Figure 1.--This photograph was taken in during the fighting on Sicily during July 1943. An American corpman administers to a wounded soldier as a family looks on. Notice the black dresses of the Sicilian women and girls. |
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The Allied invasion of Sicily, Operation Husky, was the next step in the Mediterranean campaign after the Axis
surrender in Tunisia. Control of Sicily would mean Allied control of most of the Mediterranean. The Allies had two
other goals. Sicily would provide critical bases for an invasion of Italy. An Allied invasion of Italy in turn would
maintain pressure on Germany and force it to divert forces from the Atlantic Wall in France and the Eastern Front in
Russia. The invasion was Operation Husky and involved risks. Unlike the Torch invasions, the Axis had strong forces on
Sicily that could be expected to vigorous contest the landings. The landing flotilla had to brought from England
exposing it to U-boats nd Luftwaffe attacks. The island was defended by the Italian 6th Army, with over 200,000 men,
and two German divisions, the 15th an 90th Panzer Grenadiers. The Italians had performed poorly in North Africa. It
was unclear how they would fight on actual Italian ground.
After the British victory at El Alamein (September 1942) and the Allied Torch landings (November 1942), it was clear
that the Axis would be defeated in North Africa, although several hard months of fishing remained. President Roosevelt
and Prime Minister Churchill along with the Combined Chiefs of Staff met in recently liberated Casablanca (January
1943). The Americans wanted to cross the Channel and invade France. It would have been a terrible mistake. Not only
were the Germans still too strong, but Americans commanders were not ready for such an ambitious undertaking. The
British argued for using the forces in North Africa which were readily at had to invade Sicily. Thankfully the British
won the argument, partly because of better staff work and partly because Churchill managed to persuade Roosevelt.
[Atckinson, The Day ...] Hitler's decision to rush German forces to Tunisia was another factor. It meant that
there would be no quick Allied victory in North Africa. The next Allied target would be Sicily. They also announced
the goal of "unconditional surrender", although Roosevelt made the announcement without discussing it with Churchill.
The decision is controversial. Some have argued that it stiffened German resistance. Unconditional surrender making
possible the de-NAZIfication of Germany would seem to have been the correct decision. Roosevelt also saw it as a way to
show the Allied commitment to Stalin. [Powaski] Another major decision was the commitment to a"round the clock"
strategic bombing campaign against Germany.
Royal Navy submarine Seraph released a body identified as Major William Martin, a supposed Royal Marine
officer (April 30). They released the body off Spain where Abwehr operatives were active. Martin was meant to be an
officer drowned while acting as a military courier carrying Top Secret documents. The body was released off Huelva
beach where it would be found by fishermen. The false papers attached helped to persuade the Germans that the next
Allied offensive after North Africa would target Sardinia and Greece as well as Sicily. This helped disuade the Germans
from focusing on Sicily. The incident became known in history as "The Man Who Never Was".
The Allied armies continued the drive on the shrinking Axis enclaves in northern Tunisia. The British took Bizerte
and the American Tunis (May 7). The 3-year North African campaign finally ended at Tunis and Bizerte in Tunisia. Italian
Field Marshal Messe ordered the remaining German and Italian troops to surrender (May 13, 1943). The prisoners included
130,000 German and 120,000 Italian prisoners. Among the prisoners were General von Arnim and 25 other axis generals/ The
surrender marked the end of the once vaunted Afrika Korps. All of North Africa from Casablanca to Alexandria was now in
Allied hands.
A glance at the map shows that Sicily is the key to the Mediterranean. It is the largest island in the
Mediterranean and controls movement between the eastern and western Mediterranean. This fact was recognized from the
classical era when both the Peloponesaian War and the Punic Wars were settled over control of Sicily. The Allies in
planning Torch has not initially conceived of Sicily as the next step. This was primarily because the United States was
still focused on a cross-Channel invasion in 1943 to relieve pressure on the Soviet Union and bring the war to a quick
close. The failure of the Allies to bring Torch to a quick conclusion meant that little time existed to transfer their
forces to Britain an prepare for am invasion. And the Americans, chastened at Kaserrine were developing a greater
respect for German capabilities. And the Torch landings against the limited French forces in Morocco and Algeria had
shown that a much more powerful force would be need to taken on the Germans in France. The landing craft alone would
take more time to assemble. Hitler by moving into Tunisia had forestalled that. But he paid a heavy price in men and
equipment. More importantly he had blooded the U.S. Army. And the British and American armies coming out of the North
African campaign were a far more effective fighting force. The Allies were in a quandary--where to strike next. Stalin
was expecting a second front. Waiting an entire year until spring 1944 could hardly be seen as an effective war
strategy. Roosevelt in particular wanted another action against the Germans. [Powaski] Thus Sicily emerged as the
next Allied target. The troops were in place and given the distances involved, the demands on Allied shipping were
manageable.
The Allied invasion of Sicily, Operation Husky, was the next step in the Mediterranean campaign after the Axis
surrender in Tunisia. Churchill concerned about a premature cross-Channel invasion, convinced Roosevelt that Sicily
should be the next target. It was a disappointment for General Marshal, but the course of events in North Africa was to
convince him that it was the best decision.
Control of Sicily would mean Allied control of most of the Mediterranean. The Allies had two other goals. Sicily would
provide critical bases for an invasion of Italy. An Allied invasion of Italy in turn would maintain pressure on Germany
and force it to divert forces from the Atlantic Wall in France and the Eastern Front in Russia. It also offered the
prospect of invading Italy and knocking the first Axis country out of the War.
The invasion was Operation Husky and involved risks. Unlike the Torch invasions, the Axis had strong forces on
Sicily that could be expected to vigorous contest the landings.
Amphibious landings are dangerous military operations. This is especially the case against an enemy force with
strong mobile forces. The two German Panzer divisions on Sicily in particular were a serious threat during the first
few days when Allied forces were coming ashore and not yet present at full strength or with their heavy equipment. Thus
deception efforts are of great importance. Here complete deception need not be achieved. Any reduction of the Axis
force, failure to reinforce, or hesitation could be critically important to the success of the Allied landing. After
the Axis surrender in Tunisia (May 1943), Sicily was the obvious next step for the Allies. One might think that it would have been very difficult to convince German planners that the Allies would next strike elsewhere. In fact, Allied
intelligence was very effective in confusing the Germans. The Allied misinformation effort. One of the most notable
was British Operation Mincemeat involving disguising a corpse as a military courier. Spanish authorities as the British
anticipated, turned the corpse over to the Germans. The materials included in the courier's bag and pockets (including a
love letter) were so well done that they helped conform other efforts to convince the Abwehr that the Allies were
targeting Sardinia and Greece. The deception appears to have been excepted at the highest level, including Gen. Alfred
Jodl. [Holt}
The landing flotilla had to brought from England exposing it to U-boats nd Luftwaffe attacks.
The island was defended by the Italian 6th Army, with over 200,000 men, and two German divisions, the 15th an 90th
Panzer Grenadiers. The Italians had performed poorly in North Africa. It was unclear how they would fight on actual
Italian ground.
The British 8th Army under Montgomery landed along the southeast coast. The newly created American 7th Army under
Patton landed along the southwest coast. The landings did not go well. The task force encountered a storm at sea.
British gliders plunged into the sea. Units landed on the wrong beach. Luckily the Germans and Italians were
surprised. American Airborne troops played a key role in the success of the landings. Many units were spread all over
the southern coast, well away from their targets. Even so they disrupted Axis communications and deflected attacks away
from the all important beach landings. Within hours of the landings, German Panzers were moving toward the beaches.
Here naval gunfire played a key role in holding off the Panzers. Infantry counterattacks and artillery being landed
helped to establish the beachhead. [Atkinson, The Day ...] Two attempts to reinforce the beaches with Airborne
troops (both parachute and glider-borne units) ended tragically. The Luftwaffe had launched some limited opposition to
the landings and Allied antiaircraft batteries were concerned. They mistook the C-47s and gliders for enemy bombers.
The British were to drive north along the eastern coastal road and seize Messina. The Americans were assigned to
seize and secure airfields and protect the British frank as they drove north. The Germans based their defense of the
island on opposing the British drive on Messina along the coastal rode. The terrain was mountainous f, ideal for
defensive action. Patton did not appreciate the supporting role he was given. General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander
was in overall control as Allied ground commander. Historians vary on what occurred after the British attack north
bogged down. Some reports suggest that Alexander ordered Patton to take Palermo at the northwestern tip of the island.
Others say that Patton exceeded his orders in taking Palermo. Once in Palermo, Patton could open a new offensive on
Messina, from the west, putting the Germans in a vice. Patton to avoid German strong points, used a series of limited
amphibious operations as he moved east along the northern coastal road. The Germans decided to evacuate Messina. The
Americans and British finally entered Messina (August 17). They had Messina and bases for an upcoming invasion of Italy. They failed, unfortunately, to capture the German force defending the island.
Patton's conflict with Montgomery became increasingly apparent in Sicily. While the German's tied Montgomery's
forces down by blocking the coast road to Messina, Patton drove west and seized Palermo and then beat Montgomery to
Messina by hours. The German's managed to successfully evacuate their force. Patton was involved in incidents during
the Sicilian campaign that almost ended his military career. Most famously, he slapped a soldier suffering battle
fatigue in a medical station. Lest publicized was the shooting of Italian POWs. The American soldiers involved
claimed that Patton's fiery statements encouraged them to shoot the Italians. As a result, Patton was not chosen to
command the American forces in the Italian campaign. [Porch] He was also for several months not brought to Britain and
did not play an important role in planning the D-Day invasion.
Patton with his amphibious operations hoped to cut off important German elements , but the strength and mobility of
the Panzers made this impossible. Patton launched an amphibious landings, Operation Brolo, hoping to bag German armor
units (August 11). The landing forced the Germans to withdraw, but failed to cut them off. The German commander,
General Hube, on the same day began the full-scale evacuation of Sicily. Carefully laid minefields and blown bridges
made it difficult to pursue the retreating Germans closely. The final amphibious end run by a regiment of the 45th
Division failed when they landed in the wrong place (August 16). Units of the American 3rd Infantry
Division entered Messina (August 17) just hours after the last Axis troops had boarded transports to cross the narrow
Straits of Messina. Only a few hours later advanced units of the British 8th Army. This time, however, the Germans
had escaped. Hitler uncharacteristically had not opposed the withdrawal. Given the Allied naval superiority, this was a major accomplishment. It wasonly possible because the Straits of Messina were so narrow.
Sicily as part of Italy was part of the Axis. Yet the Sicilians greeted the Americans and British as liberators
rather than conquerors. Most Sicilians were jubilant over the arrival of the Allies. There were jubilant celebrations
after the Allies reached village after village en route to Palermo and Messina. The arrival of Americans, especially
Americans of Italian ancestry was a special treat. Many Sicilians had relatives in America. Many Sicilians broke down
in tears. Sicily had for centuries been a poor part of Italy with much of the land in the hands of big landowners.
Mussolini's Fascist regime had done little to change this. Since the War, food had been rationed, further reducing
already limited diets. Many were in desperate circumstances by the time the Allies arrived. Children and women
scrambled for the food in army garbage. Some offered what little they had, from hazel nuts to grapes, to the advancing
soldiers.
Sicily was the first piece of Axis territory to fall to Allies. It had an immediate impact on Italy where the War
was increasingly unpopular, causing the removal of Mussolini. Possession of Sicily provided the Allies important bases
for the upcoming invasion of the Italian mainland. It also was a training ground for the key Allied operation of the
War--the D-Day landings in northern France. Mistakes were made in Sicily. Eisenhower allowed most of the Germans to
escape. There would be no bagging of Germans as had been accomplished in Tunisia. It is the Germans, however, that had
made the major mistake, although by this stage of the War they had few options. America in 1940 virtually did not have
an Army. The Army that America began to build was full of novices with a very small professional core. This was
apparent with the amateur Torch landings and the bruising at Kaserine. [Atkinson, An Army ...] The key American
commanders (Eisenhower, Patton, Clark, Bradley and others) had no real experience in commanding large armies. Many
others proved incompetent and had to be replaced. If they had been pitted against a major German force the results
could have been disastrous. Rather they faced relatively small, poorly supplied German formations and they had support
from the British. This they learned the basics of modern war from the Germans who did not have the capability of
delivering a decisive blow. The importance of the early campaigns like Sicily was the creation of a competent American
Army. The result was that the American Army that entered the Continent on D-Day was not the poorly trained and
commanded force that began the War in North Africa. In addition, both the Americans and British learned major lessons about amphibious invasion which would greatly assist in the success of the D-Say landings.
Atkinson, Rick. An Army at Dawn.
Atkinson, Rick. The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944.
Holt, Thaddeus. The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War (Scribner, 2004), 1,148p.
Porch, Douglas. The Patth to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II (Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 2004).
Powaski, Ronald E. Toward an Entangling Alliance.
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