Figure 1.--NAZI Propagnda Minister Josef Gobbeks edffectively hid the true nature ofthe Dustche Wehrmachtr, especially the Ostheer. He wanted tanks and more tanks for the weekly movie newreels. The problem is that 80 percent of the Ostheer was unmotorized infantry. One question rarely asked is why was so much of the Ostheer unmotoriozed when the Germans had invented Blitzkrieg and had a larger industrial capacity thjan the Soviedt Union. Part of the ansewer to the questiion is German industrial policy. Here we see the resukt. We see the German Army in the last phase of the drived in Mosdcow (November 1941).

The automobile industry was vital in World War II, more important than many recognizd at the outst of the War. Of course a country does not win wars with automobiles. But industrial wars are on by mass producing the weapons of war. The same plants that could build cars could not only buld mikitary wheeled wheeled vehicles (trucks), but also tanks, planes, and other implements of war. Only it would take time to fully retool and gear up for war, a little more than a year. It would take even longer to build plants like Willow Run specifically designed to produce specific weapons systems. And a country with experience with large-scale assembly lines was in the best position to design assembly lins for the key World War II weapons systems. And that country would be the United States and mass production would be at the center of the Arsenl of Democracy and the key to victory. So much of the War shifted from the foot soldier to motorized and saerial fire power and moving men and equipment rapidly in mass. This was Hitler's great mistake. He was in mny ways a creature of World War I and did not fully understand how warfare had changed. It was not so much the decision to invade the Soviet Union that doomed NAZI Germany, but sending the largely unmotorized Ostheer East on foot with horse-drawn carts. Goebbels propaganda films focused on tanks and aircraft desguised this, but 80 percent of the Ostheer was unmotorized infantry. Hitler also badly misjudged how quickly American industry could convert for war. Another factor deeply inbedded in German industrial policy was high qulity and craftmanship. This mzay sound like an zadvntage, but it is the opposite of mass production assmbly lines. Hitler for exmple resisted producing stamped out weaponry. He wanted high-quality profuction. One reason the Soviets outproduced the Germans in key weapons systens like like tanks even though the Germans had a much larger steeel industry, The Soviets eagerly adopted American mass poduction assembly line-techniques. And Soviet industrial policvy was an important factor in their Ostkrieg victory. The Germans built tanks designed to last a life time. The Sovits understood that the life-span of World War II weaons systems was ststidsuclly in months and un combat often n a matter of hours. And thus bult threir tanks, plsnes, and guns to reflct this--meaning the raw material and labor that went into a Soviet tank was fraction of that of German tanks. This had a significant impact on production numbers.

Created: 3:26 AM 2/20/2022
Last updated: 3:26 AM 2/20/2022