Figure 1.--The Ardennes was a quiet sector of the front. Here GIs throw a party for some of the loical children. One GI has dressed up as St. Nicholas. U.S. Army |
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The Wehrmacht launched a carefully planned attack against weak Anerican units in the Ardennes (December 16, 1944). The offensive was commanded by Field Marshal Gerd von
Rundstedt. The NAZI panzers stormed westward along a 60-mile front stretching from Saint Vith in Belgium south to Echternach in Luxembourg. The German goal was to break through the American lines, sweep through the Ardennes, and seize Antwerp. The port of Antwerp was essential to the Allied offensive. The major limiting factor to the Allie was supplies and the Allies were beginning to repair the Antwerp port facilities. With Antwerp the British and Canadians in northern Belgium could be cut off and encircled.
The Allied thought the Wehrmacht was esentially defeated and incapable of mounting amajor offensive. The Germans were also careful to avoid sending messages bout the offensive electronically. Thus Ultra did not have a clear picture, although Allied commanders were given some warnings. The Germans forced the U.S. 28th Division to retreat from Wiltz (December 19). Eisenhower ordered the 101st Airborne Division to defend the
vital crossroads town of Bastonge in Belgium. The German panzers pushed west. German Panther and Tiger tanks in many ways were superior to the American panzers, but they were slower and the Tigers could not cross many Belgian bridges, limited possible crosings. They also guzzled huge quantities of fuel and fuel ws the principal limiting facor to the Germand offensive. he German plans were contingent on capturing American fuel depots. When the German offensive began, George S. Patton's 3rd Army to the south was about to launch an invasion into the German Saar. In a brilliant movement, within 2 days, he turned the offensive on a 90° axis and struck northward into the German flank to relieve the 101st Airborne in Bastogne. The 3rd Army liberated Ettlebruck on Christmas Eve and broke through the German lines to relieve Bastogne (December 26). The U.S. 5th Armored Division conducted a surprise night crossing of the River Sure and liberated Diekirch (January 18, 1945). The Germans were pushed back to the positions they held at the start of the battle (January 28). The Whrmacht offensive in the Ardennes delayed the Allied offensive toward the Rhine by about 6 weeks. The llies i the campaign, however, destroyed virtually all of the Wehrmacht reserves and important panzer units as well as futher depleting the Luftwffe. This meant that the ability of the Germans to defend the Rhine and Berlin was significantly reduced.
After the liberation of Paris, the Allies rapidly moved north into Alsace and Belgium, much of which was liberated in September. The Germans fell back toward the Rhine. While most of Belgium was rapidly liberated, the Germans found defensible positions in the Ardennes west of the Rhine. The jibilation of civilians with the arrival of the allies was noted by the Germans as they retreated out of eastern and central Belgium.
NAZI Germany by Autumn 1944 teetered on defeat. Germany had not yet been invaded, but the Allied strategic bombing campaign was deveststing German cities and industry. A Soviet offensive in the East had destroyed Army Group Central, opening the advance into Poland. In the West, the D-Day landings and subsequent Allied Offensive had destoyed the Germsn Army in France and enabled Allied Armies to move toward the Rhine. A crossing in 1944 had been staved off with the failure of Market Garden, but the Allies were stradily moving up powerful forces toward the Rhine. The Allies in Italy had taken Rome and moving into northern Italy where they would thresten the Reich from the south. Rommel and other generals who dared speak has counseled seeking a political solution. Hitler fully aware of the ctimes he had ordered knew that the Allies would not accept a political sollution. No matter how small the chnces of success, he was determined to gamble everything on one last offense. The questuion for Hitler was weaher to target the Soviets or Western Allies, Germany did not possess the resources to strike both. Early in 1944 Hitler made a radio broadcast in which he persued the theme of a great campaign to save Europe from Bolshevism. He compared his mission to that of Greece and Rome. Yet he decided to strike at the Western Allies. One Historian believes this was in part because he ws embittered with the West for wreacking his campaign in the East. The choice was also a matter of tactical advntage. The West could be struck from behind the fotificaltions ofv the Wst Wall with less fuel expenditures. He also judged the Western Allies as weaker and possesing less resolve. Another factor in Hitler's mind was that terror toward the Russians would endsure that the Wehrmacht would fight in the eadt. He was unsure how long threy ould continue to fight in the west. [Fest, pp. 719-20.]
Hitler began to conceptualize the offensive as the military situation increadingly deteriirated. Hitler met with his top generals in the Füher Bunker in East Prussia (September 19444). It was one of the last meetings there as the advancing Red Army would force Hitler to move hi headqusaers west. The meeting was attended by both Field Marshalls Wilhelm Kertel and Alfred Jodle. After reviewing the deterirating military situation, Hitler ordered Jodle to begin planning for an offensive in the West. He was authorized to use remaining reserves and the latest output of tanks and other equipment in the attack. Hitler saw the offensive as coming somewhere between the Aachan area and the southern Luxembourg-France boundary. Hitlers initial plans were to attack sometime between November 20 and 30. Hitler believed the weather would limit the American ability to react and limit the use of their superority in the air. Jodle returned with a plan with several options for Hitler to choose from (October 9). Plans called for deploying about 31 divisions. The opperation required massive amounts of information and fuel for the armored and motorized divisions that woyld plsy a key role in the fighting. The offensive was code named Wacht am Rhein (Watch on the Rhine). Hitler believed that the name might confuse the Allies in hinking that it was more of a defensive operstion, but eventually changed it to
Autumn Mist. Hitler chose the Ardennes among the major alternatives Jodle presented to him. The German generals involved in the operation try to disuade Hitler. Von Runstedt (Wehrmsacht Commander of the West), Field Marshall Model (tactical commander), Josef"Sepp" Dietrich (commander of the Sixth Panzer Army), and Hoss von Manteuffel (commander of Fifth Panzer Army) all had dounts about the opersation. They did not believe that theGerman Army had the power to accomplish the goals Hitler set. Field Marshall Model reportedly said, "This plan hasn't got a damned leg to stand on". Hitler was adament, rejecting their arguments.
Some historians believe that Hitler by late 1944 was essentially irrational. This is hard to assess and reach any definitive conclusion. Hitler had since Barbarossa become increasingly dismissive of the advise from his generals. The assasination attemot in the Führer Bunker had badly shaken and outside of a few individuals (Bormann, Goebels, and Himmler), he trusted no one. His doctors were plying him with narcotics. The Plans fir Autumn Mist were not rational in a military sence. The strength of the Allies in men and material and the superority in the air doomed any major military effort. German did not even have the fuel supplies to conduct the offensive. Yet from Hitler's point of view it was a totslly rational plan. Unless Germany scored a major victory in thr field, defeat was inevitable in 1945. Hitler was fully aware of the crimes he had authorized throughtout occupied Europe and what would happen to him once Germany was defeated. Thus one ladst desperate offensive was an entirely rationsal decession, no matter how small the possibility of victory.
The Germans deployed three armies organized into 10 corps totaling about 29 divisions. Key to the German offensive was Dietrich's poweful Sixth Panzer-Armee and Mauteuffel's Fifthe PanzerPrum. Both were equipped with latest Grman tanks which out classed the American Shermans. The Americans in Belgium and the surronding area had three armies organized into 6 corps with about 31 divisions. In addition there were about 3 British divisions, as well as Belgian, Canadian, and French units. The Allies had overweakming superior forces on the Western Fromt, but by concentraring their forces in the Ardeennes had achived tactical superority.
Hitler convened a meeting of his troop commanders in two sessions (December 11-12). The commanders were driven arround to confuse them as to Hitler's location. They then had to surrender threir side arms and briefcases. They then had to pass through ranks of SS gusards. They were stunned at Hiler's physical condition when he addressed them. His hands trmbled and his left arms occasionsally twitched violrently. An armed guard stood behind every chair wher the commanders sat. In a 2-hour speech he spelled out the military situation. He admitted it was a gamble, but detailed thecadvantages of an offensive strategy. The then spoke at length concerning the weakness of the alliance agsinst Germany. [Fest, p. 720-21.]
The Wehrmacht launched a carefully planned attack against weak American units in the heavily forested Ardennes (December 16, 1944). The offensive was commanded by Field Marshal Gerd von
Rundstedt. The NAZI panzers stormed westward along a 60-mile front stretching from Saint Vith in Belgium south to Echternach in Luxembourg. The German goal was to break through the American lines, sweep through the Ardennes, and seize Antwerp. This would have cut off four Allied armies which would have been unable to obtain supplies. Hitler also believed that the American and British alliance was weak and success in taking Antwerp could help break it. Hitler believed this would have forced the Westrern Allies to sue for peace. The Battle of the Bulge proved to be the lsargest battle which the United States fought during World War II.
The port of Antwerp was essential to the Allied offensive. The major limiting factor to the Allie was supplies and the Allies were beginning to repair the Antwerp port facilities. With Antwerp the British and Canadians in northern Belgium could be cut off and encircled.
December brought some of the worst weather in Belgian history. The Battle was fought in heavy snow and cold temperatures. This worked to the advantage of the Germans, because the Allies could not deploy their overwealming supperority in airpower. This mean that the 1,000 high quality tanks could be used to maximum effect.
The Bulge has been described as the greatest intelligence failure of the War. The Allied thought the Wehrmacht was esentially defeated and incapable of mounting amajor offensive. The Germans were also careful to avoid sending messages about the offensive electronically. I am not sure why they did this. Available evidence suggests that German commanders did not believe that the Enigma machines had been cracked. Perhaps they were just being cautious. Thus Ultra did not have a clear picture. Given the size of the offensive, it was not possible to completely limit every aspect of the offensive from appearing in electronic messages. The Blechley Park Ultra code breakers did thus develop some information for Allied commanders. There is a difference of opinion among historians ascto how effectively the Blechly Park code breakers warned of an impending attack. Some contend that there was no clear unambiguous warning. [Austra] Other historians argue that commanders failed to properly evaluate the intelligence provided. [Baker] The prevailing attitude among the Allied leadership, however was such that these warmings were giving little credence. The Allied commanders were convinced that the Wehrmacht no longer possed the capability to mount a significant offensive.
The German offensive quickly created a bulge in the Allied line, giving the battle its name.
The German offensive in the Ardennes was launched with complete tactical suprise (December 16, 1944). The American line in the Ardennes covered a substantial area, but was held by the First American Army with only about six divisions with one in reserve. The sectors were more than double the area in which a divison was normaly deployed. The Germans struck the American First Armt with eight armored divisions and thirteen infantry division. The attack was precced by a whitering artillery barage. The full force of the initial German blow fell on the American 106th Infantry Division deployed on what the Americans believed was a quiet front in the Ardennes. The 106th was devestted by the force of the German blow. The Division suffered substantial losses and two of its three regiments (the 422nd and the 423rd) were surrounded by the advancing Germans. The Division's third regiment (the 424th) was positioned to the south succeeded un withdrawing and linking up with the 112th Regiment of the 28th Infantry Division. [Kline] The 5th and 6th Panzer armies which equaled eleven divisions they broke into the Ardennes through the Loshein Gap against the American divisions protecting the region. The 6th Panzer Army then headed North while the Fifth Panzer Army went south. On the northern flank the Sixth Panzer army attacked the two southern divisions of U.S. V Corps on Elsborn Ridge, but with little success. On the southern flank, the 5th Panzer Army attacked the U.S. VIII Corps. This corps included units that were not yet battle hardened. The Germans achieved considerable success. Units were surrounded and there were mass surrenders. The Germans forced the U.S. 28th Division to retreat from Wiltz (December 19). The battered 106th Infantry Division slowed the German advance toward St. Vith. This was critical as it gave the Americans time to react and move forced north into Belgium.
Although initially overwealmed, the outgunned American units soon organized a fighting withdraw which delayed the Germans. American units focused on blovcking the roads which slowed the German advance. Particulkarly important was the actions of the reconnaisance plastoon of the 394th Infantry Regiment of the 99th Infantry Division. This probably was the single most gallant pl;atoon in the United States Army. The key to the German campaign was the success of armored units rapidly penetrating American lines and swizing critical fuel stockpiles in rear areas. For this purpose Jochen Peiper was given command of aoerful panzer force, apart of the 1st SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Panzer Division. This was the most powerful force in the German order of battle. The small American reconnaisance platoon miraculously delayed Peiper's panzers 24 hours and in the end was a major factor in preventing him from seizing the American fuel stockpiles. [Kershaw]
The German panzers pushed west. German Panther and Tiger tanks in many ways were superior to the American panzers, but they were slower and the Tigers could not cross many Belgian bridges, limited possible crosings. They also guzzled huge quantities of fuel.
Fuel was the principal limiting facor to the Germand offensive. The Germans by December 1944 had lost the Romanian oil fields to Allied bomving and finally to the Red Army. In addition the Allied strategic bombing had finally targeted the synthetic fuel fsctories in the Ruhr. Coal there was been convered into petroleum. The result was to straggle the NAZI War effort. There was no fuel to train pilots which severely weakened the Luftwaffe. It also restricted both Wehrmact and Luftwaffe combat operaions. Even for the NAZI's last offensive of the War, sufficent fuel to fully fuel combat operations was not available. The German battle plan was thus contingent on capturing American fuel depots.
A major initial target for the Germans was St. Vith. The town was a crossroad with roads leading directly to the Muese River and Antwerp. The American 7th Armored division blocked Dietrich's Sixth Panzer Army at Saint Vith (December 17).
This action delayed the German advance from the onset and forced the Germans to redirect the advnce over less favorable terrine and pooer roads. The American armor and retreating infantry units managed to hold out in St. Vith for 5 days. The Americans finally retreated from St Vih and set up a new defense along the Orne River? (December 21). The Germans finally took St Vith, but there timetable was badly upset.
German soldiers, especially SS units commited a serious of attrocities during the fighting in the Builge. The best known is the Malmedy massacre. SS units massacred 86 unarmed American soldiers that had surrendered. A SS unit commanded by Colonel Peiper shot Americans captured at Baugnez. (Peipher was a commander in Sepp Dtrich's 6th SS Panzer Army. Detrich was noytorious on the Eastern Front for executing 6,000 Russian POWs in repriasl for killing 6 SS soldiers.) The Americans were shot on a road near Malmeddy. The SS had captured 140 men. They succeeded in shooting 86 men, but 43 men escaped. While small compared to what went on in the East, the Malmedy Massacre was the worst atrocity committed against American troops by the Germans. The SS killed other American soldiers who has surendered as well as Belgian civilians, but the Malmedy massacre is the best known incident. After the War, the Americans made a major effoty to track down and bring those responsible to judstice. Rumors of the massacre spread rapidly throughout the American army. This affected how the Americans viewed surrender. It also affected the treatment of German soldiers trying to surrender once the tide of battle turned. American soldiers were noit the only tsarget of the SS. The Germans were under no illusions about the sympathies of Belgian civilians. There were numerous incidents of SS soldiers shooting civilians, including women and children. A SS unit commanded by Joachim Peiper murdered 93 civilians in Stavelot. Civilians told the American soldiers that retook the town that the Germans shot the children, because their crying was annoying. There were numerous other such incidents.
As the battle unfolded, it soon became clear that the samall crossroad town of Bastogne would prove to be the key to the engagement. The town was the crossroads of seven paved roads. Early in the bsattle both the Germans and Americans recognized the importance of the town. This lead to a race between the Americans and Germans to occupy the town. Eisenhower ordered the 101st Airborne and the 10th sarmored Division. Division to defend the town. The 101st had participated in the D-Day landings and in drops which helped liberated the Netherlands south of the Rhine. The 101st arrived in Bastogne just hours before the Germans. The 10st had to move with such speed to get to Bastonge that some arrived without weapons. Only part of the 10th Armored made it to Bastogne before the Germans surrounded the town. Amunition was also in short supply. Some men got weapons from the retreating soldiers moving through Bastogne. The advancing Germans surrounded the town and subjected it to a whitering attack from all sides. In the end this proved a mistake. The Americans taking advantage of interior lines moved artillery back and forth to meet each German attacks. The tank destroyers of 10th Armor played a key role in stopping the German armor. Amunition and food quickly ran short for the American defenders. After battering the town for several days, the Germans were sure the Americans were desperate. General der Panzertruppe von Luttwitz Commander of XLVII Panzerhops dispatched officers under a truce flag demanding the Americans surrender (December 22). Brigadier General Mcauliffe who commanded the 101st Airbrn in Bastagone exclaimed "Aw, nuts" when he received the German message. McCauliffe was the deputy commande, but the Division's commande Maxwell Taylor was at a meeting in Washington when Hitler struck in the Ardennes.) McCauliffe was unsure how to reply formally, but his staff assured him hat his initial respnse woyld do fine. This message was then given to the Germans by Joseph Harper. The Germans had no idea what Mcauliffe meant. Harper explained that the jest was that they could all go to Hell. The German renewed their assailt on Bastogne. Supplies became critical for the surrounded Americans. For several days the bad weather prevented supply drops. The defenders were soon reduced to a handful of rounds each. The Germans launnched an all out attack (DEcember 25). Power armor units and an aerial bombardment hit Bastagone. Pamnzers reached within a mile of McCaluiff's comand post, but were stopped by well placed Ameruican tank destroyers. A lead force of Patton's Third Army commanded by Genersal Abrams finally reached Bastogne the next day. (Decenber 26). When the weather cleared, supply drops were organized and fighters and bompers attacked the German forces surrounding the city as well as vehicles moving supplies forward (December 29?).
American resistence as Bastogne significantly restricted the German ability to move forward to the Meuse. The Germans created a huge bulge in the American line, but failed to even reach the Meuse River where out of the Ardennes they could have effectively deployed their Panzers on the flat Belgian country side. Hitler met with his commnders again to urge them on (December 28). General Hodges 2nd Armored Divisions stopped the 2nd Panzer Division short of the tip of the Bulge short of the Meuse River at Celles (December 29). When the weather finally cleared, American airpower mauled German armor and vehivcles attempting to move supplies. This had to be done over roads which meant the fighters and bombers could concentrate their attacks. The VII Corps north of the Bulge pushed south on the German northern flank. Patton's Third Army which had been engaged in France rushed north toward Bastogne to engage the German southern flank. The Allies finally launched a major counterattack offensive (December 30). Patton's Third Army struck north while the First Army pushed south. There goal was the Belgian village of Houffalize. The Germans resisted fierecly. Soldiers on both sides slogged it out in dreadful weather conditions and snow.
When the German offensive began, George S. Patton's 3rd Army to the south was about to launch an invasion into the German Saar. In a brilliant movement, within 2 days, he turned the offensive on a 90° axis and struck northward into the German flank to relieve the 101st Airborne in Bastogne. The 3rd Army liberated Ettlebruck on Christmas Eve and broke through the German lines to relieve Bastogne (December 26). The U.S. 5th Armored Division conducted a surprise night crossing of the River Sure and liberated Diekirch (January 18, 1945). The Germans were pushed back to the positions they held at the start of the battle (January 28).
Heavy cloud cover and snow made it impossible for the Allies to employ their huge advantagev in airpower. Finally a turn in the weather (December 24) allowed the Allies to bring their greatest advantage to bear--air power. Allied fighters and bombers concentrated on the roads reaking heavy losses in German armor and imbolizing the Wehrmacht. In only a few days the Allies flew 15,000 sorties. Hitler seeing his offensive being pulverised ordered what was left of the Luftwaffe to respond. The luftwaffe's response was operation "Great Blow" (January 1, 1945). The objective was to destroy Allied air power. German planes attacked Allied air fields in Belgium, the Ntherlands, and northern France. The attack destroyed 206 Allied aircraft and base facilities. Rather than destroying Allied air power, however, the Germans lost more planes than thre Allies (about 300) and 253 pilots. Yhis essentially destroyed the Luftwaffe as a creditable gforce. While the Allies could easily replace the planes and pilots, the Germans could not.
Eisenhower decided on a broad front strategy to reducuing the Bulge rther than a pincer attavk to catch the Germans in a pocket. Military historians today debate thids strategy. With the great material advantages the Allies possed, Eisenhower's strategy worked. It was accomplished, however, at considerable cost.
As the Americans pressed the German lines, the Soiviets in the east prepared their offensive. Guederian warned Hitler (Janury 9). Hitler still foccused on his colapsing invasuion dismissed the reports of Soviet activity. The eastern Front had been wekened for the Ardennes offensive. Units had been moved west. Armour and amunition had been diverted to the west. Marshall Konev struck first at Baranof and tore through German lines (Janusry 12). Marshsl Zukov struvck next and crossed the Vistula (January 13). Further north the Soviets pushed forward into Eastetn Prussia toward Danzig. [Fest, p. 722.]
The Wehrmacht offensive in the Ardennes delayed the Allied offensive toward the Rhine by about 6 weeks. The Allies in the campaign, however, destroyed virtually all of the Wehrmacht reserves and important panzer units as well as futher depleting the Luftwffe. Essentially the Bulge broke the back of the Wehrmacht. It was the last German offensive of the War. This meant that the ability of the Germans to defend the Rhine and Berlin was significantly reduced.
Austra, Kevin. "Battle of the Bulge: The Secret Offensive." Military Intelligence 17, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1991): 26-33.
Baker, Bob. "Warning Intelligence: The Battle of the Bulge and the NVN Easter Offensive." American Intelligence Journal 17, no. 3/4 (1997): 71-79.
Clark, Champ and Valerie Moolman. The Last Great Gamble (Prentice Hall Press, 1989).
Fest, Joachim. Hitler (Vintage Books: New York, 1974), 844p.
Franklin, Jim. " The Battle of the Bulge-Timeline," August 2, 1995.
Goldstein, Donald M., Katherine V. Dillon, and J. Micheal Wenger. Nuts! The Battle of the Bulge (Prange Enterprises, 1994).
Kershaw, Alex. The Longest Winter: The Battle of the Bulge and the Epic Story of World War II's Most Decorated Platoon (Da Capo, 2005).
Kline, John. " The Battle of the Bulge," January 1, 1997.
Meyers, Chris. "The Battle of the Bulge-An Ardennes Christmas, "July 25, 1996.
Meyers, Chris. "The Battle of the Bulge-Hitlers Last Gamble," July 25, 1996.
Reinbol, D. "The Battle of the Bulge," April 4, 1997.
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