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The Wehrmacht was in the mind of many military historians the finest military force in modern history. It was also a vast criminal enterprise. Since the end of World War II there has been an effort to paint the Wehrmacht a a professional, not political force that was the victim of Hitler and the NAZIs. Nothing could be further from the truth. The German Army (tHe Reichwehr) became highly politicized following World War I. Conspiracy theiries florished in the minds of officers and men who could not bring themselves to accept defeat. The leadership of the Reichwehr was never committed to German democracy and the Weimar Re;public. It should be rememvered that its was President Hindenberg, a Prussian Junker to the core, who brought Hitler to power. The Reichwehr, faced with the threat of the NAZI SA, agreed to swear a personal oath of loyalty to Adolf Hitler. The Wehrmacht cooperated closely with the NAZIs to rearm Germany far beyonf that needed for defensive puroses. It is true that there was resistance with the Wehrmacht to Hitler's early aggressions, especially the seizure of the Sudetenland, but this was more out of fear that it would bring a disatrous war than the objection to the goal of seizing the German populated area. Hitler turned the Wehrmacht into his instrument of aggression, the invasion of neighboring countries and the seizure of their resources to support the German war mmachine. It was also the occupying military force establish the German conmtrol needed to conduct the Holacaust, a process that was to be continued with the Slavs in the East. It is true that the Holcaust itself was conducted by the SS and there were Wehrmacht officers who were horrified at NAZI atrocities. It is also true that the Wehrmacht was deeply implicated in the Holocaust itself. And as the NAZI regime grew in strength, so did support for the NAZIs grow within the Wehrmacht. Only the impending defeat of Germany brought about an attempted, but failed coup (July 1944). The bulk of the Wehrmacht remained loyal to Hitler. The Wehrmacht's early success came because the German economy was converted to the production of a new generation of modern weapons effectively used in the concept of Blitzkrieg adopted by the Wehrmacht. The NAZI Party and Hitler Youth also effectively prepared young Germans for war. The Wehrmacht high-command did not resist the NAZIfication process. Many commanders subscribed to the stabbed-in-the-back" conspiracy theories. They saw NAZI indocrination as stiffening the backbone of the German soldier. The Wehrmacht's basic military concept was designed to use its superior equipment, supported by the Luftwaffe, and tactical doctrine to defeat opponents before they could adequately prepare. The NAZIs unfortunately for the Wehrmacht took the victories for a confirmation of the racial superority of the German people. Failure in the skies over Britain (1940) and before Moscow (1941) meant that two dangeous opponents were not defeated in quick lighting strokes. When Hitler inexplicably added America to German enemies, the fate of the Wehrmacht was sealed. Germany faced enemies who used the tactical doctrines Germany developed and backed them with far greater human and material resources.
The Wehrmacht was in the mind of many military historians the finest military force in modern history. It was also a vast criminal enterprise. Since the end of World War II there has been an effort to paint the Wehrmacht a a professional, not political force that was the victim of Hitler and the NAZIs. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Germany as the Western Front buckled under the weight of the anglo-American offensive, was forced to ask for an accept an Armistace (November 11, 1918). The resulting Treaty of Versailles (1919) placed severe restrictions on Germany's armed forces. The Treaty limited the Army to 100,000 men and the navy to 15,000 men. The German fleet was to be limited to six battleships, six cruisers, and twelve destroyers. Germany was prohibited from a general conscription program. The Army was prohibited from having tanks or heavy artillery. Germany was prohibited from having an air force.
The new German Republic created the Reichswehr after World War I (March 23, 1921). The officer corp of the Army became highly politicized ater the War. Conspiracy theories florished in the minds of officers and men who could not bring themselves to accept defeat, especially the idea that the German Army could have been defeated. Blaming the politicans was much more acceotable to the army officers. The leadership maintained official political neutrality. There were a range of political views held by the officer corps. By all accounts the strongest element was monarchists, understandabe because they had all grown up in the old German Empire. There were also many officers sympathetic to right wing parties, of which the NAZIs were just one. The leadership of the Reichwehr was never committed to German democracy and the Weimar Republic. The Reichwehr was not, however, prepared to change the Goverment. A major factor here was that they feared Allied intervention if they moved against the Republic. It should be remembered that it was President Hindenberg, a Prussian Junker to the core, who brought Hitler to power--albeit with some reluctance.
German rearmament is generally conceived as a program initiated by the NAZIs after Hitler seized power (1933). Many Germans and not just NAZIs viewed the Versailles Treaty as unfair and affornt to national honor. The Germany military even in Weimar Republic was violating the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty. The Reichwehr almost from the onset attempt to circumvent the restrictive provisions of the Versailles Treaty. There were a range of programs devrloped by the German Army to expand the military beyond the limits agreed to under the Versailles Agreement. German companies set up operations in other countries like the Netherlands where airplanes were built. German companies wirked on submarines in Japan. The Army conducted many of the programs in secret. It is unclear to what extent the German Government was informed.
Hitler hoped to seize power by winning the presidential election (1932). Although Hindenburg won the election, his advisors convinced him that the best way to address growing political disorder was to appoint Hitler chancelloe. He did so (January 1933).
The true nature of Hitler and his associates was demonstrated on the Night of the Long Knives (a phrase from a popular Nazi song). The Reichwehr in 1934 was the only German institution capable of resiting Hitler and the NAZIs. The Reichwehr, faced with the threat of the NAZI Sturm Abteilung (SA), agreed to a deal with Hitler. Hitler agreed to disarm the SA and to deal with the SA leadership. He had Rohem and his associates arrested and killed (June 29-30, 1934). Rohem was in fact one of Htler's longest and closest associates. Hitler hestitated but Herman Goering and Heinrich Himmler with his assistant Reynard Heydrich played key roles in convincing him. There was no concern within the military of the extra-judicial executions of the SA leadership. The NAZIs used the occassions to settle some old scores with anti-NAZIs as well. In exchange the Reichwehr, waiting until President Hindenburg died, swore a personal oath of loyalty to Adolf Hitler (August 2). The oath was not to the German nation, but was a personal oath to Hitler himself. Although the German military had earlier swore a similar oath to the Republic, the oath to Hitler took place with no difficulty. Major elements of the military had never been committed to the Republic. There was strong monarchist sentiment within the military. Some NAZI policies, especially the ultra-nationlism and criticism of the Versailles Treaty were shared by much of the military. Offers of rearmament and expabded military spending appealed to many in the military. When President Hindenburg died (August 2), Hitler was the absolute dictator of Germany. Hitler had visited Hindenburg on his deathbed. Hindenburg had become senile. The dieing president thought he was meeting with Kaiser Wilhelm II, and referred to Hitler as "Your Majesty". Hitler declared the office of President to be permanently vacant and essentially merging it with the office of Chancellor, tking the title of Leader and Chancellor (Führer und Reichskanzler). Hitler ordered a plebiscite which took plce on August 11, 1934. The NAZI's announced a 90 percent favorable vote. Noone knows the actul vote tally.
The Wehrmacht cooperated closely with the NAZIs to rearm Germany far beyond that needed for defensive puroses. As the NAZIs strengthened their hold on Germany, they began to openly defy the Versailles Treaty restrictions. The NAZIs reintroduced conscription (March 16, 1935). Officially the NAZIs announced that the core professional standing army would remain at 100,000 men with another 100,000 receiving military training each year.
The 1935 conscription law first used the name Wehrmacht. Thus some historians date this as the date ofcreation for the Wehrmacht. NAZI control over the Wehrmacht can be dated from this point or the earlier loyalty oath (1934). There was still a core element in the high command that was not under NAZI control. Gradually the leadership came more an more under NAZI control. The insignia of the Wehrmacht was changed to a stylised version of the Iron Cross known as the Balkenkreuz. This had earlier been used on tanks and planes during World war I.
It is true that there was resistance with the Wehrmacht to Hitler's early aggressions, especially the seizure of the Sudetenland, but this was more out of fear that it would bring a disatrous war than the objection to the goal of seizing the German populated area.
Hitler turned the Wehrmacht into his instrument of aggression, the invasion of neighboring countries and the seizure of their resources to support the German war mmachine.
The Wehrmacht's early success came because the German economy was converted to the production of a new generation of modern weapons effectively used in the concept of Blitzkrieg adopted by the Wehrmacht. The Wehrmacht's basic military concept was designed to use its superior equipment, supported by the Luftwaffe, and tactical doctrine to defeat opponents before they could adequately prepare. Blitzkrieg provedenormously sccessful on he battlefield and enabled the Wehrmacht to dominate most of Europe. It was not suffcent, however, to over come the stratehic blunders of the NAZI leadership.
The Wehrmact largely invented modern warfare. Blitzkrieg tactics proved highly effective, especially small countries or in the case of France, unprepasred countries which could be quickly defeated. Britain, the Soviet Union, and America proved to be a very different matter. The NAZIs unfortunately for the Wehrmacht took the victories for a confirmation of the racial superority of the German people. Failure in the skies over Britain (1940) and before Moscow (1941) meant that two dangeous opponents were not defeated in quick lighting strokes. It took the British some time to learn the lessons of Blitzkrieg. The Russiand also took some time to erfect the Blitzkrieg tactics, in part because Stalin had killed a substantial part of the professional core of the Red Army. America learned faster. When Hitler inexplicably added America to German enemies, the fate of the Wehrmacht was sealed. Germany faced enemies who used thesame tactical doctrines Germany developed and backed them with far greater human and material resources.
The Wehrmact operated with some of the best equipment of any military force during the War. This was certainly the case when the War began. And this advantage was magnified by the superior German tactical doctrine. German Panzers outclassed the tanks of the Western Allies, although the Soviet T-34 shicked the Germans. The German 88s were probably the most effective artillery piece of the War, used both as a tank killer and anti-aircrat gun. German machine guns, especially the screaming minney, and assault riffles were extremely effective. Yet there were many weaknesses in German weaponry. The Wehrmacht procurement system was run poorly, squabsering resources in uneeded or competing weapon systems and constantly changing requirements. One of sthe strengths of the German weapon system was actually a najor weakeness. German weapons tended to be beautifully engineered, almost mechanical pieces of art. They also tended to be complicated. This meant that they were costly to mass produce and difficult to repair in the field. Hitler involved Germany in a war with opponents with vastly superior scientific and industrial resources. The Wehrmacht after failing to defeat the Red Army in Barbarossa would be hard pressed to compete with the weapons programs of the Allies. Inefficencies in the Wehrmacht's procurement system meant that Germany's limited industrial capacity was poorly used. And the Wehrmacht noted as first employing modern warfare was not a fully mechamized force when the War began, still relying upon horse power to move equipment and artillery. Germany used captured trucjs and other equipment in Barbarossa and used French-built tricks throughout the War. Germany made full use of the Skoda works in Czechoslovakia, but never fully mobilized the infustrial capacity of other occupied countries. The Allied air strategic air campaign, especially the assault on Germany's petroleum infrastructure, meant that by the end of the War, the Wehrmacht was no longer a mobile force.
The NAZI Party and Hitler Youth also effectively prepared young Germans for war.
The Wehrmacht high-command did not resist the NAZIfication process. Many commanders subscribed to the stabbed-in-the-back" conspiracy theories. They saw NAZI indocrination as stiffening the backbone of the German soldier.
The organization of the Wehrmacht and the German military in general is a very complicated topic. The Wehrmact was created by the NAZIs out of the Reichwehr of the Weimar Republic. The Wehrmacht was by far the largest of the German military formations, the other two were the Kreigsmarine and the Luftwaffe. When the NAZIs seized power there were two Party para-military organizations, the SA and SS. The Army viewd the large SA as a challenge to its institutional position as the principal armed group of the German state. And with good reason. SA commander Rhoem was a close associate of Hitler and dreamed of forming the new NAZI army around his SA. The Army after the NAZIs seized power was the only force capable of challenging Hitler's control of Germany. This impasse was settled by a bargain between Hitler and the Luftwaffe resulting in the Night of the Long Knives. Hitler used the SS to destroy the leadership of the SA and in return the officers and men of the Wehrmacht swore a personal oath of loya;ty to Adolf Hitler as Führer of the German Reich. Ironically after the War began, it was the SS that began to challenge the Wehrmacht insitutionally. The Waffen SS became increasingly important. The Wehrmacht itself had a variety of specialized units. Some of the best known were infantry, panzer (armoured), artillery, paratroop, police, ski, and other units. At the end of the War the NAZIs created the Volksstrum. Field organizations varied grearly over the course of the War. The three principal formations in the East were Army Groups North, Central, and South. The primary German formation in the west was Army Group B and especilly its 7th Army in France that had the primary respnsibility for stopping the Allied liberation of France. There were many smaller field formations. One of the most famous of these was the Afrika Korps in North Africa.
The Wehrmacht over the course of the War saw itself involved in the occupation of most of Western Europe. Security services played key roles in the occupation, but it was the Wehrmact with its large force was the primary occupation force. It was the Wehrmact that manned control points and could muster the force needed to deal with any substantial show of resistance. The primary purpose of the occupation was to extract resources from the occupied countries so as to support the German war effort. The second important goal of the occupation was to persue NAZI racist policies against the Jews, Slavs and other peoples. The policies supported by the Wehrmacht differed significantly in the East and West. Except for the Holocaust, the Wehrmcht was generally expected to behave correctly toward civilians in the West. The standards were very different in the East. This varied from country to country. The NAZIs had allies in the East (Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia). Finland was a cobeligerant, but the Wehrmacht was no heavily committed there. Other countries were occupied by conquest (Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, areas of the the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia). The peopl in some of these countries were favorably disposed toward the Germans, especially the Baltics and western Ukraine. Even in the Axis allies, the NAZI occupation policies extracted resources with little or no payment to the host country. In addition to formal occupation policies there were also numerous interactions between the soldiers and the people in the occupied countries. Most were fleeting. Others such as liasons between the soldiers and local women could be more involved. Again there were differences between East and West.
It was the Wehrmact which established NAZI control over conquered countries and then carried out the occupation. It was the German occupation in most countries which established the conditions needed to carry out the Holocaust. Some countries like Slovakia were eager participants even without formal occupation. The whole process of the Holcaust was to evntually be continued with the Slavs in the East. It is true that the Holcaust itself was conducted primarily by the SS and there were Wehrmacht officers who were horrified at NAZI atrocities. It is also true that the Wehrmacht itself was deeply implicated in the Holocaust. And as the NAZI regime grew in strength, so did support for the NAZIs grow within the Wehrmacht. There is no doubt that what the NAZIs were perpetrating was wll known within the command structure of the Wehrmacht. Writing after the War can be self serving. We have ample evidence of what German generals actually knew and felt because the British taped the private conversations of Wehrmacht generals taken prisoner. [Neitzel] The British were interested in specific issues, such as the status of nuclear research, but the transcripts is atreasure of information about what the German General Staff actualy felt. The Wehrmacht generals knew a great deal about the Holicaust, including actions like Babi Yar. They had an accurate estimate of the number of Jews killed. Some were apauled. Others felt that that they had not been brutal enough.
The German Army in both World War I and World War II was the most disciplined army involved in both conflicts. In both cases it was fough by an officer corps trained by the institution of Imperial Germany which were essentially continued during the Weimar Republic, both overtly and covertly. Hitler began effort to NAZIify the officer corps and by the end of the War had made considerable progress. There was one huge difference in the two wars and that was death sentences hannded down to soldiers. The Imperial German Army issued 48 death sentences for desetion or other similar infractions. The Wehrmacht in contrast sentenced 32,000 of its men to death and carried out 22,000 of those sentences. [Messerschmidt] These were virtually all military crimes like desertion rather than assaults on civilians. A substantial part of the total were executed in the last year of the War. We are not yet sure about this major difference in the two World Wars. Surely 9 million casualties on the Eastern Front must have been a factor. And the NAZIfication of the officer corps was another factor. The number of death sentences issued by the Wehrmact was unlike any other Western army involved in the War. The Americans executed one soldier for repeated instances of desertion. There were other executions, but for crimes like rape of civilians. The British executed four men. I am not sure about the French, but this is complicated by the surrender to the Germand (June 1940) and the conflict between Vichy and the Free French. The situation with the Soviet Red Army was different. The Red Army routinely shot shirkers and deserters or sentenced them to punishment units which were used in suisidal attacks and thus amounted to a death sentence. We have seen estimates that the Red Army executed 0.2 million men. We are not yet sure how creditable this estimate is, but the number would be very substantial. .
Hitler cotrrectly judged that after his appointment as Chancellor, that the Reichwehr was the only force in Germany that could prevent him from seizing tital power. The Whermacht was also in 1944 the only force capable of taking control of Germany from the NAZIs. Wehrmacht officers had perpetrated terrible attrocities. Some were apauled with what the SS abd other security forces were doing. Others were bothered about the Wehrmacht's conduct. Only the impending defeat of Germany, however, brought about an attempted (July 1944). An idealistic young Catholic aristocrat, Colonel Claus von Staufenberg, placed a bomb in the Wolf's Lair. After Hitler was dead, the Hpme Army would seize cintrol of Berlin and then Germany. The idea was to then negotiate a separate peace with the Western Allies. That by 1944 was unrealistic. In the end, the failure to kill Hitler and the extensive NAZi penetration of the Wehrmact led to the coup's failure. The bulk of the Wehrmacht remained loyal to Hitler and the NAZIs. The real loser was the German people. The great bulk of German civilian casualties took place after the failed coup. To form the Honor Court trying the conspirators, Hitler appointed Field Narshal Gerd Von Rundstedt--a Prussian aristocrat who despised Hitler personally.
The Wehrmacht was badly battered in the East, first before Moscow (Winter 1941-42) and then at Stalingrad (1942-43). The lst major offensive in the East was at Kursk (July 1943). In this huge battle, the Soviets essemtiall destroyed the Wehrmacht's armored formations. The Wehrmact still controlled large areas in the East which could have been defended using geographic barriers like rivers and mountains. Here Hitler's insistance on hollding ground resulted in the Wehrmacht's failure to make use of the geographic barriers, as Keslering did so effectively in Italy. And American Lend Lease began reaching the Sovits in quanity during 1943. This included large numbers of trunks. These tricks gave the Red Army a mobility that they never had before and the Germans did not have. The Wehrmact at the beginning of 1944 was a battered, but still formidable military force. The Soviers in a series of five massibe offensives essentialy destroyed the Wehrmacht in the East. This was complimented on a smllr scale in the West after the Allied bread out from Nrmandy. The last Wehrmacht reserves were expended in the Battle of the Buldge (December 1944). There were regular Wehrmacht formations within the Reich, such as Model's Army Group B in the Ruhr. But without air cover and fuel, they were immobile. And even among the officer corps, the will to resist had been broken.
Rather than defy the Föhrer, Field Marshal Model dissolved his Army Group and shot himself. The primary interest of the Wehrmacht in the closing phase of the War was to move as many men as possible west so they could surrender to the Western Allies rather than the Soviets.
The NAZIs as the Soviet and Allies approached the borders of the Reich, formed the Volksstrumn with boys nd old men. The age for the Volkssturm was officially 16 years, but we note much younger boys in Wehrmacht uniforms. We are not sure why that was, but we suspect Htler Youth and lacal NAZI leaders were responsible.
were hastily trained, ill-equipped and not terribly well led were the major recruits for the Volkssturm in the closing months of the year. The HJ boys, however, went into battle with a fervor even beyond that of the Waffen SS. Many accounts exist of battle hardeneded Wehrmacht and and SS troops who met these boy soldiers on the way to battle. Their advise was almost often "Its over. Go home!" The boys, however, armed with a few anti-tank weapons like Panzerfauts and perhaps a machinegun if one could be found, these Hitler Youth schoolboys went into battle. Often they performed amazingly well, even when given hopeless assignments. The Volkssturm played a major role in the defense of Berlin. In the West they were more willing to surrendr to the Allies.
Throughout the War the Germans arogantly considered their military prowess unmatched. It is true that the Wehrmacht was a highly professional militarty force. They developmened an implemented what amounts to the princioles of modern warfare. Their officers were well trained and highly competent and the motivation and morale of the ordinary soldier unexcelled. Here the Hitler Youth played a major role in preparing German Youth psycologically and ideologically for military service. They also had some of the fimest engineered weapons of the War. As the War continued, the Germans blamed their reverses on the fact that they were outnumbered both in manpower and industrial capacity. This is certainly a najor factor, but only partly true. NAZI arrogance caused the Wehrmacht to constantly underestimate the Soviets which was a major factor in the filure before Moscow and at Stalingrad. NAZI mismanagement did not fully utilize the potential of German industry until Speer took command of the economy and by then it was too late. After the War historians added Hitler's interference in military command and NAZI racist policies which made it impossible to cpitalize on anti-Soviet feeling in the Ukraine and other areas of the Soviet Union. But there were weakenesses in the Wehrmacht itself. Wehrmacht procurement demanded a very high grade of weapons enguneering. This produced some of the finest weapons of the War. It also meant weapons that were difficult to mass produce and often were hard to maintain in the field. Another major fault was military inteligence. German military intelligence constantly failed before the major battles of the War. While German professional soldiers looked derisively at the Red Army and the U.S. Army it was these forces that defeated the Wehrmacht not just with brute force, but with artful deception campaigns and superior military intelligence. D-Day and Bagration are but two examples of this. There are several more.
Feldgrau.com is a non political German military history research site. Our focus is on the German armed forces during the most tumultuous period of the 20th century, the time between 1918 and 1945. We've been online since February of 1996 and have had over one million visitors! Our main focus is on the operational histories of the units and organizations that made up the German army, navy, airforce and all associated auxiliary formations, both during the Weimar period and the NSDAP era. Feldgrau is a massive work in progress; our motto is "information kept secret is lost". There are many sections here that aren't yet complete but we strive to add new information all the time!
Messerschmidt, Manfred. "Das Bild der Wehemacht in Deutschland seit 1945," Revue d'Allemagne 30, no. 2 (April-June 1998), pp. 117-125.
Neitzel, Sönke. Ed. Tapping Hitler's Generals: Transcripts of Secret Conversations, 1942-45 (2008).
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