Figure 1.--World War II was not only an industrial war, but awar of movement. The countrues that could produce the most modern implements of war were likely to win the war. This meant the mastery of the assembly line and mass production--essentiallyn the Unitged States. Not only could the Unites States produce weapons in vast quantuty, byt the huge autombile industry produced the needed vehicles of war in numbers the Germns could only dream about. This was largly because American car companies beginning with the model-T buiilt vast number of very basic cars that the average American worker could aford. German industrialists actulluy looked dowen on American industry. Germsn companies built expensive, beautifully crafted cars that only the well-to-do could aford. As a result the German autoimotive industry had a capaciy only a small fraction of the American industry. The very basic car here we think is Ford probably about 1925. As the Germbs fiound to theur detiment, beautifullky crafted weonry is not a way to win an industruial war. Compare this car with the the sleek, finely crafted cars being produced in bassically cradt workshops by the Germans.

The automotive sector first became a factor in World War I. American trucks would be an important factor in the cWar. The Germans, however, asked for van armisdtice before American indutry had fully coverted to war priduction. World War II was very different. The American auotomotive industry would play a crucially imoportant role. And it was far larger than in World War I. In fact the American automotive industry had an economic footpeint larger than the entire economies of most countries. After Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt after nearly a decade of lambasting businessmen, he called then 'economic royalists.' he turnbed to them in aesperate effort to save America. And he understood the importance of the automotive industry. World War II was an industrial war and industry would be America's route to victory. In fact, the President called the leading and higest paid businessman (Outside Hollywood) in the country--the chairman of General Motors--William Knudsen. His job became to mobilize the Arsenal of Democracy for War. America would not omly arm it's own miliilary, but help arm it's fighting allies. And at the heart of the production miracle that followed would be Knudsen and the American automotive industry. America had dominated the sector before the War. Unlike other countries, it was not only the well-to-do who owned cars in America. Henry Ford had brought the automobile within thw purchasing power of the average wprker. And a huge industry had grown up to fill that demand. The British automotive sector was a distant second and Germany far behind. German car ownereshipp was a tiny fraction of American car onership and this was reflected in the size of the German automotive sector. The Italian sector was even smaller and the Japanese auto sector viurtually non existent. Of course a country does not win wars with automobiles. But the same plants that could build cars could also turn out trucks, tanks, planes, and other implements of war, only it would take time to fully gear up for war, a little more thsn a year. It proved to be, however, the key to victory. So much of the war shifted from the foot soldier to notorized fire power and moving men and equioment rapidly in mass. This was Hitler's great mistake, he did not fully understand how warfare had changed. It was not so much the decision to invade the Soviet Union that doomed NAZI Germany, but sending the largely unmotoirized Ostheer East on foot with horse-drawn carts and how quickly American industry could convert for war.

Chronology

The autmobile combined with the internal combution engine was a German invention. (190s) They made fine automobiles as did the British and French as well as American manufacturers. They were, however, finely crafted vehicles made in essentially craft shops in small numbers and were very expensive (!900s). The automobile was a play thing for the wealthy. Henry Ford took the insightful step of applying assembly line manufacturing techniques to motor vehicle contruction. The result was the Model-T -- a vehicle for the average man. Many Europeans sneered at the Model-T. It was not finely crafted automoble. Thry saw it as shoidy amdf ignored the tevhnologucal innovations. It was cheap and American workers were paid enought to aford one. The result was a huge new industry for America's already expanding industry. At the time, the United States was the largest industril economy in the world. The automobile industry enabled it to grow far beyond the capacity of the European countrues. When World War I began, transportation was just beginning to make the move from horse carts to trucks. In this trasition, Europe was far behind America, in large part thanks to Ford's Model-T. World War I proved to be a major turning point in transportation. Before the War, goods were mostly delivered to cities by rail and then horse-drawn waggons to wholesalers and reyailers. Small trucks began to be built by Ford in large numbers. And the advantages of motorized vehicles soon became apparent. America's principal World War I industrial contribution to the Allies was delvering trucks in large numbrs. And in America this led to the mass production of relatively inexpensive trucks. The mass production of cars was largely an American phenomenon. Amnd the Roaring Twenties meant evrngreater production of cars. Companies moved beyomf the clunky Model-T. There were big powerful cars, but compnies continued to produce low-cost models. Well paying jobs ewere plrenyiful snd peolke bought cars. The Europeans were more reluctsnt to make the shift to mass production was much slower. European companies were less interested in mass production prefering to produce more expensive, better crafted vehicles. The Germans were especually reluctnt. This meant a more restricticted market and a substantially smaller industry. Ford and General Motors had subsidiaries in Europe and Japan. But the Europeans were still reluctantg to adopt The American automobile industry was hard hit by the Depression. Curiosly many of the unemployed owned cars. Will Rogers quipped, "America was the first country to go to the poor house in the auromobile." merican poducion fell 75 prcent in th first few years iof the Depression (!929-32). The capacity of the Americn indudstry, howevr, was still huge. Hitler was especilly interested in casrs. He promoted mass production and the Volkswaggen for the German worker, but to little affect. The Germns were still intent on crsaftsmnship, The Soviets cintracted with merucan companies and did adopt mass production techniwques. Hitler was too anxious to launch his War, however, to wait for the German automobile industry to grow. Thus the utomoble industry was not fully capable of equipping the Wehrmacht. By contrast the American automobile industry was fully capable, but American did not have a substantial army to equip. Instead American automobile companies in 1939 were having their first good year since the onset of the Depression, chuning out sleek new cars using large quantituies of steel, copper, and chrome.

Mechanization

Germany after the United States, Germany was the greatest industrialized country in the world. This gave it an enormous ability to build arms -- a potential it did not fully capitalize on for a variety of reasons. A major problem for Hitler and the NAZIs, however, was that the automobile industry was not a major part of German industry. America at the turn-of-the 20th century was the leading industrialized country in world, but only a little above Germany and Britain. It was the automobile industry led by Henry Ford and the Model-T Ford that propelled America into the industrial stratosphere. The automobile and internal combustion engine are not themselves actual weapons, but are essential for modern warfare, because of the importance of mobility. This began to show in World War I when trucks, aircraft, and tanks played an important role. But it was in World War II that motor vehicles and the internal combustion engine would play a decisive role. And thanks to none other than NAZI Propaganda Minister, Josef Goebbels, this is not well understood. Goebbels was a film addict and for his propaganda films he loved to have tanks photographed. No country filmed tanks more than Germany. This has left us with a poor understanding of the German Army. We are left with countless images of German Panzers rolling over Poland, the Low Countries, France and then the western Soviet Union. Fortunately for humanity, filming tanks and manufacturing them are two very different matters. The United States and the Soviet Union both greatly out produced the Reich in tanks and other motor vehicles. The the Panzer Divisions and mechanized infantry were less than 20 percent of the German Army. Some 80 percent of the Ostheer moved east on foot with horse-drawn cars carrying their supplies and often moving their artillery. Goebbels wasn't, however, as enamored with horses and his photographers were instructed to focus on tanks. Much of this film footage survived, unlike the tanks, and plays an enormous role in World War II documentaries even today. Goebbels film footage gives the impression that the Germany Army was an ultras-modern modern, highly mechanized force. It was not. And part of the reason for this was that the automobile sector was a small part of German industry. When Hitler and Stalin launched World War II by invading Poland (September 1939), there were 47 Germans for every motorized vehicle. Germany's Axis allies were in even worse shape. There were 104 Italians for every motor vehicle. The situation in Britain and France was very different. There were some 14 Brits for every motor vehicle and 8 Frenchmen. And most prominently just 3 Americans. [Whitaker] We do not have data on the Soviet Union, but its motor vehicle industry was substantial -- few cars, but large numbers of trucks, and tractors. And like NAZI Germany they were producing substantial numbers of tanks and aircraft before the War. (The Soviets had the world's largest armored and air foirce at the time of the NAZI Barbarossa invasion.) After Hitler invaded they also received huge numbers if American trucks through Lend-Lease. Of course Britain and France in 1939 were just beginning to use that capacity that capacity to build arms in 1939. And America was even further behind. But large motor vehicle industries had enormous implications. It meant there were great factories building vehicles and engines in large numbers as well as all the ancillary industries to support those factories. As importantly the needed petro-chemical industries to fuel and maintain large fleets of vehicles. And vitally those factories could be converted to war production in a relatively short period of time. Hitler because of enormous military spending and imaginative, if ghastly immoral, generals who invented Blitzkrieg had a huge advantage, the potential to win the War by over running poorly prepared countries before they had built up their defenses. His gamble succeeded with France, but failed with Britain. And Hitler soon found himself fighting not only Britain, but the Soviet Union, and the United States. The Channel and Atlantic Ocean protected America and Britain, but when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, the great bulk of the Ostheer, Goebbels film footage not withstanding, moved east on foot with horse-drawn carts. The Soviet Union had adopted American-styled production techniques to produce trucks and tractors as well as tanks. And unlike France had the time and space to absorb the initial German blow. The mechanization story did not end there. The NAZIs overran much of Europe. This gave them access enormous productive power and resources. But the NAZIs never converted that potential into actual production. They did in Czechoslovakia, but not in highly industrialized France, Belgium, and the Netherlands which could have more than double their motor vehicle production.

Countries

The automobile was largely invented by French and Germans, but only in America did it become a huge part of the national economy. Henry Ford produced the Model-T Tin Lizzie (1908). It was not a luxury car made in a craft shop fir a small number of wealthy people, it was cheaply made on an assembly line, but American workers could afford it and thus sold in extraordinary numbers. America was already the greatest industrial power in the world, but he automobile put in in line to becoming a greater industrial nation than all of Europe. Not only did American producers more cars than all the rest of the world, but much of the production in other countries came from the subsidiaries of American American manufacturers. There were huge economic consequences. Manufacturing cars led to the expansion of major new industries, like the rubber industry and oil industry. Other counties built cars, but notably Germany and Japan built cars and trucks in relatively small numbers. This would have huge consequences when they decide to make war on the Allies (Britain and France) and eventfully the United States. The War would be a mobile conflict and although cars were not a military weapon trucks were vitally important, especially when Germany and Japan decide to plunge into the Soviet Union and China, respectively. And they did so with an army largely on foot--a huge miscalculation . Britain was the only country that began the War with a fully motorized army. Even the United States did not have a fully motorized army in 1939. But the military potential of the automobile plants was far beyond just producing trucks. The same Detroit assembly lines that turned out chrome-laden steel automobiles would soon be turning out tanks and aircraft in huge numbers and the engines that drove them. The Soviet Union was a case of its own and a vital one in World War II. The Soviet industrialization effort included the mass production of motor vehicles. An for the needed technology, Stalin turned to the capitalist West, primarily American companies. Germany also had American subsidiaries, but while the Soviets took mass production to heart, the Germans were dismissive of it. The outcome of World War II would be powerful affected by this cultural mindset.

Oil

Oil was imprtant in World War I. The navies of the day were shifting from coal to oil, in part because it significsntly reduced the smoke trail. Tanks and trucks emerged as militarily important. And planes rquired high-octane gasoline. But draft animals remained vital to moving armies and arrtillery. Bcause of American trucks, the Allies were much more mechanized than the Central Powers. While important in World War I, oil was critical in World War II. Strategic materials played a critical role in World War II, in both the desire to launch the War and in the ability to wage an extended conflict. Several materials were important. The key resource was, however, without doubt oil. The vast mechanized rmies, navies, and air fleets mobilized by the combatant countries required vast quantiies of petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) products. Modern war was impossible without oil. Much of the German Ostkrieg attempted in and apaid a haevy price. The fighting circled the globe and warfare became both mobile and mechanized. Military forces required huge quantuities of voil for air, land, and sea operations. Oil was not evenly destributed arond the world. Some countries had a great deal and other countries very little. The two major producers were America and the Soviet Union. America produced vast quantities of oil, to supply its industries and the many civilians who owned cars. Gasoline rationing was the major complsint Americans had on the hoime front during the War. It hs been said that the Allies floated to victory on aea of American oil. It also exported large qantities. The Soviet Union produced less, but still very large quantiies. Procuction in the Caucauses was especilly important. Britain and France had very limited domestic production, but imported from America and American associated countries Mexico and Venezuela). Fields in Middle east and India supplied Btitish field armies and Indian Ocean Mediterannean fleets. The Axis on othe other hand had very limited domesic oil resources. Japan in particular was almost entirely dependent on American oil. Some British analysts believed that the Germans could not launch another war because it lacked adequate domestic oil producion. Theywere wrong, but oil wold become a major concern for the Axis. The Germans managed to cobbel together enough domestic production, synthetic fuel production, and terrestrial imports (primarily from Romania and the Soviet Union--until 1941) to run their war effort, although oil was a serious contraint throughout the War. They even got the Soviets to ship them oil. Oil remained, however, a primary concrn for German planners and was one of the enducements in invading the Soviet Union. Oil was even more critical for the Japanese who were dependent on Americn oil exports. Thus the Soutthrn Resource Zone (SRZ), especially the oil-rich Dutch East Indies becane a primary objective. Inconveniently for the Japanese, the American controlled Philippines Islands backed by the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor lay between the Home Islands and the DEI. The Axis began the War without adequate domestic oil resources, but a major part of their wars trategy was to acquire needed oil supplies. The Allies, especially America, had plentiful sources of oil as did the Soviets. The British with the Royl Navy were able to keeo\p the sealanes open so they could import oil and blockade Germny's access to maritime imports. Allied war planners understood the vulnerability of the Axis war economy, but at first lacked the mikitary capability to attack the German and Japanese oil industries. Eventually destroying Germny's synthetic oil industry and cutting the sea lanes by which Japan attempted to ship the oil of the Soothern Resource Zone back to the Home Islands became war-winning operations.

Importance

The automobile industry was vital in Woitrld War II, more imortant than many rcognizd at the outst of the War. Of course a country does not win wars with automobiles. But industrial wars are on by mass producing the weapons of war. The same plants that could build cars could not only also turn out amyh wheeled vehicles (trucks), but aldso tanks, planes, and other implements of war, only it would take time to fully retool and gear up for war, a little more than a year. It would take even longer to build plants like Willow Run specifically designed to produce specific weapons systems. And a country with experience with large-scale assembly lines was in the best position to design assembly lins for the key World War II weapons systems. And that country would be the United States and mass production would be at the center of the Arsenl of Democracy and the key to victory. So much of the War shifted from the foot soldier to motorized and saerial fire power and moving men and equipment rapidly in mass. This was Hitler's great mistake. He was in mny ways a creature of World War I and did not fully understand how warfare had changed. It was not so much the decision to invade the Soviet Union that doomed NAZI Germany, but sending the largely unmotorized Ostheer East on foot with horse-drawn carts. Goebbels propaganda films focused on tanks and aircraft desguised this, but 80 percent of the Ostheer was unmotorized infantry. Hitler also badly misjudged how quickly American industry could convert for war. Another factor deeply inbedded in German industrial policy was high qulity and craftmanship. This mzay sound like an zadvntage, but it is the opposite of mass production assmbly lines. Hitler for exmple resisted producing stamped out weaponry. He wanted high-quality profuction. One reason the Soviets outproduced the Germans in key weapons systens like like tanks even though the Germans had a much larger steeel industry, The Soviets eagerly adopted American mass poduction assembly line-techniques. And Soviet industrial policvy was an important factor in their Ostkrieg victory. The Germans built tanks designed to last a life time. The Sovits understood that the life-span of World War II weaons systems was statisuticlly numbered in months and in combat often a matter of hours. And thus bult threir tanks, planes, and guns accirdijgly -- meaning the raw material and labor that went into a Soviet tank was fraction of that of German tanks. This had a significant impact on production numbers.

Sources

J. Whitaker & Sons. Witaker's Almanack (London: 1939).

Created: 2:42 AM 8/19/2021
Last updated: 5:07 PM 4/27/2022