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Hitler launched the most imense military campaign in human history with te invasion of the Soviet Union--Operation Barbarossa (June 1941). It is estimated that on the eve of battle, 6.25 million men faced each other in the East. The Soviets were surprised and devestated. Stalin ignored warnings from the British who as a result of Ultra had details on the German preparations. Stalin was convinced that they were trying to draw him into the War and until the actual attack could not believe that Hitle would attack him. The attack was an enormous tactical success. The Red Air Force was virtually destroyed. Soviets cities fell and whole Soviet armies were engulfed in sweeping pincer movements spearheaded by German panzers. Many military analysts question whether the Soviets could resist the NAZI blitzkrieg. The Soviets did hold, in part because Germany's Axis ally Japan struck America rather than the Soviets. This allowed the Soviets to bring Siberian troops west to spearhead a devestating surprise Winter offensuve before Moscow (December 1941). The German Army Group Center suffered devestating losses from which they never fully recovered. As a result, the German offensive in 1942 was restricted to the southin an rffort to fully seize the Ukraine as well as the Caucasian oil fields. Again the NAZIs gained great success and wre on the verge of seizing Stalingrad when a second surrose Winter offensive destroyed Germany's most fowerful formation--the Sixth Army. Germany's final great Eastern offensive came in 1943. This time the WeEhrmacht was capable of striking in only a small section of the front--the Kursk salient. THe battle was the largest tank engagement in history and destroyed the Whrmacht as an offensive force. The Soviets seized the ininitive with Operation Operation Bagration which shatered Army Group Center (June-July 1944). This was the most devestating German defeat of the War. It essentially destroyed NAZI Germany's defensive capacity, opening the way to western Poland and the Reich itself.
It is difficult to tell what the Soviet people on the eve of theNAZI invasion were thinking because of the cintrolled society. Most with memories of World War I desperately wanted to keep out of the War. Some were aware that their country was a far from perfect society. Mny believed the propaganda published in the newspapers and broacast on the radio. Many minorities were being perscecuted, especially the Ukranians and the Balts and Poles in the teritory acquired through the 1939 pact with Hitler. The newspapers lauded Stalin, the "Genius of Mankind, the Greatest Genius of All Times and Peoples". Moscow and St. Petersburg were overcroded and people existed in squalor. There was along side this a kind of intelectual frment. The theaters offered wonderful music and dance. Moscow had a brabd new, modern Metro. Thenew NKVD chief, Lavrenti Beria, seemed less rithless than his predecessor. The depths of the Great Terror seemed to have passed. Stalin's rule had brought schools and educational opportunities. There were jobs to be had. Some were still idealtically committed ro Socialism and a new better future for Russian and the world. [Braithwaite]
The Battle of Britain in many ways changed the course of the War. An invasion of Britain was impossible without air superiority. Hitler, fearing a cross-Channel invasion, decided that the only way to force the British to seek terms was to destroy the Soviet Union. He began shifting the Wehrmacht eastward to face the enemy that he had longed to fight from the onset--Soviet Russia. The nature of the War changed decisevely in the second half of 1941. The Germans invaded Russia in June 1941, launching the most sweeping military campaign in history. It is estimated that on the eve of battle, 6.25 million men faced each other in the East. The Soviets were surprised and devestated. Stalin ignored warnings from the British who as a result of Ultra had details on the German preparations. Stalin was convinced that they were trying to draw him into the War and until the actual attack could not believe that Hitle would attack him. The attack was an enormous tactical success. The Soviets were surprised and devestated. The Soviet Air Force was destoyed, largely on the ground. The Germans captured 3.8 million Soviet soldiers in the first few months of the campaign. No not knowing the true size of the Red Army, they thought they had essentally won the War. German columns seized the major cities of western Russia and drove toward Leningrad and Moscow. But here the Soviets held. The Japanese decission to strike America, allowed the Sovierts to shift Siberian reserves and in December 1941 launch a winter offensive stopping the Whermacht at the gates of Moscow--inflicting irreplaceable losses. The army that invaded the Soviet Union had by January 1942 lost a quarter of its strength. Hitler on December 11 declared war on America--the only country he ever formally declared war on. In an impassioned speech, he complained of a long list of violations of neutality and actual acts of war. [Domarus, pp. 1804-08.] The list was actually fairly accurate. His conclusion, however, that actual American entry into the War would make little difference proved to a diasterous miscalculation. The Germans who months before had faced only a battered, but unbowed Britain now was locked into mortal combat with the two most powerful nations of the world. The British now had the allies that made a German and Japanese victory virtually impossible. After the Russian offensive of December 1941 and apauling German losses--skeptics began to appear and were give the derisory term " Gröfaz ".
The NAZI program for Lebensraum in the east was not just to acquire territory. The plans for that territory was monsterous beyond belief. he plan was to evacate Poles an Russians from these territories. Some would remain to serve as slave laborers. Millions would be expelled or "evacuatd" with the understanding that large numbers would die in the process. The goal was to make the east German. Here Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler had the responsibility for persuing this effort. He appears to have assigned his deputy Reinhard Heydrich appears to have coordinated this effort and essentially he SS's entire eastern operations. Heydrich ordered the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) (SS Security Service) in 1941 to begin the necessary planning. The Reichs-Sicherheitsdienst (RSHA) (Reich Decurity Head Office). There were differences of opinion within the SS and between the SS and Alfred Rosenberg's Ostministerium (Ministry for the Occupied East) over how to claim the East. There was agreemnt that large numers of Slavs had to be removed to Siberia. There were differences as to the extent to which forcible evictions should take place.
Military histories commonly concentrate on the major battles, generals, tactics, and weaponry. Often neglected are logistics. This is not a mistake military planners make. Questions of logistics are commonly decisive in warfare. It was logistics and the overwealming superiority of the Allies in men and material that determined the outcome of World War II. No where exceptin the Pacific was logistics more important than the vast Eastern front. It was by far the largest campaign of the War involving the longest terresterial supply lands. The Germans launched the invasion of the Soviet Union with an incomplete logistical plan. The Germans prepared for a quick summer campaign which would achieve victory by the fall. There was no plan for fighting or supplying the three army Groups in cold winter weather. The resultung disaterous defeat before Moscow (December 1941) doomed the NAZIs to defeat. The German Wehrmact was not as is often thought a modern mechanized force. The Wehrmacht had powerful mechanized panzer divisions, but much of the Wehrmacht still rlied on horse-drawn transport. And the Wehrmacht encountered another problem at it entered theseemingly enless steppe of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union did not have a modern road network. When the rains arrived the Wehrmacht was mired down in an empenetrable sea of mud. Thus the Germans had to depend on the Soviet rail network. This limited both operations and supply. The NAZIs hoped that these limitations would also restrict the Red Army as after Stalingrad it relentlessly deove west. The Red Army as a result of Lend Lease, however, had access to the industrial powerhouse of the United States. And among other items, huge numbers of lovomotives and trucks poured into the Soviet Union. The Soviets were not impressed with American tanks, American trucks were a very different mattr. As a result, in five stunning offenses during 1944, the Red Army destroyed the Wehrmact--exactly what the Wehrmact had attempted to achieve with Barbarossa--and advanced to the very borders of the Reich.
The Resistance was especially important in the Soviet Union where guerrila groups disrupted German supply lines. The Soviets created the largest and most
important Ressistance effort. This was possibly primarily because of the genocidal NAZI policies in the East. Ironically, the Soviet Union was the one country that the NAZIs invaded where they could have developed considerable popular support. The early successes of the Germans staggered the Red Army and Soviet society as a whole. Red Army soldiers surrendered in staggering numbers. Only slowly did anti-NAZI partisan units begin to form. Many of the partisans units were formed from men left behind as the Red Army retreated east. Later the Soviets dropped men and supplies to reinforce the partisan units. Other partisan units were formed by civilians. They Soviet partisans were an important part of the Great Patriotic War. Partisans killed thousands of German soldiers, but the major contribution was in disrupting Wehrmacht supply lines. Not only did this make supplying front line troops difficult, but it forced the Wehrmact to deply an important part of its combat strength in rear areas to secure supply lines. This was especially important in 1941-43. As the tide turned on the Eastern Front, the importance of the partisans declined as the Red Army became an effective fighting force. The partisans even in the later phases of the War was still significant and were a cotinuing drain on the Wehrmacht as it retreated west.
Leningrad was one of the to major cities of the Soviet Union. Army Group North ws assigned the task of seizing the city. It struck toward Leningrad and during July made rapid progress through the Baltic Republic. Then the Gemans were slowed by the boggy, forested
country between Lakes Peipus and Ilmen. Army Group North planned its final drive to Leningrad (August 10). The drive on Lenningrad was part of a pincer movement. The Finns had joined the German invasion in an effort to regain the territory seized by Stalin in 1939-40. The Finns reached their pre-1940 border on the Karelian Isthmus 30 miles north of Leningrad (August 31). Army Group North to the Souh arrived at the Neva River 10 miles (August 31). southeast of the city. The Finns launched an offensive east of Lake Ladoga toward the Svir River, hoping to join up with Army Goup North driving from the southwest (September 4). Army Group North took Shlisselburg on Lake Ladoga. This severed Leningrad's land links with the rest of the country. Soviet resistance was stiffening, but Lennigrad at this time was within the Hitler's grasp. A confluence of factors, however, combined to save the city. Hitler vascilated as to what was the priority target and where forces should be concentrated. Hitler determined that Leningrad was to be surrounded to avoid costly street fighting. (Later at Stalingrad he changed tactics.) At Leningrad this forced Army Group North into the narrow isthmus to the east, reducing its tactical advantage. Finninsh Field Marshal Baron Carl G. E. Mannerheim, refused to cross the border and close in from the north. Mannerheim apparently decided that Finland was not going to persue the War beyond retrieving lost Finnish trritory. Then Hitler in on of his many vassilations redeployed Army Group North's panzers (second week of September. This was a critical decession. Hitler left Army Group North only one motorized corps, and ordered that it be held in reserve. In the savage fighting which followed. The Soviets managed to stop the Germans. Lenningrad was, however, cut off from food and fuel. Some supplies could be brought in on an ice road after Lake Ladoga froze, but Stlain refused for several months to evacuate the children. Many were to starve that first Winter. Available food was given primrily to combat troops. The people of the city were put on starvation rations. Refugees without Lenningrad ration cards were left to starve. The Germans ubjected the city to incessent artillety fire and Luftwaffe bombing. The German seige lasted more than 2 years. Finally the Red Army opens its offensive to relieve the city (January 15, 1944).
The desisive battle of Barbarossa and arguably the entire War was fought before Moscow during the Winter 1941-42. The Japanese decission to strike America, allowed the Sovierts to shift Siberian reserves. A Japanese spy in Tokyo had informed Stalin well before the actual attack on Pearl Harbor. These troops, well trained in winter warfare, on December 6, 1941 launched a winter offensive stopping the Whermacht at the gates of Moscow--inflicting irreplaceable losses. The Wehrmacht was stuned at the extent of the Soviet offensive, assuming that the staggering victories in the Summer had crippled the Red Army. There were no preparations made such as winter clothing or assessing the performance of weapons in extemely cold winter conditions. Hitler had assummed that the camapign would defeat the Soviets in a summer campaign before the onset of Winter. Hitler demanded that the Whermacht stand and fight. This probably saved the Wwhrmach from an even greater dissater than what ocurred. An entire Germany Army, the 16th Army of more than 90,000 men, was essentially cut off and only supplied with an enormous effort by the Luftwaffe. A land corridor was not restablished until April 1942. The massive Axis army that invaded the Soviet Union had by January 1942 lost a quarter of its strength amd huge quantities of tanks, artillery, and supplies. These losses of men and material by the Wehrmacht were especially grevious and Germany did not have the manpower resources or industrial capacity to fully repace and reequip a new army.
Japan and the Soviets fought pitched battles along the Manchrian border in 1939. An offensive by Marshall Zukov forced the Japanese to ask for an armistace. Still the Soviets kept important forces on the border. Japan in late 1941 was poised for a military strike to take advantage of the fighting in Europe. There were two basic options: strike north at the Sovierts or South at the resources of Southeast Asia. The decission was to strike south. Here the only force to oppose the Japanese was the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor. A Japanese carrier taskforce on December 7, 1941, executed a surprise attack on the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. It was a brilliant tactical victory for
Japan, but perhaps the greatest mistake in modern military history as it brought a suddenly united America with its vast industrial capacity into the War.
The battle of Stalingrad is generally seen as the turning point in the Second World War. The German summer 1942 offendive aimed south at the Ukraine, the Causeses, and reaching the Volga at Stalingrad. The massive winter losses had significantly reduced the capabilities of the Wehrmacht. They simply were unable to accomplish the assigned objectives. The Wehrmacht no longer had the strength to launch a massive offensive all along the Eastern Front. They decided to strike in the south toward Stalingrand and the Caucuses where Hitler was especially interested in the oil resources. The powefull, well equipped 6th Army was assigned the task. Initially they achieved startling successes. The shatered elements of the Red Army fell back accross the Don and were persued by the 6th Army. German inteligence, however, failed to appreciate the ability of the Russians to form and arm replcement armies. Hitler refused to even listen to estimates of Soviet strength. Hitler here made a deadly error. He dividing his forces, weakening 6th Army in an effort to seize the oil rich Caucusses. The Red Army withdrew accross the Volga when the 6th Army reached Stalingrad, but mainatined forces needed in the city to steadily bleed the Germans. By fighting in the city, the 6th Army's powerful mobil striking potential was negated by determined Red Army soldiers. The Soviet counter-offensive surrounding the 6th Army in Stalingd came as a complete suprise to
the Germans. The result when Hitler refused to let the 6th Army break out was the complete loss of the Army, the most powerfull unit in the German order of battle (December 1942-January 1943). A HBC reader as a GI in Germany after the War met a youth named Hans who as a Hitler Youth boy flew a combat mission in
the Luftwaffe Komet rocket plane. His brother was killed flying supplies into Stalingrad where the 650,000 men of the 6th Army were trapped. Not many of those Germans trapped came back to Germany after the war nor did many of the Soviets captured by the Germans return home.
Most historical accounts of the air war available in the West seal with the Luftwaffe campaigns in the West and the subsequent Allied strtegic bombing campaign. The air war on the Eastern Front is much less studied. This is somewhat surprising as Germany and the Soviet Union when the War began had the two mist powerful air forces. The Luftwaffe essentially destroyed the Red Air Force during the first few days of Barbarossa. As a result the Red Air Force was not a factor during Barbarossa. The Red Army during the Barbarossa had to fight with virtually no air cover. This graduaally changed and by 1943 the Red Air Force was again an important factor in the War. Several factors were involved here. The Soviets did have a substantial aeronautics industry and the Soviet war plants that had been moved east by 1943 had reached full production. America through Lend Lease was delivering planes to the Soviets. The Allied strategic bombing campaign forced not only forced the Luftwaffe to withdraw assetts from the Eastern Front to defend German cities. In addition the bombing disrupted German production as well as casused substantial lossess in German fighters. Many accounts of the air war do not give sufficent attention to the impact on the Luftwaffe of engaging the Allied bombers even before long-range fighter cover became available.
The defeat in North Africa was punishing, but it was on the Eastern Front against the Soviets that the great bulk of the Wehrmacht was deployed. The Germans after Stalingrad fell back, but began amassing their forces for a third summer offensive of the Russian campaign. The offensive this time was even more limited than in 1942. The target was a buldge in the Soviet line, the Kursk salient. The fighting on the huge Eastern Front involved vast armies in some of the most savage fighting ever recorded and Kursk may well have been the most vicious fighting of the War. The latgest tank battle in history occurred during 1943 at Kursk where the Germans suffered losses from which they never recovered. It was their vast important offensive on the Eastern Front. Without the Soviet defeat of the Wehrmacht, the Western Allies would have been hard pressed to contain the Germans or cross the Channel. A victorious Russian ally, however, meant that peace following the War would be far from ideal and leave the peoples of Eastern Europe locked into a new totalitarian dictatorship for a half a century.
Opperation Bagration was the largest German defeat in World War II, but is vurtually unknown in the Wesr. The attention of the Western Allies was on Normany in June 1944. Unlike the Axis, the Allies attempted to coordinate their strategy. Thus the Soviets launched their major 1944 effort in coordination with the D-Day landings to prevent the Wehrmach from transferring forces west to smash the Normandy bridgehead. Operation Bagration was timed to begin on the same day the NAZIs invaded the Soviet Union (June 22) 3 years earlier. The NAZIs had launced offensives in Spring or early Summer 1941, 42, and 43). The Wehrmacht no longer was capable of a major offensive in the East. It was the Red Army's turn in 1944. The target was the Wehrmcht's Army Group Central, the most powerful existing German formastion. Army Group Center was deployed defensively in Byelorussia. Bagration in many ways was a replay of Barbarossa, only in reverse. The Red Army in a massive 5 weeks campaigm suuceeded in moving the front line west to Warsaw, liberating Byelorussia and much of eastern Poland. Army Group Center was shatered. The Red Army completely destroyed 17 Wehrmacht divisions and heavily damaged the combat effectivness of more than 50 other German divisions--essentially half of the German force. The Soviets killed or took about 0.4 million German prisoners. Army Group Central was shattered as a military force. It was the single greatest defeat suffered by the Wehrmacht in the War--worse them the disaster at Stalingrad. The Wehrmact sffered greater casualties than at Stalingrad. [Zaloga] Bagration not only smashed Army Group Central, but drove the Germans back into western Poland.
The Red Army reached Romanian teritory (August 1944). It was at this time that a Madame Kolontay, Stlin's agent in Stockholm, presented a draft armistice agreement to the Romanians. Given the military situation, it seemed a generous offer. The Soviets demanded that the German armies leave Romania within 15 days. The Soviets pledged to only pass through north territory as they pushed west toward Hungary and Germany. They pledged not to take Bucarest and the south of the country. Antonescu prepared to defend Romania. He deployed nine elite divisions on the Focsani-Namoloasa-Galati line. He believed that they could hold the Soviets until the Armistice could be signed. Romanian diplomats sent the Soviet proposal August 22). Anti-Fascist elements in Romania were plotting with King Michael to remove Antonescu and end the War. King Michael arrested Antonescu and immediately declared a ceasefire. The Red Army ignored the King's cease fire and persued yheir offensive. The Soviets quickly broke the Romanian defensive line. Most Romanian soldiers refused to fight. The Soviets took more than 0.6 million prisoners. The NAZIs refused to recognize the new Romanian Government. They attacked Bucarest hoping to put down the new Government. German military resources by this time gad been badly degraded. And even Hitler decided against committing the few military resources available in Romania at a time that the Red Army was driving through Poland toward the Reich. The Romanian Army which refused to fight the Russians, did engage the Germans and held the capital until the Red Army reached it. The Romanians surrendered unconditionlly (September 12, 1944).
After Operation Bagration (June-July 1944), Warsaw on the Vistula was the principle barrier standing between thev Red Army and Berlin. The Poles did not greet the Red Army in the same way that populations in the West cheered the Americans and British. They had no illusions about what would follow in the wake of the Red Army, a Stalinist dictatorship. The Home Army (loyal to thev London goverment-in-exile) decided on a desperate gambit at the Red army apprpached the Vistula. They would stage an insurrection and free Warsaw. The Home Army rebelled (August 1) anticipating the support of the Red army. Instead Stalin ordered the Soviet troopds to stop on the far side if the Vidtula. The German reaction was vicious. On one day alone the SS rounded up and shot 25,000 Polish men women and children. The Americans offered to drop supplies, but Stalin refused permission for the flights to use needed Soviet air bases to refuel for the return trip. Thev Poles fought valiantly on, finally capitulating (October 2). The Germans at Hitler's orders virtualy razed the city. The Soviets finally took Warsaw with little resistance from the Germans (January 1945). [Davies]
The battle for Berlin fought in April 1945 was one of the most horific engagements of World War II. Stalin ordered the Red Army to take Berlin. After the Americans seized the Remagen Bridge and crossed the Rhine, Stalin ordered the time tble speeded up and at the same time lied to Eisenhowser that he was
preparing to take the German capital. Losses on both the German and Russian side were enormous. Russian losses were in part due to the fact that Stalin had
ordered that Berlin be seized bfore the Americans could reach it. Stalin's ordered resulted in a race to Berlin by Marshal Zukov and Koniev, both wanting the victor' laurels. It has always been wonderd why Stalin was so obsessed with Berlin and was willining to sacrifice so many Red Army soldiers to get to Berlin before the Americans. It has always been felt that it was primarily for the political value, to demonstrate the role of the Red Army in defeating the NAZIs. A British histoian argues that there was another important reason. Beria had learned of the American Manhattan Project to build an atomic bomb. Stalin as a rsult ordered a top secret Soviet atomic bomb project--Project Boradino. Located at Berlin was the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, the center of the German atomic project. While the Germans were fa behind the Americans, the Russins obrained agreat deal of valuable information an 3 tons of uranium oxide. [Beavers] The Soviet conquest of Berlin proved to be a nightmare for the surviving women, almost all of whom were raped. It is estimated that 2 million German women were raped by Russians at the end of the War. Perhaps 0.2 million of those rapes took place in Berlin. The rapes included children, nuns, old ladies, and even Russian women brought to Germany to work as slave laborers. The Soviets denied the German civilian reports, but Soviet archieves leave no doubt as to what occurred. [Beavers]
The Germans already reeling from Soviet offenses collapsed less than a year after D-Day in May 1945. General Karl Weidling, the commander leading the defense of Berlin, finally surrendered (May 2). The new Führer attempted to move as much of the Wehrmacht west and to surrender to the Western Allies. Eisenhower made in clear that the surrender would have to be to both the Western Allies and the Soviets. Kietel signed the final act of Capitulation (May 8). Eisenhower refused to meet with the German officers. Only after they had signed the surrender documents did he appear to ask them if they fully understood the document. He refused to shake hands. As the Allied armies moved through Poland and Germany, the horrendous crimes of the NAZI party were revealed to an incredulous world.
Beavers
Boyd, Carl. Hitler's Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and Magic Intelligence (University of Kansas: Lawrence, 1993), 271p.
Braithwaite, Rodric. Moscow 1941: A City and Its People at War (Knopf, 2006), 398p. Braithwaite was a British ambassador to the Soviet Union.
Davies, Norman. Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw (Viking, 2004). Davies is critical of The allies, President Roosevelt in particular for allowing Stalin to swollow up Poland. Like other authors making similar charges, Davies does not explain just what could have been done to have prevented it.
Domarus, Max. Hitler Reden und Proklamationen 1932-45 Vo. 1-2 (Neustadt a.d. Aisch: Velagsdruckerei Schmidt, 1962-63).
Karpov, Vladimir. Generalissimo (2002).
McJimsey, George. Harry Hopkins: Ally of the Poor and Defender of Democrracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 474p.
Mastny, V. "Soviet war aims at the Moscow and Teheran conferences," Journal of Modern History (1975).
Zaloga, Steven J. Bagration 1944: The Destruction of Army Group Center (Praeger Illustrated Military History: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 96p.
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