Figure 1.--Hitler launched World War II thinking that the Luftwaffe would allow him to bomb other countries and prevent them from bombing Germany. Berlin became, however, a target from an early point in the War. At first British Bomber Command had a small force of obselete aircraft. Only a few planes with small payloads could reach the German capital. Berlin proved a difficult target indeed. Not only because of the distance and the Luftwaffe defenses, but the city with its stone buildings and wide avenues could not be destroyed by fire bombing. It would have to be done by high explosives. And the British in 1942 at night and the Americas in 1943 during the day set about destroying the city. Losses wee very high until with the arrival of long range escorts, the Allies succeeeded in destroying the Luftwaffe in 1944. This meant that after Eisenhower released Bomber Commad and the 8th Air Force (September 1944), Berlin and other German cities faced huge waves of unopposed bombers. This painting by Wilhelm Wessel, "Bombing Raid on Berlin, 1943" shows the aftermath of a British night raid.

Argueably the most contoversial aspect of World War II was the Allied strategic bombing campaign. There are two elements of the campaign that remain controversial. First is the effectiveness of the campaign. Second is the morality of the campaign. With the NAZIs in command of the Continent, the only way that Britain could stike at Germany was by air. Germamn air defenses meant that the RAF could only bomb at night and restricted British strategy to areavbombing. This significantly inhibited the effectiveness of British operations. The entry of America into the War meant that the air offensive could be significantly expanded. Both Curchill and Roosevely were committed to strategic bombing. The hope was that strategic bombing would force the NAIs to capitulate. The Allies at Casablanca demanded unconditional suurendetr (January 1943). The American buildup of air forces in Bitain continued throughout 1942 and by the beginning og 1943the 8th Air firce was ready to join the British in an around the clock bombing campaign against Germany. American and British planners agreed on four priority targets: 1) U-boat building facilities, 2) aircraft production plants, 3) ballbearing plants, and 4) oil refineries. Although not at the time, the Allied strategic boming campaign has become the most controversial aspect of World War II.

Forces and Weapons

Even before World WAr II began, the NAZIs were threatening neigboring countries with destruction from the air. Hitler's vaunted Luftwaffe in fact did not have a strategic bombing force. The rapid movement of the Panzers, however, the Luftwaffe's tactical mombers in range allowing them to exact terrible damage. It was the British and Americans, however, that were building a heavy bomber force capable of aging a strategic bombing force. We wonder how many German civilians watching the destruction of Warsaw realized that their Führer had sent in motion forces that would weak the sane damage to their cities. All of the major air forces of the world, including the Luftwaffe, Bomber Command and the U.S Army Air Forces, began the War wedded to the high explosive bomb. This was true despite the fact that as early as World War I the thermite bomb had been developed and its potential known. German had produced a very large stockpile of thermite bombs with the intention of using them against Britain. Churchill reports that the British were preparing a major bombing campaign against Germany for 1919. [Rumpf, p. 103.] The War of course ended before the campaign began. I am not sure why the German thermite bombs were not used. Ludendorff after the War claimed that the General Staff concluded that while they would cause extensive damage, they would not affect the outcome of the War. [Rumpf, p. 93.] Of course what Lundendorff said after the War has to be taken with considerable skepticism. Regardless no country began the War intending to rely on incendiaries. The reason seems to be the same reason naval planners were wedded to battleships. Generals and admirals like big bangs. Thermite bombs meerly fizzled. The Luftwaffe uses incendiaries on London and other British cities, but they were only a secondary part of the bomb load. Geberal Albert Kesslering who oversaw air operations against Britain as commander of Air Fleet 2 wrote, "E overestimated the effect of the high-explosive bomb, as the Allied did later. .... The incendiary bomb was a more efficent weapon; dropped in thousands, even hundreds of thousands, over a given area it could cause fires which would destroy completely, where a high explosive bomb would only damage." [Kesselring] Both the British and Americans began the War using mostly high-explosives. In the inexlorable series of unintended consequences, the Luftwaffe taught the British the potential impact of incendiaries. It took a while for air commnders to extensively employ incendiaries, by it was German cities that were devestated by fire. One of the commanders that learned this less was General Curtis LeMay. When he was transferred to the Pacific, the terrible potential of the thermite bomb was turned against Japanese cities with largely wooden buildings. Assessments after the War concluded that the potential destruction of incendiaries was potentially 4 to 5 greater than high explosive bombs, although this depended somewhat on the target. [Rumpf, p. 99.]

German Civil Defense

After World War I, it was widely assumed that the next war if it ever came would include a strategic bombing campaign. Such a campaign was being planned in World War I, but the War ended before it could be launched. It was also widely believed that such a campaign would include the use of poison gas. It was not wideky understood at the time that incediaries were the most devestating munitions. Thus far more consideration was given to poison gas than fire. Because of the fear, the major European powers engaged in a range of civil defence programs. The most intensive steps were taken in Britain, probably because of the German bombing raids durung World war I. The British gave more attention to poson gas and evacuation than bomb shelters before the War. They also built the Chain Home radar network that played such an important role in the Battle of Britain. The Germans also engaged in civil defense planning. This began before the NAZIs seized power, but was instensified as the the War approached. The NAZIS, however, did not fully appreciate the value of radar at the beginning of the War, apparently thinking that the strength of the Luftwaffe would protect German cities. Göring personally assured the German public than the Reich's cities could not be bombed. From the NAZI point of view this was to be the fate of other peoples. NAZI newsreels showed the German people what the Luftwaffe was doing. The most effective way of protecting German cities was to defeat of Britain and France. The Soviets did not have a strategic bomber force and the Atlantic Ocean put the Americans and their B-19 Flying Fortresses out of rnge. The fall of France effectively delayed attacks on German cities. The failure to defeat Britain, however. meant that the attacks were delayed not prevented. The British set about developing a large long-range bomber force. Britain also provided bases for the American 8th Air Force. The delay gave the Germans the time to build not only a formidable air defence lin, but also a first-class Civil Defense system. The Germans also evacuated the children from the cities. About 0.3 million German civilans were killed in the strategic bombing campaign, some estimates are as high as 0.5 million. While apauling in human terms, these losses given the intensity of the Allied bombing campaign are a testimony to the success of the German civil defense effort.

German Western Air Barrier

German entered the War with a powerful tactical air force, but without a strategic bombing force. Air Marshal Göring assured the German people that the Luftwaffe would provide an impregnable air barrier in the West. Numbers of air craft were used to butress the German claim. [Rumpf, p. 37.] The Allies at the onset of the War were not willing to attack German cities in force. A retinence that the Germans did not exhibit during their invasion of Poland. From the beginning of the War Germean newsreels shown in movie theaters showed burning Polish cities. After the fall of France, German cities were for a time beyond the reach of effective attack from RAF Bomber command until the arrival of modern heavy bombers like the Lancaster. The initil Grman fighter defenses were effective enough to force Bomber Commad to shidt to nighttime bombing. Even before this Bomber Command raids became effective, small raids were enough for the Germans to begin constructing an air defense barrier from the North Sea accross the Low countries and western Germany--the route Allied bombers would have t take to attack the Reich's industrial heartland. The Kammhuber Line would become the most fearsome air defense lines of World War II. It include radar, search lights, and Flak batteries backed by German day and night fighters. This was the defensive line the American 8th Air Force faced when it joined the air war with day time raids. It did not prevent Allied air attacks, but it did limit their effectiveness and extracted a heavy toll on Allied air crews and air craft.

Initial British Bombing Campaign (1939-40)

The initial British bombing raids in 1939 dropped leaflets. The British were reluctant to actually bomb German cities, in part fearing reprisal raids from the Luftwaffe. I have little information on the French at this time. There was not significant bombing campign, except for Luftwaffe operations in Poland (September-October 1940), until the Battle of Britain. After the fall of France (June 1940), German cities were no longer as vulnerable to FAF attacks. Bomber Command had only small numbers of heavy bombers and they were slow, poorly defended, and had a limited load capacity. Throughout the Battle of Britain, small numbers of British bombers hit German targets in night time raids. The rids were wholly ineffectual in a military sence. Hitting a military target at night with 1940s technology, especially 1940 technology was very difficult. Sometimes the raiders did not even hit the intended city. Some of the raids were also very costly in air crews and planes. The raids did have an in important psychological impact. British raids on Berlin so enraged Hitler that he ordered a change in Luftwaffe tactics in the Battle of Britain, which may have well resulted in a favorable turn in the battle in favor of the British

Air War Developments (1941)

The air war in the West wound down in 1941. The Luftwaffe launhed some heavy raids on Britiain before shiting east to prepare for Barbarossa. With the attack on the Soviet Union, Luftwaffe bombers were primarily deployed in the East and to a much lesser extent in the Mediterranean. Hitler focused on the Soviet Union and ordered all projects shelved that could not be made operational in 12months. The British conducted raids durng 1941, but they were done with small numbers of planes and with negligble results. More importantly the RAF was pouring enormous resources in Bomber Command and building an increasingly important bomber force. The British during 1942 increased the number of long range four engine bo,bers from 41 to 539. They also were training increasing numbers of air crews. America, although not yet in the War, expanded its commitment to air forces. The United States had develped a long-range startehic bomber in the 1930s--the B-17. Congressional resistance had limited actual construction. The fall of France had changed many minds in Congress concerning military appropriations. President Roosevelt in 1941 ordered Air Chief Hap Arnold to build a strategic bomber force of 5,000 planes. The United States also commenced an enormous pilot and air crew training program.

America Enters the War (December 1941)

Adolf Hitler on December 11, 1941, declared war on the United States. This conviently solved FDR's dilema of how to enter the war against the NAZIs when America had been attacked by the Japanese. Curiously, America was the only country on which Hitler ever declared war. The entry of America into the War changed all calculations of strategic ballance. The Soviets alone in 1941 were already out producuing the Germans in many areas such as tanks. The entry of America was to mean that German war production would be only a fraction of Allied production and that difference was already being felt on the battlefield. The story of American industry in the War is phenomenal. FDR in 1941 was already supplying Britain and the Soviets through Lend Lease. The declaration of war enabled FDR to harnass the vast American economy to war production. This was something that the Germans had still not done as late as 1942. Within the first year alone, America built 24,000 tanks and 48,000 planes. An impressive start, but just the beginning. American industry in 1942 equaled the armaments production of all three AXIS countries combined. And this was occurring at a time when the Societs alone, not to mention the British, were already out producuing the Germans. America in 1944 doubled its arms production again. [Fest, p. 656.] These were numbers the Germans could not hope to match. In no theater did these overwealming numbers show up more than the air campaign. At a time that the Luftwaffe could not fulfill its required role along the vast Eastern Front, a tidal wave of long range American bombers (B-19 Flying Fortresses and B-24 Liberators) flowed into England, each had the range to hit every German city including Berlin. The American planes began arriving in England early in 1942. England became, in effect, a huge unsinkable air craft carrier in the North Sea. Combined with the RAF's new Avro-Lancasters, the Allies were building a massive air armada aimed at German industry.

Evacuation of German Children (1939-45)

Much less known than the British World War II evacuation of children from urban areas is the German evacuation program evacuating children. The program was called the Kinder Land Verschickung (KLV) which operated during World War II (1939-45). The children had to go to rural areas on "holiday" but really they should be out of the cities and towns that had difficulties feeding them and were being bombed by the Allies. Both schools and the Hitler Jugend (HJ) were involved in organizing thd KLV. The HJ was especially important in the KLV organiation beginning in 1940. About 2.5 million children were send to 9,000 camps until end of World War II. In many cases the children were accomapnied by their teachers.

The British

The British had been bloodied by the Germans. Their initial British reluctance to use their bombers had dissappeared in the Blitz. Churchill made it clear, "We ask no favours of the enemy. No, we will meet out to the Germans the measure and more of the measure that they are meeting out to us. We remember Warsaw in the first few days of the War. .... You do your worst and we will do our best." The man given the job of organising the strategic bombing campaign by RAF Bomber Commasnd became known as 'Bomber Harris' After the War, Bomber Harris was never given recognition for the job he was given and while other commanders recieved Knighthoods Harris never did. It is only recently that a statue to him was erected in Parliament Square. It is the target, as is Winstan Churchill's statue, of leftwing grafitee writers when there is a protest rally.

Bombing Cities

The air plane was first used in any significant way in warfare during World War I. It was used entirely in tactical operations. Plans were in place to begin strtegic bombing in 1919, but the War ended before this began. After the War, military analysts theorized as to the possible military impact of strategic bombing. The idea terrified Europeans, but no one in fact knew about the actual military impact. Both the Axis and Allied powers believed that terror bombing campaigns would undermine civilian moral and destroy their will to fight. Air power in World War II proved to be critical, but the impact was much more complicated than some proponents of air power had theorized. During the World WAr II, terror bombing had mixed results. It proved effective in Poland (Warsaw), the Netherlands (Rotterdam), and Yugoslavia (Belgrade). In other countries such as England (London and Coventry) and Germany (Hamburg), it was not effective in undermiing morale. In Britain ' London Can Take It' unified the civilian population and made them more determined than ever. This would seem to be the situation in Germany where the Allies not only returned tit for tat but bombed German cities to rubble. The differenc appears to be whether the civilian population is prepared and preceives that it is possible to effectively resist. In the instances where tetrror bombing did force the country to surrender, it was accompanied with a land invasion which convinced civilians that resistance was futile. While the strategic bombing campaign failed to destroy the German will to resist, it did play a role in the destruction of the Luftwaffe and finally destroyed the German war economy.

Precession Bombing

The Luftwaffe in the opening weeks of the Battle of Britain persued a precission bombing campaign targetting the RAF. It might well have worked had Hitler not ordered a terror bombing campaign targetting London and other British cities. Americam military planners were wedded to the principle of precession bombing. This became ingrained in the American preparations. The Army Air Corps claimed that they could hit a pickle barrel with their Nordon Mark 15 Bombsite. Considerable accuracy was possible with single bombers in the clear and uncontested skies of the Arizona dessert. Conditions proved very different over northern Europe with the German defenses, the often cloudy weather, aqnd bombers flying in large inflexible formations, Bombers on test runs in Arizona were able to bring bombs to within 500 ft of the tatget. The Eight Air Force persued day light operations in part to achieve achieve constant stress on the Luftwaffe (the British bombed at night) and in part to persue precession raids. Such efforts broke down in some operations. [Budiansky] Actual results achieved by American bombers over northern Europe wre that bombs fell more than 1,000 feet from targets.

Allied Combined Bombing Campaign (1942-44)

Once America joined the War in December 1941, a massive bombing campaign against Germany from England became feasible. America's indistrial potential gave the Allies to mount a strategic bombing campaign orders of magnitude above the Luftwaffe's capability. The air campaign became a major aspect of Allied strategy. While American began building in facilities in 1942, the British debated how to begin the strategic bombing campaign in 1942. Some wanted to target key German industrial sites, especially German synthetic fuel plants. Had they done so at this time might have changed the course of the War. Hiting precission targets, however, over heavily defended, often cloud-covered German cities was no easy matter with 1942 bombing technology. [Speer, p. 287.] In addition the British had been bloodied by the Blitz and the much easier to execute strategy of area bombing was appealing. The strategy of area or terror bombing of civilians won out. RAF planner Charles Portal was the leading abvocate of area bombing. Air Marshall Arthur "Bomber" Harris, the head of RAF Bomber Command, introduced area bombing as the RAF's principal strategy in the bombing campaign. Harris phrased it susinctly, "The Germans sewed the wind, now they will reap the whirllwind." The RAF began its area bombing strategy on March 28, 1942 with a massive night time raid on Lübeck, virtually destroying the historic city. Hitler transferred two bomber groups of about 100 planes each from Sicly which conducted Baedaker targeting historic treasures of British cities. The ballance of forces, however, had turned decidedly against the Germans. The RAF responded on May 30 with its first 1,000 bomber raid on Cologne. The results were devestating. One of the wirst hit cities was Hamburg. Thre were firestorms which destetated the central cities. The firestorms sucked tres, vehichles, sections of buildings, and people into the conflagerations. Those not killed by the bombs and flames were suffocated by the smoke and lack of oxygen. The American 8th Air Force with even larger number of bombers than the British began initial opearions against the Germans in 1943. The Americans opened their full-scale daylight bombing campaign on January 27, 1943 with an attack on Wilhelmshaven. Througout 1943, German cities were exposed to "round the clock bombing" inflict serious civilian casulties. The Americans bombing by day, attempting to hit specific targets using their Nordon bomb sites. The British bombed by night and at best could hit specific cities. Large numbers of German civilians were killed, injured, or rendered homeless. The RAF on May 16-17 began targeting German industry in the Ruhr. The American and British air crews suffered very heavy casulties against German fighters and increasingly effective anti-aircraft guns. At times it was unclear if the bombing campaign could be sustained. Long range fighters were not available in 1942-43 to escort the bombers to their targets in Germany. The actual impact of the campaign was disappointing. German civilian morale did not crack under the British area bombing and the Americans found it much more difficult to hit specifuic industrial targetys than anticipated. Even so, the air campaign forced the Luftwaffe to deploy major assetts defending German cities rather than on the critically important Eastern Front. Especially important large numbers of Luftwaffe fighters and even more important trained pilots were being shot down by the bombers. In addition large numbers of artillery pieces, which could have been used against Russian tanks, had to be diverted to anti-aircraft defenses. These defenses were manned largely by the Hitler Youth.

D-Day (June 6, 1944)

The Allied air campaign against Germany in the months leading up to the Normandy invasion has to be cut back. Targets in France associated with the landings were given the highest priority. The strategic bombing camapign had, however, forced the Luftwaffe to esentially pull back to Germany. As a result, there was virtually no Luftwaffe operations to oppose the Allied landings on June 6. After D-Day and the subsequent operations to support the beach head (June 1944) and breakout (July 1944), the strategic bombing campaign could be resumed in full force against Germany with an ever expanding air armada. The bombers when operations were resumed had fighter escorts, long range P-51 Mustangs which significantly reduced the losses of planes and air crews.

German Economy

Contrary to popular conceptions, the German economy was not effectively harnessed for war. Civilian consumption was not drastuically curtailed as was the case in Britain. Women were not mobilized for war work. Industrial prodiction was not totally directed at the War effort. Only when Albert Speer was appointed Armaments Minister in 1942 did German industry begin to take needed steps to maximize production and reach some of its potential. [Speer] The Germans, as a result, despite the bombing were able to expand war production. Some have used this to charge that the Allied bombing cmpaign was ineffective and a misallocation of resources.

Renewed Allied Air Campaign (September 1944-April 1945)

After D-Day (June 1944), the Allied bombing campaign was significantly intensified. This time the campaign was much different. The bombers now had fighters now had P-38 fighters accompany them from French bases which moved closer to the German border as the Allies took Paris (August 1944). Even longer range P-51 Mustangs, arguably the best propeller fighter of the War were deployed in increasing numbers. The result was a renwed and even more intense Allied air campaign with dramatic decline in Allied air crew losses. And as the fighters engaged Luftwaffe fighters rgere was a dramatic and unsustanable loss of German pilots. The Allies established air surperiority over Germany and bombed German cities at will. Rge Allied bombing killed an estimated 0.6 million German civilians and destroyed or seriously damaged some 6 million homes. Göering is reported to have said that he realized that te War was lost when he first saw the American P-51s over Berlin. Berlin and other major cities by 1945 were wastelands. This time German war production was affected, not only because of the damage to industrial cities, but because the Allies targeted Germany's production of fuel. The Romanian Ploesti oil field were targetted as well as synthetic fuel plants in Germany. About one-third of Germany industry depended on these plants. Most of the Luftwaffe's fuel came from them. [Hillgruber, p. 420ff.] By the end of the War many German units were reduced to using horse drawn carts. The Luftwaffe which still had planes could often not mauntain an effective training program because of fuel shortages and in many cases could even muster the fuel to fly the rapidly dwindling number of remaining planes.

Secret German Weapons

Hitler by late 1944 no longer spoke to the German people in sharp contrast to earlier years when he ws a constant presence on German radio. His deteriorating physical condition, relentlessly depressing reports from the fronts, and the destructon of German cities by Allied bombing were all factors. Hitler's mouth piece Josef Goebbels became his spokesman. Goebbels raged about vengenance and secrt weapons. There were indeed secret weapons. The world's first combat jet, the ME-262, was introduced in 1944. It was an inovative extremely effective fighter and if properly used could have severely impaired the Allied air campaign. Hitler's interference, however, prevented it from being effectively used. The V1 begining June 13 were used to target London and other British cities after the D-Day landings in June 1944. The V1 could be shot down, but there was no defense against the V-2 balistic missles which soon followed. There were many other projects under development or on the drawingboards. Some like the ME-163B Komet were futuristic concepts. Especially significant, however, was a new generation of jet fighters which would have been ready in 1946. Only the Allied bombing camapign prevented some from actually being built.

Dresden

The most criticised Allied air raid occurred at Dresden near the end if the War. The Allies conducted incendiary raids on Dreden February 13-14, creating a firestorm killing thousands of civilian. The raid was ordered hurriedly after a request by Stalin who believed that reenforcements were being rushed through Dresden to counter a Soviet offensive. After Dresden, Prime Minister Churchill ordered Air Marsahll Harris to end to area bombing. Churchill explained: "It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, should be reviewed. Otherwise we shall come into control of an utterly ruined land."

Controversy

The most contoversial aspect of World War II today was the Allied strategic bombing campaign. Interestingly at the time this was not a matter of great reflection, especially before Dresden. There are two elements of the campaign that today controversial. First is the effectiveness of the campaign. Here the debates concerns the earlier phases of the campaign. There is little doubt that in the later phases of the campaign that German industrial production was affected and the mobility and effectiveness of the German war machine shattered. Second is the morality of the campaign. Here too often critics of the campaign use arguments that are essentially a condemnation of war itself. Here it should be remembered that it was Germany that launched World War II. It is true that civilians as the strategic bombing campaign unfolded became the target and as many as 0.6 million German civilians were killed. It is also true that NAZI Germany killed about 12 million civilians and POWs in concentration camps and death camps and was planning the destruction of much larger numbers of civilians had they won the War. German assessments of the strategic bombing campaign usually stress the terrible toll on civilians. Allied assessments normally accenuaye the role of the campaign in destroying the German war machine and by implication saving tens of millions of lives that the NAZIs had slated for destruction and even more that were to be consigned to slave labor in a NAZI dominated New Order.

Historical Reflections

There is a vast body of literature on World War II, both fiction and non fiction. The Battle of Britain, the Blitz, the British evacuation of children, the V weapon attacks, and the Allied air campaign over northern Europe have been covered in thousands of books. There have also been large numbers of movies and television programs, again both documentaries and fiction accounts. These accounts address both the bravery of the aeviators and the suffering and endurance of the British people. Some of the accounts about children and books by adults looking back at their childhood are touching. HBC has drawn from much of this extensive literature and media presentations. Surprisingly given the fact that the Germans suffered more than any people in the War from the aerial campaign there has been an almost defening silence from German writers. We note very few writers or film makers who have addressed the subject.

Sources

Budiansky, Stephen. The Men, Machines, and Ideas that Revolutionized War, from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II (Viking: 2004), 518p.

Corum, James S. Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940" (University Press of Kansas, 2000).

Fest, Joachim C. Hitler (Vintage Books: New York, 1974), 844p.

Freidel, Frank. Franklin D. Roosevelt: Rendezuous with Destiny (Little Brown: Boston, 1990), 710p.

Hillgruber, Andreas. Strategie=Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegführung 1940 bis 1941 (Frankfurk am Main, 1965).

Kesselring, Albert. Soldat nis zum letzten Tage (Bonn, 1953).

Lindkvist, Syen. A History of Bombing (1999). HBC has not yet been able to consult this important work.

Rumpf, Hans. Edward Fitzgerald, trans. The Bombing of Germany (Holt, Rinehart and Winston: New York, 1962), 256p.

Sebald, W.G. Trans by Anthea Bell. On the Natural History of Destruction (Random House), 202p.

Snyder, Louis L. Historical Guide to World War II (1982).

Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich (New York, 1970).

Created: August 20, 2002
Last updated: 11:37 PM 10/10/2007