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As Britain moved toward war in the late-1930s, the issue of how war information should be handled arose. Britain like America had a free press so unlike the Fascist and Communist dictatorships, there was no easy answers other than the dictatorships were so blatantly evil and determined to have a war that it was their actions (And the information available in 1939 just skimmed the surface as to how evil these dictatorships actually were.) It would be Hitler himself that convinced the pacifist-minded British people that they would have to fight another horrific war. It was certainly not Government propaganda. In fact, Chamberlain as part of his appeasement effort toward Herr Hitler, attempted to keep information about the extent of German rearmament from the British people. He felt that growing anti-German feeling was impairing his attempt to reach an understanding with Hitler. This was Chamberlain's almost fatal mistake, misjudging Hitler's character and the possibility of peace. The totalitarian NAZI state should have given Chamberlain a clue, but it did not. Hitler was mystified after the fall of France as to why Britain refused to make peace, unable to comprehend that it was his behavior and decisions that made peace with Britain impossible. There were precedents for managing information during war time. Near the end of World War I, Britain established a Ministry of Information--MoI (1918-19). It was created during the the crisis created by German preparations to win the War with men released from the Eastern Front after the collapse of the Russian Army. Press baron Lord Beaverbrook was the first Minister, but the MoI continued to operate for months after the end of the War. The British Government toyed with reestablishing the Ministry during the Munich Crisis, but it was not actually established until a day after the Government declared war on Germany (September 4, 1939). There were several ministers, but Anti-Appeasers Duff Cooper and Brendon Bracken were the most important. They did not have to justify going to war, Hitler had done that for them. The major issues faced by the MOI was how to maintain morale in the face of catastrophic battlefield defeats and the Blitz. The MoI also provided valuable information helping the public cope with the war situation, especially after the fall of France when Britain became the front line of the War (June 1940). The first efforts were rather amateurish compared to Goebbels' sleek NAZI Ministry of Propaganda output, but the British would learn. And as in World War I, America would become a major target.
As Britain moved toward war in the late-1930s, the issue of how war information should be handled arose. Britain like America had a free press so unlike the Fascist and Communist dictatorships, there was no easy answers other than the dictatorships were so blatantly evil and determined to have a war that it was their actions (And the information available in 1939 just skimmed the surface as to how evil these dictatorships actually were.) It would be Hitler himself that convinced the pacifist-minded British people that they would have to fight another horrific war. It was certainly not Government propaganda. In fact, Chamberlain as part of his appeasement effort toward Herr Hitler, attempted to keep information about the extent of German rearmament from the British people. He felt that growing anti-German feeling was impairing his attempt to reach an understanding with Hitler. This was Chamberlain's almost fatal mistake, misjudging Hitler's character and the possibility of peace. The totalitarian NAZI state should have given Chamberlain a clue, but it did not. Hitler was mystified after the fall of France as to why Britain refused to make peace, unable to comprehend that it was his behavior and decisions that made peace with Britain impossible. There were precedents for managing information during war time.
There were precedents for managing information during war time. Near the end of World War I, Britain established a Ministry of Information--MoI (1918-19). It was created during the the crisis created by German preparations to win the War with men released from the Eastern Front after the collapse of the Russian Army. Press baron Lord Beaverbrook was the first Minister, but the MOI continued to operate for months after the end of the War.
It was Hitler himself that convinced the pacifist-minded British people that they would have to fight another horrific war. It was certainly not Government propaganda. In fact, Chamberlain as part of his appeasement effort toward Herr Hitler, attempted to keep information about the extent of German rearmament from the British people. He felt that growing anti-German feeling was impairing his attempt to reach an understanding with Hitler. This was Chamberlain's almost fatal mistake, misjudging Hitler's character and the possibility of peace. The totalitarian NAZI state should have given Chamberlain a clue, but it did not. Hitler was mystified after the fall of France as to why Britain refused to make peace, unable to comprehend that it was his behavior and decisions that made peace with Britain impossible. There was the Oswald Mosley Fascists and the tea with Hitler crowd, but the overwhelming majority of the British people looked ion Hitler and the NAZIs with disdain, although they passionately wanted ton avoid another war. The British Government toyed with reestablishing the MoI during the Munich Crisis (1938).
The MoI was not actually reestablished until a day after the Government declared war on Germany (September 4, 1939). The early action suggests that it was a matter of some concern. The Government led at first by Neville Chamberlain decided to follow the World War I precedent of not taking over the media. The Government did not suppress either newspaper reporting or editorial freedom. They allowed allow debate and discussion. The Government's major mechanism of control would be controlling the flow of information made available to the media. Chamberlain was severely criticized and for a time in 1942 there was possibility that Churchill might be replaced. There were , however, no new election until after NAZI Germany surrendered.
Americans are used to commercial radio, but around the world Governments took various approaches to radio. Radio broadcasting arose after World War with the technological advances made during the War. And the British decided that the new medium was to important to be allowed to be controlled by market forces. (Americans might have said it was too important to be controlled by government and showed up in the appeasement debate.) It began as local radio for technological reasons. This worked for the British and both entertainment and news programming was presented by the BBC. The BBC abandoned local radio and the first national services were born (1930s). The BBC eared a very positive reputation in the inter-War years. However, it has to be said that the opposition to appeasement was primarily in the print media. The BBC was very supportive of the Chamberlain Government and appeasement. It was notable that during the appeasement debate before the War, the BBC refused to air Churchill's speeches opposing appeasement. Something not often mentioned in the discussion of the BBC and political bias. During the war itself, however,the BBC established a powerful reputation for credibility. Of course this was in part because the primary metric for comparison was Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry. At any rate this proved to be an asset during the war. George Orwell after the War wrote, "The BBC as far as its news goes has gained enormous prestige since about 1940 … 'I heard it on the radio' is now almost equivalent to 'I know it must be true.'" It is important to note that unlike Chamberlain, Churchill did not muzzle his critics in the BBC. Commercial broadcasting would not appear in Britain until well after the War in the 1970s.
There were several ministers. Chamberlain appointed John Reith (January 1940-May 1940). Reith set the tone for British war propaganda. Reith was the former director general of the BBC. He set two governing principles: 1) news was the 'shock troops of propaganda' and 2) that propaganda was most effective when believable, especially when it told 'the truth, nothing but the truth and, as near as possible, the whole truth'. Stirring words. Of course that was NOT what the BBC did during the appeasement debate. They did not broadcast Churchill's speeches or those of other prominent appeasement critics. That was rather unrealistic in World War II, but the BBC set a high standard. Upon becoming prime-minister, the Minister of Information was one of the first replacements Churchill made. Churchill appointed Anti-Appeasers Duff Cooper (May 1940-July 1941) and Brendon Bracken who served until the Germans surrendered (July 1941-May 1945).
The MoI did not have to justify going to war, Hitler had done that for them. The major issues faced by the MoI was how to maintain morale in the face of catastrophic battlefield defeats and the Blitz. The MOI also provided valuable information helping the public cope with the war situation, especially after the fall of France when Britain became the front line of the War (June 1940). The first efforts were rather amateurish compared to Goebbels' sleek NAZI Ministry of Propaganda output, but the British would learn.
The MoI was not a purely domestic operation. As in World War I, America would become a major target. Without America, Britain could not defeat a NAZI Germany dominating the Continent. It was thus important that British new releases, primarily the BBC broadcasts, be creditable to American listeners. If Britain was going to collapse like France, it did not make sense to back a defeated power.
Unlike the propaganda phrase commonly used, Britain was never alone. In addition to steadily increasing support from the United States, Britain was firmly backed by the Empire, especially the Dominions (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa). The situation in India was a little different, but the country was very important to the British war effort. The Indian Congress Party launched the Quit India effort, but the Indian Army remained loyal to Britain and played an important role in the Middle East and CBI campaign. The individual countries had a marginal impact on the war, but overall the Empire as a whole was a very valuable ally akin to a major power. It thus was important for Britain to maintain morale and support throughout the Empire. Again, the the MoI had to thread the needle. It has to alert the Empire to the threat, but not give the impression that there would be a collapse as in France. Again the MoI effectively helped maintain the support of the Empire providing men, food, goods, and raw material to the war effort. Recognizing this, the ministry set about detailing to the British public the vital contribution made by these countries to the common cause.The MoI kept the British public informed of the contribution of the Empire. It also attempted to inform the colonies of what Fascism mean to the colonial people. This effort does no seem to have been notably successful because outside of the Dominions, the experience of people in the Empire was imposed British rule. Now while Fascist including Japanese rule was far more oppressive, actual personal experience is often a major factor in forming opinions. The MoI attempted to demonstrate what Britain was doing for its colonized peoples. The MoI issued a series of pamphlets -- 'Victory is Vital'. These were very simple publications using a basic level of literacy. Today they would be seen as patronizing. They had to deal with Japanese 'Asia for the Asians' propaganda which persuaded some Asians, especially in Burma and the Dutch East Indies (modern Indonesia). One problem area was the Middle East where the British were fighting the Germans and Italians and the Afrika Korps advanced to a few miles from Suez. This was a little surprising given the brutality of Italian occupation, involving chemical weapons, and the contempt that the Germans had for Semitic people. But again experience is a powerful matter and the British had occupied or heavily influences areas from Egypt east to Iran (Persia). And there was the traditional fact of the Zionist Movement in British Palestine. Many Arabs were attracted to NAZI genocidal policies toward the Jews. The Palestinian Grand Mufti was welcomed by the NAZIs and pent the war comfortably in Germany encouraging the NAZIs to murder more Jews. The British managed to hold on, but if Rommel had broken through in Egypt, the Germans would have had many Egyptian and other Arab supporters. There were MoI efforts. The MOI published beautifully illustrated children’s storybooks aimed at the Middle East and other Muslim audiences. hey were illustrated by W. Lindsay Cable, who illustrated Enid Blyton’s books (1940-42). He worked on other projects fir the MoI. The titles included "Hussein & Johnny" and "Ahmad & Johnny" and were published in Arabic, Farsi, and other Middle Eastern languages.
The MoI worked through a range of media. The BBC was its most powerful voice. And not only for the domestic audience. After the fall of France, the BBC was virtually the only ray of hope for a captive Europe under NAZI control. The print media was unlike the BBC not controlled by the Government print media, but largely dependent on the Government for its sources. Britain had next to Germany the major European film industry which was especially true when the French film industry fell into NAZI hands. Regular film production continued which not only helped to maintain morale at home, but films like "Mrs, Minerva" helped influence American opinion. The film industry also made documentaries to help civilians maker the best of the War such as how to prepare tasty meals with what was available. Other activities included curating exhibitions of various sorts. A huge range of posters of varying artistic value were printed. Some of which are archived on CIH. Some of this output will be familiar to readers. Perhaps the least publicized area of MoI activities is publishing. A wide range of books, periodicals, pamphlets, and even postcards were produced by the MoI. Hitler's outrageous conduct meant that an explanation for the declaration was not needed. By this time most Brits had come to the conclusion that appeasement had been a great mistake and the Government had gone way to far in appeasing Hitler. Chamberlain and appeasement until AFTER Munich had been strongly supported, although thuis was in part because the Chamberlain had manged the news keeping information on German rearmament from the public. . (Based on the World War I experience, however, World War Ii would be even more terrible and that the public would need to be reminded and the war effort explained. The Blitz proved to be a nearly year-long reminder. The first such publication was "Why Britain is at War". "The Outbreak of War" contained the text of speeches and radio broadcasts made by leading politicians and a "message to his people” from King George VI. This was followed by "Hitler in his own words". It contained a series of diplomatic documents released by the Foreign Office, using Hitler's own words to condemn the German dictator. These publications were official documents without photographs or illustrations and in most cases without interrogative comments. The idea was to permit the documents to speak for themselves. This approach was abandoned very quickly. One early project was "How Hitler Made the War" (October 1939). Book seller WH Smith warned that 'nobody would want to buy it' 'because of the lack of illustrations'. One historian believes that official censorship initially imposed proved to be a 'farce'. He contends that censors focused too heavily in details and a range of administrative issues. And as a result, the press had become contemptuous of the efforts and began ignoring them. [Welch] This put the system of 'voluntary' system in jeopardy and official compulsory censorship possible. The Government decided that the DoI would be responsible agency, largely because it was important to integrate news reporting with what might be called 'positive propaganda'. The MoI administered this operation so well that the still free press, the BBC, and other groups involved effectively maintained the trust of both the British domestic population as well as the listening public abroad. This was not only in America and other neutrals as well as people trapped in NAZI-occupied Europe. The BBC successfully thread the needle between being honest, free, and truthful while at the same time giving nothing of real value to the Germans carefully monitoring British broadcasts. This was a remarkable achievement given all the distressing news that dominated war reporting until late-1942. After the disasters of 1939-40, the British censorship system was operating so successfully that most people, including BBC listener, were largely unaware that an effective form of per-censorship was operating. and this included the BBC. The result was even with wartime propaganda, the British often based on BBC broadcasts gained a reputation for truth and accuracy in sharp contrast to the Germans and Japanese. Of course this was especially true beginning by late-1942 when the Axis began to suffer major battlefield losses.The material did not all ficus on military issues. There was far more, such as encouraging the British people to savor the culinary delights and health qualities to be found offered by Potato Pete and Doctor Carrot. A major problem in cooking savory dishes is that there was virtually no onions to be had anywhere in Britain. Britain imported most of their onions from France. Thus there was no onion character. There was alsom material abut women in the workforce, although no Rosy the Riveter character emerged. There was also material on T how important figures such as members of the Royal Family continued to demonstrate solidarity with the British people as they resisted NAZI bombing, shortages, and loss of loved ones. Postcards showed inspirational figures such as Churchill, Monty, and 'Bomber' Harris. Although at the end of the War, the British Government began walking away from Harris.
After VE-Day, bureaucrats in the MoI attempted to create a permanent place for en its role in the British Government. The Germans were the major adversary and after VE-Day the public began to demand an end to war-time restrictions. Churchill was defeated in the first General Election since 1935 (July 1945). Even after Labour came to power, the MoI continued to exist. Finally it was it was unceremoniously closed (March 1946. Duff Cooper, a former DoI minister maintained that a centralized propaganda bureau had no place in Britain's post-war democracy. In his memoirs, he wrote, "I believe the truth of the matter to be that there is no place in the British scheme of government for a Ministry of Information." [Cooper] Of course that did not mean that bias was eliminated in BBC broadcasts or Government 'information campaigns' ceased, but the wea age of wartime propaganda and censorship was ended.
Cooper, Duff. Old Men Forget (London: Faber & Faber, 1953).
Welch, David. Persuading the People: British Propaganda in World War II.
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