Figure 1.-- |
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American President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill decided that the Allies needed to open a Second Front to take pressure off the hard-pressed Red Army reeling under the German summer offensive driving toward Stalingrad and the oil-rich Caucauses (July 1942). Joseph Stalin demanded an invasion of Europe. Wisely Roosevelt and Churchill targetted French North Africa. American General George Marshall, in many ways the architect of the American victory, was opposed to Totch, considering it a diversion. Roosevelt insisted. While Montgomery's victory at El Alemain often receives more attentiin, it was the Torch landings that were the decisive action. The Amercan and British landings in North Africa sealed the fate of the Axis desert campaign. Even if Rommel had broken through to Suez, he would have been forced to turn west to deal with the Allied landings in French North Africa. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed Allied commander to oversee the Torch Landings. The Allies driving east from their Moroccan and Algerian beachheads linked up with the Brish advancing west (November 1942). Although Hitler rushed reinforcements to Tunisia, the end result was the first major defeat of a German Army by the Western Allies.
France had colonized North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) in the 1830s. Substantial numbers of French colonists moved to Algeria in particular. The French colnists were known ad the "pied noir".
Robert Murphy was a virtually unknown diplomat at the U.S. Embassy in Paris. When the Germans entered Paris, the Embassy was essentially closed down (June 1940). Murphy was sent to Vichy where Marshal Petain after signing an armistice with the Germans organized a new French government in the unoccupied zone. From Vichy Murphy wrote a number of reports. One of these reports addressed the possibility of arming French forces in North Africa to continue the fight against the Germans. America was still neutral at the time and the idea of an American invasion was not something that Murphy addressed. That report would come to the attention of the President. [Vaughan]
I am not sure precisely when President Roosevelt decided that an invasion of North Africa would be America's opening move against the Europeam Axis. He seems to have decided long before America entered the War, perhaps as soon as his election victory (November 1940). This was when he sent Robert Murphy to Algiers on a fact finding mission. [Vaughan]
President Roosevelt chose Robert Murphy as his Special Representative. Murphy met with the President several times. Unfortunately for historians, there is no record of these meetings. He reported directly to the President. The State Department would be entirely cut out of not only the Murphy mission, but Operation Gotch itself. The Department would finf out about Totrh only after the landingds occurred. Nurphy selected a small group to collect information on military forces that could resist the landings throyghout French North Africa (Morocco, Algeria. and Tunisia). These men operated under the cover of consular commercial and relief activities. They also made contact with French resistance forces that would assist the Allied landing force and disrupt Vichy resistance. Murphy made his first trip to Algiers (November 1940). He returned to report to the President and then went back to Algiers. [Vaughan] Murphy at first had some home that Pétain could be convinced to join the Allies and then turned his attention to the Vichy commander in North Africa, General Maxine Weygnd. This lso proved fruitless, Weygand refused to break with Pétain and was eventually replaced. [Funk] Murphy saw Admiral Darlan and General Juin as individuals that could bring Vichy forces over to the Allies, but there loyalties were questionable and neither could safely approached on the subject for planning purposes. [Funk]
The Japanese carrier attack on Pearl Harbor of course changed everything (December 1941). Isolationist America was now in the war and the American people weee firmly behind the war effort. Adolf Hitler removed an inconvient problem that Roosevelt would have faced by declaring war on America. Now Churchill had want he had waited for over a year--an American ally fully in the struggle. He rushed to Washington to meet with the President (January 1942). His primary concern was to make sure that despite the Japanes attack, priority would be given to the European Theater and the defeat of NAZI Germany. Churchill realised that a Cross-Channel; invasion was not feasible in 1942 and saw an invasion of North Africa as the best option open. Roosevelt readily agreed.
The Americans and British agreed from the onset that priority would be given to the defeat of NAZI Germany which posed the greatest military threat. There were substantial differences between the two militaries about the appropriate strategy. The Americans in part because they had not yet confronted the Germans wanted to prepare for a cross-Channel invasion of France as soon as possible. The British were nore cautious, in part because they knew the strength of the Germans and in part because they were unsure about the capabilities of the American Army. American President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill decided that the Allies needed to open a Second Front to take pressure off the hard-pressed Red Army reeling under the German summer offensive driving toward Stalingrad and the oil-rich Caucauses (July 1942). Joseph Stalin demanded an invasion of Europe.
Churchill had been advocating an invasion of North Africa, concerned that the Allies were not yet strong enough to confont the Germans in France. The Americam military including General Marshal resisted this which they considered a diversion. Finally President Roosevelt broke the impasse and sided with Churchill. The Combined Chiefs of Staff gave the orders to invade North Africa (July 1942). Wisely Roosevelt and Churchill targetted French North Africa. American General George Marshall, in many ways the architect of the American victory, was opposed to Totch, considering it a diversion from the most important action, a cross Channel invasion. Roosevelt who relied heavily on Marshal, however, insisted in this instance.
While Montgomery's victory at El Alemain often receives more attentiin, it was the Torch landings that were the decisive action. The Amercan and British landings in North Africa sealed the fate of the Axis desert campaign. Even if Rommel had broken through to Suez, he would have been forced to turn west to deal with the Allied landings in French North Africa.
The Anwehr provided Hitler no advanced warming of Totch. The British Double Cross system helped confused the Abwehr. A Polish national codenamed Careless was involved. Another agent, Cheese, was also involved. He was also involved in the Western Deset and Huskey (Sicily invasion). ne problem for the Abwehr was that the Britosh were constantly running convoys down the coast to supply their African colonies. Some of thiose convoys also turned into the Mediterranean to supply Malta. The Germans thus did not know what to make of the convoy leabing Portsmouthband Glasgow. They seemed not to have detected the American convoy from Norfolk. The Germans began to see a Allied invasion of North Africa as a possibility. OKW offered Vichy air support in case of a British invasion (Midnight November 7). Vichy military authorities in Algiers avvept the offer. OKW asks for rports from the Italian Navy. The Italians conclude the British are about to invade North Africa. Neither the Germans are Italians yet know the Amerucans are also involved. OKW receives reports from the Spanush theorizing an nvasion of Italy. Hitler is briefed at Rastenberg in East Prussia and he cocludes that the Allies will land at Tripoli or Benghazi in Libya to cut off the retreating Afrika Korps. He then leaves for Munich where he is to speak on the annovrsary of the Beer Hall Putch. The only action OKW takes is order Field Marchall Von Rundstedt, Commander-in-Chief West to prepare to execute Operation Anton, the occupation of Vichy and the seizure of the French fleet if necessary. The Kriegsmarine's war diary reports that commanders were confused. "These contradictory reports cannot give definite indications of the enemy operational goal or goals." Jodl breiefed Hitler on te train at 7 p.m. Jodl reports that large Allied convoys are in the Mediterranean and headed east. He believes they will pass Sicily heading for Malta and Libya. At that very time the convoy befins to turn south for Algiers and Oran. Hitler tells Jodl, "If these reports are true, this is the greatest fleet in the history of the world."
The Allies put together three powerful naval task forces to convoy over 150,000 American and British forces to Vich controlled North Africa. This was the most powerful flotillaever assembled up to that time. The all American Western Task Force with 35,000 troops were ordered to seize French Morocco, targetting Casablanca and Port Lyautey. The Center Naval Task Force was made up of British ships but with 39,000 American troops was ordered to seize Oran. The Eastern Task Force escorted by British warships with 23,000 British and 60,000 American Troops whose ordered to seize Algiers.
The Western Task Force, so named because they were to land in western North Africa, was also designated Task Force 34. It was an American force commanded by Rear Admiral H. Kent aboard the heavy cruiser, USS Augusta. The Western Task Force departed from the U.S. Navy's principal East Coast base at Hampton Roads (Norfolk Virginia), Casco Bay (Maine), and from other U.S. ports (late October 1942). They were joined at sea by other American forces that had been deployed to Bermuda. The naval component included
three battleships (including the USS Massachusetts, five aircraft carriers (includung USS Ranger, light and heavy cruisers, destroyers, attack transports, cargo transports, oilers, and submarines. The American expeditionary force was ordered to make three landings on the Atlantic coast of French Morocco. The 35,000 U.S. Army troops aboard were commanded by the then virtually unknown Major General George Patton, They comprised the U.S. 2nd Armored Division and the U.S. 3rd and 9th Infantry Divisions. Patton's forces included 250 tanks. The northern group would land at Rabat, about 50 miles northeast of Casablanca. Their principal objective was the airfield at Port Lyautey. The center group anchored at Fedhala Roads and the landings moved on Casablanca. The southern group was to land at Safi, about 150 miles southwest of Casablanca. The plan was to seize the harbor at Safi where the tanks could be unloaded and then drive on Casablanca
The Eastern Task Force was a combined American-British force which departed British ports. The Task Force was was commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir Harold Burrough. The landing force was commanded by Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson. He had the British 78th and the US 34th Infantry Divisions totaling about 20,000 troops. The American troops had been dispatched to Britain soon after Ameruca entered the War fully expecting that they would be used for a cross-Channel incasion. The Eastern Task force targeted Algiers.
The air operations to support the invasion were also split into a western and eastern sector. The dividing point was Cape Tenez in Algeria. British Air Marshal Sir William Welsh commanded the British aircraft eastern sector. Major General Jimmy Doolittle placed under Patton's command oversa the American aircraft in the westertn sector.
After the French defeat by the Germans, the armistace left an area of France unoccupied which was giverned from Vichy. The Vichy Givernment also controlled French colonies like the three North African colonies. Vichy had an army of about 100,000 men in North Africa. A major concern of Allied planners was how the Vihy forces would react to the landings. While the Vichy troops were lightly equipped, the size of the force combined with French naval forces represented a far from negligible danger to the Allied invasion force. In retrospect this was especially true because the Allied amphibious capabilities and techniques were far from worked out. The Allies hoped that the Vichy forces could be induced to come over to the Allied side. Vichy forces had previously resisted the British (Oran, Dakar, and Syria). Planners hoped that they would be less hostile to the Americans. This proved to be an exercise in what Eisenhower came to see as Byzantine and nearly ended his military career. Eisenhower's first step went well. He met secretly with General Henri Giraud in Gibraltar (November 7). He informed Giraud about Operation Torch and convinced him to become commander of French forces in North Africa on the Allied side. Giraud was a respected figure, but he did not command Vichy forces in North africa. The situation in North Africa was very complicated. French commanders uniformily hated the Germans, but that did not mean that they were ready to cooperate with the Allies--especially the British. Vichy Commanders reacted variously to the landings. There were many considerations. Many despised the British. The British attack on the French fleet in 1940 affected many French commanders. Others were concernned about the strength if the Allied landings. They were quite aware of the disatrous Dieppe landings. They were not at all sure that the Allies could defeat a German army. (The El Alemaine victory was till not fully appreciated.) Many like Pétain still believed that France's only hope was to accept Hitler's New Order. Vichy commanders were uninterested in beconing associated with another Dieppe. They were also concerned about what the Germans might do in France if they did not resist. In particular they were concerned about German retributions to their families. Many wwre also loyal to Marshal Pétain personally. Others though Vichy's anti-Semetic actions and actiins against Socialists abd Trade unions was needed to reshape France.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed Allied commander to oversee the Torch Landings. headquarters at Gibraltar 2 days before the landings and would direct the invasion force from the British strong pont (November 6).
General Eisenhower was a military man with littkle experience in European diplomacy. He would have to become a fast learner. The Allies needed a French commander that could rally the Vichy forces in France to the Allied side. The Allies wanted to fight Germans not the French. General DeGualle was not an option. He had alienated both Roosevelt and Churchill and besides had no appeal to Vichy commanders. (Which was demostrated at the failed effort to seize Dakar in 1940). The Allies chose General Henri Honoré Giraud who was smuggled out of France. Upon arriving at Gibraltar, Eisebnhower learned that he was demanding to be given command of all Allied forces 48 hours after the landings. Eisenhower's Deputy Matt Clark was also dumbfounded. He was expected to take over command of French forces, not American and British forces. Eisenhower had expected Giraud to rally the Vichy forces so the Allies could land unopposed. The plan was to fly Giraud to Algiers, but Eisenhower had him reouted to Gibraltar. Eisenhower and Giraud argue. Eisenhower offered Giraud the governorship of North Africa and the material support to build an army. Giraud tells Eisenhower that he "... cannot accept a subordinate position in this command. His countrymen would not understand and his honor as a soldier would be tarnished." He shouts at Eisenhower, "I am General Giraud! I'm like Joffre! My prestige! My family!" In the end Giraud proved encapale of rallying the Vichy forces.
The Allies forces landed in Casablanca, Oran and Algiers. French resisdtance varied. Vichy forces resisted at Oran.
Vichy forces resisted at Oran. General Mark Clark attempted to negotiate with Admiral Jean-Francois Darlan who was the Commander-in-Chief of Vichy forces to achieve a ceasefire. Darlan agreed to a cease fire (November 11). French troops in Morocco and Algeria, stopped fighting but some joined the Germans in Tunisia. More importantly they turned Tunisian ports over to the Germans.
Eisenhower next made perhaps his most contriversial decession of the War. He appointed Darlan as the political head of the French North Africa. The appointment outraged Free French leader General Charles De Gaulle. While De Gaulle and Giraud did not get along, Ge Gaulle (for good reason) saw Darlan as a Fascist and a NAZI collaborator. While De Gaulle was essentially correct, from a military point of view, accepting Darlan reduced Allied casualties and facilitated the landings and Allied buildup. Aklthough not authorized in advance, Churchill and Roosevelt supported Eisenhower despite considerable political criticism. Darlan as it turned out did not last long. Ferdinand Bonnier de la Chapelle, an anti-NAZI royalist assasinated him (December 24). Giraud took his place.
Germman Führer Adolf Hitler threatened Vichy leader Henri-Philippe Pétain that he would order the Wehrmacht into the un-occupied area of France if the Vichy forces in North Africa did not oppose the Allied landings. After Darlan surrendered (November 11). Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht to occupy Vichy and seize the French fleet. Field Marchall Von Rundstedt executes Operation Anton.
The Vichy Government did not resist the Germans. Naval commanders, however, scuttled the French fleet to keep it out of German hands, denying the Germans a major prise. Admiral Raeder in particular had hoped to seize French vessels for his surface fleet.
Tunisia would proved to be last country, actuaslly a FRench colony, that Hitler would invade. At the time the Germans were encountering stiff Russian resistance around Stalingrad, but Zukov had not yet launchrd his offensive. Hitler orders scarce reserves to Tunisia. (This severely depleted the Wehrmacht's stratehic reserve and left in incapable of of effectively dealing with the Soviet Stalingrad offensive when it came.) Admiral Darlan after surrendring the Vichy forces pretended to cooperate with the Allies. He secretly ordered Vichy commanders in Tunisia to allow the Germans to use Tunisian ports and airfields. German and Italian forces from Sicily and southern Italy are rushed to Tunisia. Many Germans arrive by Liftwaffe transports--the same transports that wpuld soon be so badly needed at Stalingrad. Hitler ordered General Jürgen Von Armim with the newly formed 5th Panzer Army with 47,000 Germans and 18,000 Italians to stop the Allied advance from Torch and protect the rear of Rommel's retreating Afrika Korps. The 5th Panzer Army is a smaller force than the advancing Allied 1st Army. (The 1st Army was a largely American and British force with poorly armed French units.) The Germans while smaller were more seasoned and had powerful weapons including, a few new Type 6 Tiger tanks and 88-mm anti-tank guns.
Allied forces under the command of British General Kenneth Anderson rapidlly advanced into Tunisia. The Tunisian ports (especially Tunis and Bizerte) prove to be the key to Africa. Despite exortations from Berlin, Rommel was disinclined and probably unable to stop Montgomery's 8th Army at any of the Italian Libyan ports. Thus the Tunisian ports were the only major ports through which the Germans could move in reinforcements and supplies. Rommel decided to stop only in southern Tunisia and use the string defensives built by the French--The Mareth Line. The Allied 1st Army drive toward Tunisia is slowed by the Tunisian winter and rains creating terrible mud. The Allies spearhead moves along the coast in the north. They got within 12 miles of Tunis before being stopped. Hill 609 about 40 miles west of Tunis in particular proved to be a formidable defensive barrier. The Germans got their first and blasted out defensive positions. Americans attempt to take Hill 609 (December 24). They suffered serious losses. The new 5th Panzer Army was able to drive the British and Americans back west. Germans forces under General Walther Nehring attacked at Djedeida.
Casablanca was one of the important Allied war conferences. Churchill and Roosevelt met to confer on war planning. They tried to impose some unity among the French, but with limited success.
Churchill refers to North Africa “not the beginning of the end. But the end of the beginning.” Roosevelt announces the "unconditional surrender" demand. Churchill and Roosevelt agree on the "around-the-clock" strategic bombing of Germany.
The Battle of Kasserine Pass was the first engagements between the new American Army and the Wehrmacht. It was one of the important battles of the War, but not fully understood to this day. The Allies form a wider front in Tunisia with 1st Army. The 1st Army was composed of the British V Corps is in the north and the Amrican II Corps is in the south. The wider front streaches out the 5th Panzer Army's resources. Meanwhile Rommel had executed a 1,300 mile fighting retreat, the longest such retreat in the history of war. Hitler had ordered the Afrika Korps to stand and fight to the death at El Alemaine. Instead Rommel executed a withdrawl saving the German troops (but not the heavy equipment or many of the Italians). But it meant that he still had an effective army and with new tanls from Germany had a substantial force. Rommel arrived in southern Tunisia and began preparing his defenses using the Mareth Line (January 26). Montgomery did not persue Rommel closely, but oversaw a more deliberate advance. This meant that Rommel had considerable time when he reached Tunisia to both prepare the Mareth Line defenses for the 8th Army and deal with the advancing 1st Army in his rear. Von Armim and Rommel focus on the southern flank of 1st Army. The Allies for their part did not think the Germans were capable of a major offensive in the south, in part because of the difficult supply situation. Allied inteligence at this stage was almost entirely dependent on Ultra which reported nothing on Tunisia, but was providing useful information on Rommel's operations at the Mareth Line. Rommel and Von Armim did not like each other and as a result their opoerations were poorly coordinated. Rommel clashed with General von Arnim over oth tactics and logistics. Allied air and sea operations were slowly strangling the Axix armies in North Africa. Von Arnim using 10th and 21st Panzer on loan from the Afrika Corps struck out of Mazilla and Faid Pases (February 14). Rommel convinced Kesserling to given him 10th and 21st Panzer back, but Armim delayed, restricting Rommel's operations. The Allies suffered losses at several battles in the south. Rommel seized the important air base at Thelepte (February 17). The Americans fell back on the Kasserine Pass, in the Tunisian Dorsal Mountains.
Rommel concludes that Kasserine is the soft spot in the over extended Allied front. . Von Armim scored successes to the east. Rommel's victory at Kasserine was the most severe. Poor weather meant that there was no air cover. The Americans had not yet developed successful tanl tactics and were still unaware of how ineffective the M2 Stuarts and M-3 Grants were. The Americans falling back from engagements east of the Pass, formed a defensive line accross the Pass. The Germans succeeded in gaining the high ground on both ends of the American line and after softening it up (February 19)., he drove straight through it (February 20). The Germans in a week of furious fighting had succeeding in killing or capturing several thousand Americans and destroying much of their heavy equipment in the south. For a while Rommel conceived of driving north to the coast and rolling up much of the 1st Army. But Von Armim did not join him and heavy American air strikes destroyed some of his limited armor force (February 23). In addotion the 8th Army was approaching the Mareth Line and he had to return to direct the battle there. The victory at Kasserine underscored the strategic error of the entire German North African campaign. Despite brilliant victories, Hitler was unwilling or unable to commit a sufficent force to achieve victory and the only accomplishment was to twach the British and Americans how to fight modern mobile warfare. It took the British about 2 years to learn. The Americans were must quicker students. The Americans studied the Kasserine in detail and very quickly introduced joint air-ground operations. Patton who was given command of II Corps was a particularlyvstrong proponent. The M-2 and M-3 Tanks were phased out and tactics devedloped for using the thin-skinned and lightly gunned M-4 Shermans. Eisenhower also replaced ineffectual commanderz and revised training preparations.
The British were especially critical of the Americans. And Ultra intercepts showed that this was the general German assessment, which led them to undersestimate American units in future engagements. One German concluded that the Americans are only "playing with war". Rommel himself was less sure about such assessments. He saw the Americans as inexperienced, but was impressed to the raoid American response, pooring reserves into key passes making it difficult to exploit the victory at Kasserine. [Liddle Hart, pp. 404-407.] American air power also impressed Rommel.
Here using the Wadi Zauzaul to the south and coastal hills to the north, the Merrith Line was a formidable defensive position. The 22-mile line was bult by the French before the War to protectv against an Italian invasion. By an irony of history, a German general who was a proponent of mobil warfare would use it against the British. twer the fighting in Central Tunisia, Rommel arrived back at the Mareth Line (February 25). Montgomery’s Eighth Army begins to arrive in force (February 26). Rommel decided to strike at Montgomery. He uses his armor to hit the 8th Army's left flank. Ulra intercepts have alerted Montcomhery who positions mewly received 17 pound anti-tank guns firing 76 mm shells. Rommel loses 52 Pamzers which because of the Allied blockade are virtuallu irreplaceable. Rommel withdraws behind the protection of the Mareth Line. At this time an exhausted Rommel was recalled to Germany. 8th Army attacks on the Line are beaten back. Finally New Zealand units manage to go around the Line through the desert. The 8th Army finally begin penetrating the the Mareth Line (March 20). A mass attack of 22 squadrons of the Desert Air Force hammrs the Germans. The Afrika Korps begin a full retreat.
With the Mareth Line broken the Afrika Korps was forced to fall back to central Tunisia. This allowed the 1st and 8th Armies to link up (April 8). The Germans fell back on Tunis and Bizerte through which a trickle of supplies were still arriving. They establish a defensive perimter around the two ports. Here Von Arnim still had a powerful force and Von Armim and most German units were still determined to resist. The Italians were less willing. The Allied blockade becomes increasingly effective, essentially cutting off the Axis forces. The strong point defending the pocket in the north is Hil 609 which had stopped the initial Allied drive. It is surrounded abnd taken by the 34th American Division (May 1). This was a National Guard Division that had been hammered by the Germans earlier in its baptism of fore. And like a lot of American units had learned a great deal about fighting the Germans. Effective Axis resistance collapses (May 6) and the Americans and British take Tunis. Isolated German resistance continues, but they are surrounded and running out of amunition. Von Armim surrenders (May 12). Some 250,000 Axis soldiers surrender. This is the largest surrender of Axis soldiers until the end of the War.
Clark, Mark W. Calculated Risk (New York, 1950).
Funk, Arthur L. "Eisenhower, Giraud, and the Command of 'TORCH'" Military Affairs Vol. 35, No. 3 (Oct., 1971), pp. 103-108.
Hart, Liddell. Ed. Rommel Papers.
Vaughan, Hal. FDR's 12 Apostles (Lion Press, 2006).
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