not have the industris to ight a modern war with Japan. Tht mean that outside ssistance was vital and this could only be revived in the quantity needed by sea transport. The Japanese had the powerful Imperial Fleet . The Imperial Fleet provided powerful support to the Imperial Army on coastal areas, such as the impotant fight fir Shahghai. (1937). And it asisted the Army in seizing port adtr port as the Japanese moved south, gradually isolating China from outside help. which for much of 1942 would dominate the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. After Midway (Hune 1942) and the ferocious naval batles in the South Pacific (August-Novmber 1942), the era of Japanese naval dominance was over, although they still controlled Chinese coastal waters. he Chinese coastal route was the only route tht Japanese Marus had any hope of gtting raw material frim the Southern Resource Zone back to Home Islands to supply war industries. The United States considered invading Fomosa (Taiwan) which would have further cut Japanese aea lanes and led to the opening of a Chinese port (July 944). Gen MacArthure made the case, however, for the Philippines as the next American objectie. After the Philippines, the mericans were set on aive nort to the Home Islands rather thn any diversion toward China. This left Chinese ports in coatal hnds for the rest of the War. American supplies began to dlow in over the Hump from India (1942). The route was the longest supply change of the War. Imense quantities of shipping was needed to even get suppliies to India. Abd then there was ihe obtacle of the towering Humilaysa becaue the Jpanese had cut the Burma Road. The Americans finaly built the Ledo Road, cinecting wih the nothern leg of the old Burma Road (January 1945), but deliveries were still limited. What wasneeded was a port. And this became a primary objective of the Nationalists who began offensives against the Japanese (1945). In the end, the Japanese surrendered before the Nationalsts seized a port militarily.

Created: 8:55 AM 3/10/2016
Last updated: 12:15 AM 7/10/2020