Figure 1.--.

The major German operation orders for World War II came from the Führer, often issued through OKW. Most of the important ones were titled Führer Directives. There were also Führer Orders and other various titled orders and directives late in the War. We do not know and this time why these sifferent orders had various titles. In part some were ot aomed at the military, but the Party, security forces, and government agencies. These various orders are useful in following Hitler's major decesions and conduct of the War.

1939

1940

Führer Directive 16--Operation Sea Lion (July 16)

After the victory in Feance, Hitler issued Führer Directive 16 (July 16). It was "Preparations for a landing operation against England". The primary tasks were assigned the Luftwaffe

Führer Directive 17--Battle of Britain (August 1)

After the fall of France, Hitler persued initiatives aimed at gaining British acquiesence in his Continental gains. Hitler's focus was on Europe. He had wahat he wanted in the West. Now he wanted to focus on his primary onjective--the East. He was willing to allow the British to hold on to their oceanic Empire. In fact he thought it would be useful to have the Btitish continued to control the colored races he so despised. At the same time he was offering Stalin India. (Hitler was very good at offering allies other people's territories.) He had no desire to humiliate Britain. Here a major factor was race. He considered the British as a people with Teutonic blood. Of course the British had experiences with Hitler's guarantees and it was obvious that Britain could never be independent once Hitler had conquered Europe. Frustrated with Churchill's continued unwillingness to accomodate him, Hitler prepared to bend Britain to his will. Führer Directive August 1 ordered the Luftwaffe to "overpower the English air force with all the forces at its command in the shirtest possible time."

Führer Directive 18--Felix (November 12)

Hitler cancelled the postponed Operation Sea Lion (October 12). The question then became how to defeat the British if invasion was not possible. He met with Mussolini at the Brenner Pass (October 4). The two discussed how to best defeat the British. The outcome was a plan to withdraw the map of the Mediterrean. Italy would get Tunisia, Corsica, and Nice. (Corsica and Nice had been Italian in the 19th century.) Spain would get French North Africa. France would be compensated with British West Africa. (Hitler was very good at achieving his goals by offering up other people's territory.) Mussolini had the previous month invaded Egypt from Libya and this effort to seize Suez backed by the powerful Italian fleet still had prospects for success. Admiral Raeder stronly recommened an offensive to seize Gibrralter which would have made Royal Navy operations in the Mediterranean untenable. Hitler traveled to the French-Spanish border on his official train Amerika and met with Franco at Hendaye (October 23). He wanted to draw Spain into the War. What transpired was one of the most celebrated meetings of the War. Hitler who had in large measure enabled Franco to prevail in the Spanish Civil War, expected a grateful Franco to willingly aggree to cooperate in the NAZI war effort. Instead he found a not particularly grateful Franco who had signbificant doubts about going to war with the British. Franco had been warned by of all people Admiral Canaris (commander of the Abwehr) that Hitler was focused on the Soviet Union and that German military operaions against Spasin were unlikely. Backed up by Foreign Minister Serrano Suñer, Franco stonwalled Hitler. The Fühere was furious. He told intimates that he would have rather had four teeth pulled. Hitler and Franco would never mneet again. Despite the rebuff, Hitler still believed that Franco could be persuaded. He ordered OKW to prepare plans to seize Gibraltar--Opperation Felix

Führer Directive 19--Attila (December 10)

After the aborted meeting with Franco, Hitler traveled on to meet with Marshal Pétain (October 24). Hitler admired Pétain's military reputation and bearing. The meeting went better. Pétain did not dismiss Hitler's proposals out of hand. He was, however, uncommital. Despite the British attack ion the French Fleet at Oran, Pétain was not going to go to war with Britain. He was willing to cooperate in Hitler's New Order, but short of war. I am not sxure to what extent North Africa was discussed. Hitler ordered OKW to draw up plans to seize the uuoccupied zone if France proved recalitrant. The result was Operation Attila. And it would be executec by the Germans after the Vichy forces in North Africa failed to adequately resist the Torch landings (November 1942). One of the primary objectives was the French fleet.

Führer Directive 20--Marita (December 13)

After meeting with Franco and Pétain, Hitler still on his train Amerika traveled on to meet with Mussolini. Before arriving he learned that Italy had invaded Greece from its new Albanian bases. As was the case of the German invasions (1939 and 40) as well as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (1941), there was no coordination anong Axis partners. Upon meeting Hitler at the train station and giving a Fascist salute, he exclaimed, "Führer we are on the march." Mussolini felt left behind by the stunning German successes. He justified the invasion as premting British intervention. In reality he wanted some of the military glory that Hitler had acquired. Thinvasion was a military and diplomatic disaster, Not only did the Greeks repulse the Itlians, but it rined Hitler's diplomatic offensive to peacefully bring the Balkans into the Axis fold. This did not help with his efforts to lull Stalin into thinking that cooperation was possible with the NAZIs. And the immediate impact was have just the opposite affect as intended, it forced the Greeks closer to the British. The British responded by occupying Crete abnd Lemnos (Agean island) and transerring RAF units to southern Greece. This not only brought southern Italy within range of the RAF, but also the vital Ploesti oil fields. Thus Hitler ordered OKW to prepare plans to invasde Greece--Operation Marita.

Führer Directive 21--Barbarossa (December 18)

Führer Directive 21 or Operation Barbarossa was perhaps the central decesion of World War II. The War was lost and won on the plains of the Soviet Union. Historians generally assess this as Hitler's key mistake. Certainly he failure of Barbarossa was why Germany lost the War. But the failure of Barbarossa was not preordained. The failure lies more in Hitler's refusal to allow his generals to conduct the campaign and his decesion to wage a rascist war of anilation which turn potential allies, anti-Bolshevick elements against the Germans. There were many Soviet citizens, especially the Ukranians, but also Russians who were willing to fight with the Germans against the Bolshevicks and Stalin. By turning the War into a genocidal campaign, Hitler left the anti-Soviets Slavs little choice, but to fight with Stalin. The strength of the anti-Bolshevick sentiment was such that even with NAZI barbarity, some Russians and Ukranians decided to fight with the Germans.

1941

Führer Directive 32 (July 11, 1941)

Preparations for the period after Barbarossa. The Germans will still optimistic at this stage of the campaigm.

Supplement to Führer Directive 32 (July 14, 1941)

Führer Directive33 (July 19, 1941)

Continuation of the War in the East.

Supplement to Führer Directive (July 23, 1941)

Führer Directive 34 (July 30, 1941)

Supplement to Führer Directive 34 (August12, 1941)

Führer Directive 35--Moscow Offensive (September 6, 1941)

Barbarossa had been complicated by Hitler's interference, facilating between objectives and moving units between the the Army Groups. There had from the beginning been some ambiguity in tghe olans for Barbarossa, rising from the fact that OKH and OKW had both developed plans for the offensive. Hitler's incessant tinkering only added additional ambiguity. Finally with Führer Directive 35 he instructed Army Group Center to drive on Moscow. There is a discussion of the overall Eastern Front, but the focus here is on final victory to be achieved by the drive on Moscow. The objective was not only to seize Moscow, but to destroy the Red Army units that would oppose the drive. This was the heart of the Red army that had survived Barbarossa. It was assumed that they would stand and fight rather than let Moscow fall and this thus provided the opportunity to essentuially destroy theRed army and end the War. Field Marshall Von Bock's rmy Group Center was to be strengthened for this purpose. The 2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies were to be reinforced with the 4th Panzer Army which had be fighting with Army Groyp North on the Lenningrad Front. The drive on Moscow was to be the final stoke ending the war in the East.

Führer Directive 39--Abandoning the Offensive (December 8, 1941)

Führer Directive 39 meerly recognized what Armny Group Center had already done, shifted to thec defensive, first because of the weather and then because of the Red Army offensive before Moscow. The Führer blamed in on the weather that had come early. Some commanders wanted to withdraw the men back to Poland, abandoning their heavy weapons. Hitler calculated that without their weapons the Wehrmacht would be unable to fight in Poland. Army Group Center was esentially ordered to stand and fight in Russia at lines that could be estanlished. There they would wait until the weather changed and the offensive could be resumed.

1942

Directive No. 41 (April 5, 1942) - Instructions for the German summer offensive on the Eastern Front leading up to the Battle of Stalingrad

Directive No. 43 Continuation of Operations from the Crimea (July 11, 1942)

Directive No. 44 Operations in Northern Finland (July 21, 1942)

Directive No. 45 Continuation of Operation Brunswick (July 23, 1942)

Directive No. 46 Instructions for Intensified Action Against Banditry in the East (August 18, 1942)

1943

Directive No. 50 Concerning the preparations for the withdrawal of 20th Mountain Army to Northern Finland and Northern Norway (September 28, 1943)

Directive No. 51 (November 3, 1943) - Preparations for a two-front war

1944

Führer Order No. 11 Commandants of Fortified Areas and Battle Commandants (March 8, 1944)

Operation Order No. 7 Directive for further operations by Army Group A, Army Group South, and Army Group Center (April 2, 1944)

Order of Chief of OKW concerning preparations for the defence of the Reich (July 19, 1944)

Reorganisation of command authority in the area of Army Group North (July 23, 1944)

Decree of the Führer on the exercise of command in an area of operations within the Reich (dated July 13, 1944 and issued on July 24, 1944)

Decree of the Führer on cooperation between Party and the Wehrmacht in an area of operations within the Reich (dated July 13, 1944 and issued on July 24, 1944)

Circular Letter by Dr. Lammers regarding the second decree on the powers of command in an area of operations within the Reich (September 22, 1944)

Second decree of the Führer on cooperation between the Party and Wehrmacht in an area of operations with the Reich (dated September 19, 1944 and issued on September 22, 1944)

Second decree of the Führer on powers of command in an area of operations within the Reich (dated September 20, 1944 and issued on September 22, 1944)

Führer Order on the exercise of command in units which are left to their own resources (dated November 25, 1944 and issued November 28, 1944)

1945

The Führer on command and control of the Wehrmacht (January 21, 1945)

Employment of the Volkssturm (January 28, 1945)

Transport of refugees from the East to Denmark (February 5, 1945)

Demolitions on Reich territory (March 20, 1945)

Führer's Order on the organization of command in the separated areas of Northern and Southern Germany (April 15, 1945)

Order of the Day (April 15, 1945) - To the Soldiers on the Eastern Front