Figure 1.--. |
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After the disasters before Moscow (1941) Stalingrad (1942), and Tunisia (1943), tthe NAZi war effort was clearly failing. To add to their woes, the American ahad joined the British strategic bombing campaign. The one bright spot in 1943 was the North Atlantic where German U-boats achieved great successes in early 1943. And the North Atlantic was a critical battlefield of the War. Success here would mean not only that the Americans could not enter the war in Europe, but that Britain could not continue the War. It would have meant the end if the strategic bombing campaign and meant that there would have been no D-Day invasion. The Allies were, however, making great advances in anti-sunmarine warfare and code breaking. Besides the Americans and British, the Canadians played a key role in the Battle of the Atlantic. The decisice encounters came in May 1943. German U-boat losses were so great that Admiral Donenitz was forced to pull the U-boats out of the North Atlantic. The Allies made service in U-boats one of the most deadly assignments in World war II. Free of the U-boat menance, a torrent of American soldiers abd airmen and unprecedent quantities of arms and supplies from the Arsenal of Democracy headed for Europe.
NAZI propaganda presented U-boat men as great heroes in the German people. Goebbels' propagandists called the captains Knights of the Deep". Some of the leding captains were known by name to the public. Their achievents were chronicled in the movie news reels and the press.
Donitez after the declaration of War dispatched a U-boat force to the coast of America (December 1941). The U.S. Navy was unprepared. Naval planners did not expect an attack off the U.S. coast. There wee no convoys at the time. The U-boats mostly attacked at night. City lights were kept on, coastal shipping used the lights. The lights also perfectly siloutted the American ships. The U-boats in particular focused on the tankers. The U-boats attacks began January 13 and they sank around 400 merchant vessels and tankers--about 2.5 mullion GRT of shipping. All that damage was done with an incredibly small force, never more than 12 U-boats. Blimps, yachts, PT boats, and other vessels were deployed for coastal patrol. Amrican Naval commander Ernest King was not as committed to convoy as the British. This was especially the case because the Navy did not have sufficent escort vessels to both convoy troop ships and war equipment to Britain and to convoy coastal merchant vessels. King decided that poorly defended convoys were worse than no convoys at all. While coastal shipping suffered, America did not lose troop ships to the U-boats. The U.S. Navy began organizing coastal convoys when more escort craft became available (May 1942), after which the attacks ceased.
The success of Germany's U-boat camapign was in large measure due to tactics developed by Donenitz who conceived of the wolf pack. Donenitz was a master technician, but he was often dismissive of technology. He thought SONAR was overated. Here he was proved correct, at least early in the War, as he planned a strategy involving surface attacks in which SONAR was of little use. In the early years of the War, these tactics proved highly successful against the lightly defended British convoys. The Royal Navy had been down-sized after World War I and was dreadfully short of escort craft. The World War I destroyers provided by America helped, but many more vessels were needed. Donenitz badly miscalulated the importance of both RADAR and SONAR. The Allied in 1942 slowly improved their equipment and perfected tactics. In addition, long-range aircraft and escorted carriers churned out by American carriers gradually increased aerial cover for the convoys. Another serious miscalculation was the excessive use of radio communication. In addition, Doneintz believed in maintaining very cloise control over his U-boats. The level of radio traffic involved help the Allies locate the U-boats. Donenitz also did not believe the Allied could crack the Kriregsmarine Enigma machines.
A great deal has been written about the British Ultra cracking of the German enigma codes and the the impact on the War, especially the campaign against the U-boats in the North Atlantic. Less well knon is that the Germans suceeded in breaking the British naval convoy code. The Royal Navy ibtroduced a new code--Navl Cipher 3 (November 1941). The Germns cracked it in 3 monts (February 1942). The Germany by the summer of 1942 were reading up to 80 percent of some codes. The British were using a rather basic code. Surpringly given the fact that they were breaking a far more difficult German code, they did not seem to believe that they neded a more challenging code. It was the most serious Allied security lapse of World War II on a par with the cracking of the Allied German and Japanese codes. Even more shocking is that decoded Ultra intercepts revealed that the Germans had broken the British code. The Ulltra team reported this to the admiralty (July 1942). Almost inconceivably, the Royal Navy continued to use the code for 10 months. It is unclear how this could have happened. The Ultra project was a closely guarded secret and thus reports that their code had been broken did not explain how this conclusion had been reached. Changing a code is a complicated and costly process. Apparently naval officials were reluctant to admit that there code was so easily cracked and to go to the complicated process of introducing a new code. As a result, the Royal Navy continued used Naval Cipherv3 for 10 months after being informned that the Germans had cracked it. In addition the Germans at the beginning of thecWr used information available from commercial shippers, especially insurance data. The Germans also tapped a trans-Atlantic telephone cable. Over hearing a conversation between Roosevelt and Churchill helped them act quickly to prevent the Allies from seizing southern Italy and Rome in 1943.
After Operation Drumbeat, Doenitz moved the U-boat campaign into the mid-Atlantic beyound the reach of aerial patrols. Given the success of the U-boats, the Germans stepped up production. The principal German tacic was the Wolf pack which was often a griuping of 10-12 Uboats, but some were as large as 50 U-boats. The German effort was conducted from a command center in Paris. The Germans would establish a kind of picketline of U-boats along the convoy routes. Then when a convoy was detected Doenitz in Paris would give orders for each U-boat to converge for a coordinated attack. The U-boat which first spotted a convoy would not attack, but instead shadow it so that it could continue to relay its position. The U-boats were fast on the surface, about 17 knots. U-boats would find the convoys visually by smoke and ten then they could see the tasts and funnels submerge. One they could see the bridge than the convoy vessels could see he conning tower of the U-boat. The stategy would be for a Wolf Pack to draw off the escorts and then attack from all sides. Some U-boats even entered among the convoy ships to attack from within. The Germany developed the Leut torpedo which could zig zag, increasing the chances of hitting a vessel within a convoy. The Germans also itroduced a new type of U-boat, the Milk Cow which could carry 700 tons of fuel and supplies which could resupply U-boats at sea. Even after America entered the War, U-boat sinkings of merchants vessels increased. The tonnage sunk set a new record in 1942. The Germans by the beginning of 1943 had a U-boat fleet of 393 vessels, a force Doenitz believed could bring victory. Not only was the fleet greatly expanded, they were improved types capable of operating as far as the U.S. coast, and they had elaborate bases in French ports, greatly facilitating Atlantic operastions. Total sinkings by the end of 1941 had reached 1,094 ships resulting in the loss of over 10,000 seamen.
The northern Arctic route for Lend Lease aid was from Iceland and Scotland to Murmansk and Ark Aangel. This was potentially the most important because it was the most direct route the Soviet front lines. This route at times proved almost suisidal. The Artic convoys convoys faced a daunting gaunlet of German forces because the Germans had occupied Norway (April 1940). The convoys were attacked by U-boats as well as German surface ships and aircraft based in Norway. This combined with the severe Arctic weather made the route the most dangerous one. The Allies organized 78 convoys to the Soviet Union using the northern route (August 1941 and May 1945). The first Allied aid to the Soviet Union was delivered over the northern route. The British organized the first convoy less than 2 months after the NAZI invasion. These were begun by the British even before the U.S. Congress approved Lend Lease aid for the Soviets because of the desperate need of the Red Army. The first convoys were organized from Iceland but eventually (after September 1942), the convoys assembled at Loch Ewe in Scotland. The Arctic convoys had two letter and number identifiers: PQ or JW for the trip north to Russia, andthen the inverted QP or RA for the return trip south.
The German began using small auto-gyros. These were small primitive helicopters. They could only be used in good weather, but extended vision from a radious of 5 miles to 30 miles. I'm not sure how manu U-boats used these. They apparently were not reported by Allied recognisance.
Even before America entered the War, the U.S. Navy was deployed in the North Atlantic to protect British convoys. Anglo-American naval and scientific cooperaion resulted in the defeat of the u-boat campain by 1943. Important advances in both RADAR and SONAR were critical. An especially important development was syncronous radar. The British by May 41 had radar which could detect a conning tower from 2.5 miles, despite the weather and lighting conditions. SONAR was developed which could determine the depth to set depth charges. A new weapn, hedgehogs was developed. A torpedoe was developed that could be dropped by air craft and could home in on propellars. Throughout the War British and American scientists continued to improve radar and SONAR technology which was deployed on both escort ships and aerial patrol craft.
The U.S. ans Royal navies also improved tactics. They began targetting shadowing U-boats by providing air cover behind convoys. Increased attention was given on radio detection to lovate the U-boats. The central direction of the campsaign by made the U-boats vulnerable to detection. Doenitz wanted detailed reports from each U-boat. The huge American production capability hekped expand both the number of escort ship and aircraft. German military planners had prepared for a war with Britain and France, not America. There was a huge miscalulation of the American scientific and industrial potential. This should be viewed in the context of the almost complete lack of cooperation between the Axis paretners (NAZI Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan). Germany possessed advanced weapons system that could have immensly aided the Japanese. One of the most important was radar. American use of radar in the Pacific War was a major reason for the U.S. Navy success. The NAZIs did not, however, begin to share technology with Japan until 1944 when it was to prove to late to play an imnportant role.
German U-boats in early 1943 continued sinking substantial numbers of merchant vessels. The British food supply in early 1943 was down to a few months. The U-boats sank about 100 merchant vessels in 1943. That was a rate that could not be replaced even by the Liberty Ships. U-boat sinkings were also increasing. A major engagement was fought im March involving 80 merchants, 20 escort vessels, 44 U-bots and numerous aircraft. The U-boats achieved numerous kills in March. Royal Naval reports indicate that in March the U-boats came the closest to cutting Britain's Atlantic life lines. The engagements on the North Atlantic were no longer one-sided. American shipyards were steadily expnding production of escprt ships. In particular, three new escort carriers were delivered (April). The Allied sank 15 U-boats in April 1943. More than in the past, but still not enough to deter the Germans.
World War II turned against the NAZIs during late 1942 and early 1943. The first major reverse was the British 8th Army's vistory at El Alemain (October 1942) and the Anglo-American Torch landings in North Africa (November 1942). The Soviet Red Army then surrounded the German 6th Army at Stalingrad (November 1942). The war at sea turned a few months later--May 1943. German intellience learned of amajor convoy from Britain to America, ONS 5. German wolf packs find the convoy and sink seven ships. The next day the U-boats press the attack. Allied escorts with air cover engage the wolf packs. In the single engagement 6 U-boats are sunk, 5 wrecked, and 12damaged. It is a stunning reversal. During May the building Allied naval strength in the Atlantic and widening technical superiority succeeded in sinking 41 U-boats, but in damaging 37 others. Damaging U-boats was important as by 1943 the expanding Allied strategic bombing campaign had brought German ports and shipyards under increasingly intensive attack making repairs of serious damage increasingly difficult. The U-boats were no longer the hunters, but the hunted. Increasingly after May there was less and less a chance of a U-boat returning from a cruise. Doenitz had to break off the campaign in the North Atlantic. The Germans by the end of 1943 had built 442 Uboats, but had lost 245 U-boats. After mid-1943 the Allies were able to deliver convoys virtually unmillested across the Atlantic.
The Allied victory in the North Atlantic was due to a range of factors. Key to the Allied victory was air cover, inteligence, and radar/sonar. [White] More than any other factor, it was the expanding Allied air cover which doomed the NAZI U-boat campaign. The United States built more than 100 aircraft carriers during World War II. Most of the big Essex-class fast carriers were deployed in the Pacific against the Japanese. Allied long-range planes, (Catalinas and B-24s) provided air cover over much of the North Atlantic. Large number of small escort (jeep) carriers filled in the gaps. The Allies also organized submarine killer groups organized around the essort carries. One of these groups organized around the Guadacanal suceeded in capturing the U-505This was in addition to Ultra decripts and radio directional plotting which provided details on where the U-boats were. The Germans introduced snorkles which would allow them to run their diesel engines underwater, but the snorles could not be used in rough weather and the Allies soon had RADAR dectors that could pick up even the small snorkles. As a result, the U-boats in danger when ever they surfaced--even at night or in deep fog. And German U-boats had to surface for several hours each day to charge their batteries and take in air. The result was that the changes of U-boats returning from a cruie brecame small by the end of the War. Increasigly German U-boats were being lost on their first patrol.
The Germans worked fevirosly to improve their U-boats. Grman inelligence failed to report on many of the techhnological advances. The major weakeness of the U-boat was the need to run on the suface at least a night to recharge the batteries. The Germans introduced snorkles which allowed the U-boats to run underwater without surfacing. Improving Allied radar, however, was able to detect even the snorkle. And there were problems with its use, especially in bad weather.
The Germans developed a vastly imoroved U-boat--the Type 21. If the NAZIs had succeeded in deploying Type 21s in numbers, they could have had a significant impact on the War. An inovative naval engineer Herman WAlter designed what was to be the first true submarine. It could operate for extended periods and at great speed underwater--17 knots. This was considerably faster than the speed of any other submarine at the time. Walter conceived of using hydrogen-peroxide as fuel. This was dangerous, but allowed extended operation without surfacing. The Type 21 project had to be substabtially scaled back, however, when Hitler allocated available hydrogen-peroxide to the secret V-2 project. The new Type 21 U-boats were designed with conventional engines, but banks of batteries allowing for fast operation unferwater. The Type 21 with its stremlined hull was in fact faster under-water than on the surface. These U-boats would have wreaked havoc in the North Atlantic if the Germans had been able to deploy them. Construction began on over 120 of these U-boats, but many had been destroyed or damaged in the shipyards by Allied bombing. A smaller new U-boat the Type 23 was also developed and 63 were built. It wa primarily for coastal patrols. Two Type 21s were sent out the last days of the War. Doneitz on May 4, hoever, ordered the 35 Uboats at sea home, NAZI Germany surendered a few days later on May 8. While the new Type 21 boats proved of little use to NAZI Germany. The U-boats seized by the Soviets became the nucleus of the new Soviet submarine force after the War. The Soviets found them, however, to be dangerous to operate.
The last major effort of the German U-boat fleet was to oppose the allied D-day landings. Doenitz had pulled the U-boats out if the North Atlantic in mid-1943. He still had a considerable force. Hitler demanded that they be committed to oppose the D-Day landings. The Allies had assembled a hughe armada of 800 ships and 4,000 landing craft. The U-boats made a major effort to stop the landings, but had no real imopact, sinking only 5 cargo vessels and 2 destroyers. The German Navy for those meager results lost 72 U-boats. The resulting liberation of France, however, seriously affected U-boat operations. It meant the loss of the key Atlantic ports that had given the U-boat fleet access to the open Atlantic. Cherbourg was cut off within days after the D-Day landings. Brest had to be abandoned when the American broke out from the Normndy beachhead at the end of July.
Unlike the bery close Anglo-American technological, there was virtually no technological cooperation between the Axis partners. The one exceptuion here was German assistance to the Japanese before the War in developing high-performance aircraft. The reason for this lack of cooperation is not clear. It is like that the NAZIs were so confidebt oif victory in the ealy years of the War that they saw no advantage to strenthening a possuble future adversaery. This changed in 1943 after the Soviet destruction of the 6th Army at Stalingrad. As the War turned against the NAZIs, they became increasingly interested in assisting the Japanese. The problem was that afyer Stalingrad it was no longer possible for long-range German aircraft to reach Japan and virtually impossible for surface ships to break through the Allied blockade. We know that there wre deliveries by U-boat, although even this was difficult by late 1944. U-boats delivered roicket and jet technology to Japan which enabled them to begin construction of a series of advanced aircraft. One of these boats after the German surrender on May 8, surrendered in a U.S. port. It contained lead cases holding Uranium oxide. It is unknown what this was for, but the most likely explantion was a dirty atmic bomb.
The Anglo-American victory in the Battle of the Atlantic not only allowed Britain to survive but allowed it to actively persue the War. It also allowed America to assembleda massive force of men and supplies in England that in 1944 was unleased on Hitler's Atlantic Wall. In the end, surving on U-boats was one of the most dangerous assignments of the War. Three-quarters of the U-boat fleet was sunk at sea and about 70 percent of the U-boat crews killed--about 29,000 men. In all the Allies sank or destroyed 781 of the 842 U-boats Germany built. To this day, 68 U-boats are unaccounted for.
Hitler launched his long coveted invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941). Operations were primarily conducted by the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe. The Kriegsmarine played a minor supportive role. The success of the German operations and the participation of the Finns forced the Soviet Navy to withdraw to Lenningrad and Kronstadt. This left the Baltic a German lake so that mineral ores and other goods could continue to fuel the NAZI-war effort. This situation in the Baltic continued unchanged until the Finns withdrew from the war (July 1944) and the Red Army approasched the Baltics and East Prussia. Then the mission of the Kriegsmarine changed. The Germans carried out a massive sea-rescue operation, transporting an estimated 2.5 million west to Germany (1944-45). Soviet naval operations were more successful in operations to protect the Arctic convoys. This operation was aided by esort cradt provided by the United States.
Freidel, Frank. Franklin D. Roosevelt: Rendezuous with Destiny (Little Brown: Boston, 1990), 710p.
Lash, Joseph P. Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939-1941 (1976).
White, David Fairbank. Bitter Ocean: The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939-45 (Simon & Schuster, 2006), 350p.
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