Figure 1.--

With the arrival of the Americans it was necessary to coordinate operaions. Air Marshall Arthur "Bomber" Harris was given command of RAF Bomber Command (February 22, 1942). Brigadier General Ira Eaker hgiven command of the 8th Air Force's bombers arrived in England only a few weeks earlier. The two unlike some other Allied commanders got on well with each other. Harris provided enormous support to Eaker in setting up American bases. There was, however fundamental disagreement between British and American commanders on the conduct of the strategic bombing campaign. Harris and British commanders had come to the conclusion that area bombing was the key to succes in the air campaign. The Americans were convinced that the most effective approach was day-light precession bombing. The Americans believed that their B-17 Flying Fortresses were sufficently armored to beath off Luftwaffe fighter attacks. The British with actual experience doubted that. The Americans believe that their Norden bombsite made precession bombing possible, allowing them to drop bombs into "pickle barrels". Harris aware of the often cloudy skies of norther Europe, responded, "In order to hit a barrel from 20,000 feet, you must first see the barrel."

British Strategy

Air Marshall Arthur "Bomber" Harris, the head of RAF Bomber Command, pointed out to the public that the Germans had begun the war with the rather naive belief that they would bomb the cities of other countries, but that German cities would unscathed. G�ring had guaranteed the German people that the Luftwafee could prorect German cities. Finally in 1942 with the arrival of Lancasters in increasing numbers, Bomber Command was in a position to conduct sizeable raids on Germany. The British debated how to begin the strategic bombing campaign in 1942. Some wanted to target key German industrial sites, especially German synthetic fuel plants. Had they done so at this time might have changed the course of the War. Hiting precission targets, however, over heavily defended, often cloud-covered German cities was no easy matter with 1942 bombing technology. [Speer, p. 287.] In addition the British had been bloodied by the Blitz and the much easier to execute strategy of area bombing was appealing. The strategy of area or terror bombing of civilians won out. RAF planner Charles Portal was the leading advocate of area bombing. Harris argued that the Germans could be defeated by a strastegic bombing campaign. He introduced area bombing as the RAF's principal strategy in the bombing campaign. Harris phrased it susinctly, "The Germans sewed the wind, now they will reap the whirllwind." There were major differences among the British and American air commanders as to strategy and tactics. The British not only decided on area bombing, but there tactical approach was different than the Americans. The flew their bombers in small groups rather than massed formations. This was in part necessary in night-time raids. It also made it more difficult for the Luftwaffe fighters to come to grips with the bomber stream.

American Strategy

American airforces were part of the U.S. Army, organized into a separate Air Corps, rather than a separate service like the RAF and Luftwaffe. Army Air Corps commanders when America entered the War in Europe were firmly convinced that America's long range B-17 Flying Fortresses and new B-24 Liberator bombers could be used to target Germany's war-making industrial base in a day-light precession bombing campaign/. Commanders believed that specific industries if not plants could be effectively targeted with the new Nordon bombsite. This of course necesitated daylight bombing. There was no commitment to terror bombing or the British area bombing strategy. It is not difficult to understand why this disagreement developed. It no doubt made more sence for commnders who had not yet experienced combat missions over German to talk optimistically about hiting specific targets. Taking out war industry plants and factories seemed to make more sence than buring down houses. In addition, the Americans had not gone through the Blitz. And of course Americans growing up with the lore of the Wild West idealized marksmanship. The difference in practice, however, was less than might be imagined. German industry was centered in the major cities, often in the middle of the city. Given the technology of World War II targeting and delivery systems this meant that thge cities arround these plants would be devestated.

Debate

The Americans were convinced that the most effective approach was day-light precession bombing. The Americans believed that their B-17 Flying Fortresses were sufficently armored to beath off Luftwaffe fighter attacks. The British with actual experience doubted that. RAF Bomber Command had attempted precession bombing earlier with little result. The Americans had provided a few B-17 to the RAF in 1941 which were badly shot up by the Luftwaffe in trial raids. Harris also was not impressed with the limited bomb loads compared to the RAF's Lancasters. The Americans argued that the B-17s had to be used in massed formations. The Americans believe that their Norden bombsite made precession bombing possible, allowing them to drop bombs into "pickle barrels". Harris aware of the often over-cast skies of northern Europe, responded, "In order to hit a barrel from 20,000 feet, you must first see the barrel." Harris wanted the Americans to join him on night attacks on Germany. The Americans were determinted to attempt day-light raids with the B-17s and newer B-24 Liberators even though long-range fisgher escorts were not available..

Casablanca Conference (January 1943)

The Casablanca Conference is best known for the issuance of the demand for Unconditional Surrender. Also hat Casablanca, the difference between the Americans and British over air operations was finally settled. The issue was placed on the agenda for Churchill and Roosevelt to decide. Hap Arnold, the Chief of Army Air Forces, was with Rossevelt. He ordered Eaker to Casablance to try to win over Churchill to the American day-light precission bombing plan. Eaker had come to know Churchill. He boiled down a 23-page paper to only 1 page knowing that Churchill did not like long-winded brirdf papers. Churchill was struck with one sentence, "By bombing the devils around the clock, we can prevent the German defenses from getting any rest." Churchill told Eaker that he was not convinced, but that he believed that Eaker and the 8th Air Force should be given a chance. The result was the Casablanca Directve which formally endorsed around-the-clock bomning (January 21). The Americans would attack by day and the British by night. Priority targes would be Uboat construction yards and air-craft plants. The Allied air commanders were instructed, "Your primary objectivewill be the progressive destructionand dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a pointwhere their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened."

Sources

Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich (New York, 1970).

Created: 3:16 AM 6/20/2005
Last updated: 3:16 AM 6/20/2005